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ABSTRACT  
Since the creation of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 
2003, DHS has awarded over 28.7 billion dollars in grant funds to states, locals, 
territories and tribal entities to enhance prevention, protection, response, and 
recovery efforts. Yet, the homeland security community continues to struggle with 
measuring the impact these investments have made toward improving 
preparedness. The 2009 Federal Preparedness Report highlighted that the 
nation lacks risk-based performance metrics, accurate data, and analytical tools 
to measure how these investments have improved preparedness. This thesis 
outlines the challenges of measuring preparedness across the numerous federal 
funding streams, assesses the prevalence of these factors, and proposes five 
recommendations for improving the capacity to answer how prepared we are; 
how prepared we need to be; and how we close the gap between the two. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
Since the creation of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 
2003, DHS has awarded over 28.7 billion dollars in grant funds to states, locals, 
territories and tribal entities to enhance prevention, protection, response, and 
recovery efforts.1 Yet, the homeland security community continues to struggle 
with measuring the impact these investments have made toward improving 
preparedness. The 2009 Federal Preparedness Report highlighted that the 
nation lacks risk-based performance metrics, accurate data, and analytical tools 
to measure how these investments have improved preparedness.2 This thesis 
outlines the challenges of measuring preparedness across the numerous federal 
funding streams, assesses the prevalence of theses factors, and proposes five 
recommendations for improving the capacity to answer how prepared we are; 
how prepared we need to be; and how we close the gap between the two.3  
The Fiscal Year 2008 Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) 
guidance identified three overarching priorities, the first of which was the ability to 
measure the progress towards meeting the National Preparedness Guidelines 
(NPG).4 Performance evaluation is a requirement of federal financial assistance 
programs, but in the arena of homeland security, it has been challenging to 
quantify the impact that the grant funds have had in meeting strategic objectives, 
minimizing threats and vulnerabilities, and increasing capacity to respond and 
                                            
1 The Federal Preparedness Report, vi. 
2 Ibid., v.  
3 National Strategy for Homeland Security (2007), 43. 
4 Fiscal Year 2008 Homeland Security Grant Program: Guidance and Application Kit 
(Washington, D.C, United States Department of Homeland Security, February 2008), 3, 
www.fema.gov/pdf/government/grant/hsgp/fy08_hsgp_guide.pdf (accessed February 4, 2008). 
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recover should an event occur.5 While states and locals maintain detailed 
records of what has been purchased, there has been little evaluation of how the 
equipment, planning activities, training, and exercises has translated into 
improved capabilities and ultimately reduced risk.  
Methodology 
The research for this thesis was conducted using a hybrid approach 
including a national survey of homeland security professionals and a case study 
of the United Kingdom’s preparedness structure. The intent of these two 
methodologies was to identify universal challenges faced by federal, state, and 
local stakeholders, explore the prevalence of these difficulties, and provide 
recommendations for improving the capability to measure the impact of the 
HSGP. 
Analysis 
In a recent article, Josh Filler summarized the challenges facing states 
and locals,  
urban areas can, at best, provide only an itemized list of things it 
purchased, such as the type of first responder equipment or the 
number of people trained on a given topic. However, it can not 
explain those acquisitions and activities in the context of value-
added risk management and capability enhancements based on a 
comprehensive plan.6  
After careful analysis of the survey results and the corresponding 
comments, several themes emerged. Respondents recognized that reporting 
requirements are a necessary responsibility, but all are looking for more  
                                            
5 Electronic Code of Federal Regulations, “Title 44: Emergency Management Assistance, 
Part 13 Uniform Administrative Requirements for Grants and Cooperative Agreements to State 
and Local Governments, Subpart C-Post-Award Requirements Reports, Records Retention, and 
Enforcement, 13.40 Monitoring and Reporting Program Performance,” 
http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text/text-
idx?c=ecfr&sid=ca75ca22190756eb143a9a98bb4255fc&rgn=div8&view=text&node=44:1.0.1.1.14
.3.22.16&idno=44 (accessed January 27, 2009).  
6 Joshua D. Filler, “Not Just a Check from Uncle Sam,” Homeland Security Today, 
September 30, 2008, http://hstoday.us/content/view/5405/201/ (accessed October 16, 2008). 
 xvii
efficient and cost effective ways to complete these requirements. Respondents 
would like to see more streamlined processes that provide value for all 
stakeholders. Further, reducing the number of reporting requirements and 
eliminating duplicative reports could minimize the resource drain on states and 
locals and ultimately lead to improved accuracy in reporting. Numerous 
respondents noted that the short submission timelines has severely hampered 
the integrity of the final product. By minimizing the bureaucratic red tape and 
amount of time and effort required to complete the reporting requirements, states 
and locals may have more time to dedicate to strategic planning. This in itself 
may improve the efficacy of reporting and provide a greater opportunity for 
stakeholders to make wiser investment decisions. The majority of respondents 
felt that additional requirements are necessary for measuring preparedness, 
including a national capabilities assessment, performance management system, 
risk management program, and analytical capabilities.  
Rather than awarding federal grants to local municipalities, the United 
Kingdom has taken a different approach to initiating preparedness programs.  
The U.K. passed legislation requiring localities to adopt a risk management 
program that evaluates the threats, vulnerability, and underlying causes to gain a 
better understanding on how to prevent terror attacks, respond and manage 
when they do occur, and minimize the consequences post-event.7 Through this 
legislation, the U.K. has established Local and Regional Resiliency Forums 
(LRFs and RRFs), a risk assessment process, and performance oversight to 
ensure that the national, regional, and local levels of government are effectively 
managing risk. While the U.K. acknowledges that not all risks can be mitigated or 
prevented, they have taken a proactive approach toward managing risk. 
 
 
                                            
7 The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an Interdependent World, 
(London, United Kingdom: Cabinet Office, March 2008), 4.  
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Recommendations 
This thesis made five recommendations including:  
• Initiate a National Capabilities Assessment. A national capabilities 
assessment could assist state and locals with creating a realistic 
baseline of capabilities founded on analysis rather than perception. 
It could assist states and locals with defining current preparedness.  
• Initiate a National Risk Assessment. This activity would assist 
states and locals with developing an analytical methodology for 
evaluating threat, vulnerability and consequences that may impact 
their jurisdiction. It would assist states and locals with defining a 
desired level of preparedness based on the risk to their individual 
jurisdiction.  
• Institute an Integrated Technology Platform. To track progress and 
measure the impact grant programs are making toward the 
reduction of risk, an integrated technology platform should be 
instituted. Numerous reporting systems have been developed or 
are under construction that can collect a large amount of data. To 
convert this data into knowledge, though, it must be analyzed. 
These systems are not electronically connected, limiting the 
capacity to analyze the various reports.  
• Augment Connectivity of Federal Grant Reporting Systems. It may 
be implausible to develop a single integrated reporting system 
since there are numerous federal agencies that administer 
homeland security related grant programs. An alternative would be 
to augment the connectivity between reporting systems. This may 
assist with collecting a more comprehensive picture of 
preparedness. The ability to analyze expenditures across programs 
and jurisdictions could strengthen local, state and national 
preparedness activities and assist with directing future grant 
funding towards identified shortfalls in prevention, preparedness, 
response, and recovery efforts.  
• Augment Federal, State and Local Partnerships. The 
implementation of national assessments would take time to develop 
and roll-out. In the interim, the homeland security community could 
focus on relationship building. Following the example of the United 
Kingdom, states and locals could adopt the local/regional resiliency 
forum concept. Collectively, this group of public, private, and civilian 
organizations could leverage resources towards the reduction and 




The number of widgets that have purchased will not measure the success 
of the national preparedness movement, but rather, the strength of the 
relationships that have been developed in the process will. States and locals will 
be more apt to contribute resources if they are considered equal partners in the 
process. States and locals want to understand how the information collected will 
be analyzed, how it will be packaged for decision makers, and how the results 
may impact future funding. While this information is not secret, the lack of 
transparency creates the illusion that the analysis may negatively impact future 
grant opportunities. Overall, stakeholder buy-in is and will continue to be the 
critical component of measuring preparedness.  
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We as a Nation-Federal, State, and local governments; the private 
sector; as well as communities and individual citizens-have not 
developed a shared vision of or commitment to preparedness: what 
we must do to prevent (when possible), protect against, respond to, 
and recover from the next catastrophe. Without a shared vision that 
is acted upon by all levels of our Nation and encompasses the full 
range of our preparedness and response capabilities, we will not 
achieve a truly transformational national state of preparedness.8  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Homeland Security encompasses an expansive mission that exceeds the 
capabilities of any one jurisdiction, discipline and level of government. This role 
has forced jurisdictions to evaluate and reconcile how the additional 
responsibilities blend with traditional public safety duties, leaving many states 
and locals seeking national direction. The development of a national approach 
entails the integration and collaboration of multiple disciplines from the local, 
state, and federal levels of government, the private sector, and civilian 
population. The United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has 
worked to strengthen these partnerships and to develop a national preparedness 
framework for prevention, protection, response, and recovery from accidental, 
intentional, and natural disasters. To support the development of this system, the 
federal government created financial assistance programs, including the Urban 
Area Security Initiative (UASI), State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSP), 
and the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Programs (LETPP).9 The federal 
government also released national guidance including The National Strategy for 
Homeland Security, the National Preparedness Guidelines (NPG), and the 
                                            
8 The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned (Washington, D.C.: The 
White House, February 2006), 66, www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned.pdf 
(accessed August 18, 2008). 
9 Each grant program was congressionally appropriated as a unique budget item. Later, they 
were rolled under the Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP).  
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National Response Framework (NRF) to encourage the development of 
collaborative partnerships and enhancement of federal, state, and local 
preparedness capacity.  
Despite these efforts, grant funding has been and continues to be the 
primary means for DHS to influence state and local behavior.10,11 While these 
federal assistance programs have provided much needed equipment and 
technology for public safety agencies to respond in the post-911 environment, 
the intense focus on spending the funds quickly has had unintended 
consequences. First, the Homeland Security Grant Programs (HSGP)12 was 
initiated prior to the development of an infrastructure to implement the programs. 
This included the necessary staff at the federal, state and local levels to oversee 
and manage the programs, as well as the strategy and doctrine to guide program 
development. For most jurisdictions, homeland security has become an 
additional responsibility filled by existing personnel. Further, the distribution of 
grants from the federal government to states, who in turn sub-grant the majority 
of the funds to local jurisdictions, created additional strain on limited resources. 
The disbursement of funds in this manner shaped the information flow and 
created a separation between first responders and policy makers who were 
developing the strategic direction of the program.  
Each level of government has faced unique challenges. The federal 
government had to establish processes to dispense the funds to states, guidance 
to define the scope of the program, and procedures for monitoring the 
implementation of the HSGP. As the program evolved, the program also faced 
                                            
10 Guide to Opportunities for Improving Grant Accountability (Washington, D.C.: Domestic 
Working Group, Grant Accountability Project, October 2005), 1, 
www.nsf.gov/oig/Grant_Accountability_Guide_1005.pdf (accessed August 7, 2008).  
11 Todd Masse, Siobhan O’Neil, and John Rollins, The Department of Homeland Security’s 
Risk Assessment Methodology: Evolution, Issues and Options for Congress (Washington, D.C., 
Congressional Research Service, February 2, 2007), 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/80208.pdf (accessed December 30, 2008).  
12 The HSGP includes the State Homeland Security Grant Program, Urban Area Security 
Initiative, Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program, Metropolitan Medical Response 
System and Citizen Corps Program.  
 3
organizational restructuring. Prior to September 11, the Office for Domestic 
Preparedness (ODP) coordinated the Nunn-Lugar Domenici Program under the 
Office of Justice Programs (OJP). In 2002, ODP was moved under the Office of 
Homeland Security and was charged with administering the State Homeland 
Security Grant Program. In 2003, ODP became the Office of State and Local 
Government Coordination and Preparedness (SLGCP) under DHS and in 2005 
SLGCP was renamed Grants and Training (G&T). As of March 31, 2007 G&T 
was transferred to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and 
became the Office of Grant Programs.13 The organizational restructuring 
impacted the allocation of resources, personnel and relationships between the 
federal, state and local level of government. The shifting of personnel created a 
loss of institutional knowledge and a greater strain on state and local resources, 
as new personnel had to be educated about the state and local political 
environment and the status of the programs.  
States play the intermediary role in the distribution of funds, while at the 
same time maintaining authority over the implementation of programs within the 
state. The states have been charged with identifying the primary agency 
responsible for the administration of the grant programs (State Administrative 
Agency (SAA)). As the principle recipient of the HSGP, the states had to develop 
an equitable/risk-based distribution formula and dispense the grants to local 
jurisdictions. Since the HSGP was a new program, states had to develop 
administrative protocols, which entailed the monitoring of financial and 
programmatic performance of local jurisdictions.  
As the federal and state governments struggled to develop guidance, local 
jurisdictions had to maneuver through a highly political environment to determine 
how the funds should be invested. Sub-recipients toiled in political uncertainty, 
because a designated lead agency or jurisdiction with legal 
                                            
13 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform Act 
and other Organizational Changes,” 
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/gc_1169243598416.shtm (accessed August 16, 2008). 
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responsibility/authority for coordination of the critical disciplines, agencies, and 
jurisdictions does not exist within the geographic boundaries of a particular grant 
program. The identification of stakeholders, development of investment priorities 
and navigation through local legal/procurement processes added to the slow 
implementation of the program. The time-compressed environment though, 
forced many sub-recipients to spend the money quickly versus spending the 
funds towards strategic objectives. These conditions have made it extremely 
difficult for locals to move beyond the operational issues and focus on the 
strategic vision of the program. Even with the expanded 36 month performance 
period, initiated in the FY06 HSGP, it has been an arduous process to coordinate 
an agreed upon strategy, create budget, procure the necessary equipment, 
complete all planning, training, and administrative activities, receive and install all 
items, and complete the necessary paperwork to close out a single grant within 
the allotted time period.  
Compounding the complexity of this situation, are the numerous homeland 
security and emergency preparedness grant programs. At the state and local 
level, the facilitation of the numerous homeland security grant programs causes a 
great strain on the staffing resources of the SAA and the sub-recipients, making it 
extremely difficult to evaluate the collective impact. Since fiscal year 2001, more 
than 90 different homeland security related grant programs have been 
administered by ODP, SLGCP, G&T, and FEMA. Table 1 provides the 








Table 1.   FEMA Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness Grant 
Programs14,15,16 
 FY01FY02FY03FY04FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08FY09
State Domestic Preparedness Equipment Program X X        
Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP                
Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI)   X X X X X X X 
State Homeland Security Program (SHSP)   X X X X X X X 
Citizen Corps Program (CCP)  X X X X X X X X 
Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP)    X X X X    
Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) X X X X  X X X X X 
State Homeland Security Program-Tribal         X 
UASI Nonprofit Security Grant Program          X X X 
UASI Port Security Grant Program   X       
Emergency Management Performance Grant (EMPG)               
Emergency Management Performance Grant (EMPG) X X X X  X X X X X 
EMPG Supplemental (EMPGSUP)          X    
Infrastructure Protection Program (IPP)               
Transportation Security Program (TSP)    X         
Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP)   X   X X X X X 
TSGP-Supplemental (TSGPSUP)         X X  
TSGP-Ferry (TSGPF)         X X  
Inter-City Passenger Rail Security Grant Program (ICPRSGP)      X X X X X 
Inter-City Systems            X  
 FY01FY02FY03FY04FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08FY09
Inter-City Bus Grant Program (IBSGP)           X X 
Freight Rail Security Grant Program (FRSGP)           X X 
Port Security Grant Program (PSGP)           X X 
                                            
14 FY 2007 Homeland Security Grant Program: Supplemental Resource: Federal 
Preparedness Programs (Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Security, January 2007), 
1- 2, www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/fy07_hsgp_resource_federal_programs.pdf (accessed 
December 31, 2007). 
15 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “DHS Announces Release of Application 
Guidance for over $3 Billion in Grant Programs,” 
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1201882070387.shtm (accessed February 2, 2008). 
16 FY09 Overview: Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP), State Homeland Security 
Program-Tribal (SHSP-Tribal); UASI Nonprofit Security Grant Program (UASI NSGP), Operation 
Stonegarden (OPSG), Additional Infrastructure Security Programs, Emergency Management 
Performance Grants (EMPG), Interoperable Emergency Communications Grant Program 
(IECGP), Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Grant Program (RCPGP) (Washington, D.C.: 
United State Department of Homeland Security, November 5, 2008), 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/grant-program-overview-fy2009.pdf (accessed November 5, 
2008).  
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 FY01FY02FY03FY04FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08FY09
Trucking Security Grant Program           X X 
Buffer Zone Protection Program (BZPP)      X X X X X 
Operation Stone Garden Grant Program (OSGP)        X X X X 
Public Safety Interoperable Communications (PSIC)         X    
Interoperable Emergency Communications Grant         X 
Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Grant Program            X X 
Emergency Operation Center Grant        X X 
REAL ID            X X 
 
In addition to the homeland security related grants that FEMA administers, 
there are additional emergency preparedness grants awarded to states and 
locals. Table 2 provides a list of additional emergency preparedness grant 
programs.  
 
Table 2.   Additional Emergency Preparedness Grant Programs17 
 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 
National Bioterrorism Hospital 
Preparedness Program 
(HPP)18,19 
 X X X X X X X X 
Bioterrorism Training and 
Curriculum Development Program 
(BTCDP)20 
 X X X X X X X X 
Public Health Emergency 
Preparedness Cooperative 
Agreement (PHEPCA)21 
   X X X X X X 
                                            
17 FY 2007 Homeland Security Grant Program: Supplemental Resource: Federal 
Preparedness Programs, 2-3. 
18 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “The Hospital Preparedness Program,” 
http://www.hhs.gov/aspr/opeo/hpp/ (accessed January 12, 2009).  
19 Lt. Commander Sumner L. Bossler, “National Bioterrorism Hospital Preparedness 
Program: Surge Capacity and Health System Preparedness Surge Capacity,” (webconference, 
July 13, 2004), slide 2, http://www.ahrq.gov/news/ulp/btsurgefacil/bossltxt.htm (accessed January 
12, 2009). 
20 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “Bioterrorism Training and Curriculum 
Development Program,” http://www.hhs.gov/aspr/opeo/nhpp/btcdp/btcdp.html (accessed January 
12, 2009).  
21 Center for Disease Control and Prevention, “Emergency Preparedness and Response,” 
http://emergency.cdc.gov/cotper/coopagreement/ (accessed January 12, 2009).  
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 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 
FEMA Pre-Disaster Mitigation 
Grants22 
  X X X X X X X 
Edward Byrne Memorial Justice 
Assistance Grant Program 
(JAG)23 
    X X X X  
Hazard Materials Emergency 
Preparedness Grant Program 
(HMEP)24 
X X X X X X X X X 
Assistance to Firefighters Grant 
(AFG)25 
X X X X X X X X X 
 
Each grant program has unique guidance packages, funding restrictions, and 
reporting requirements, as mandated by the congressional appropriation and 
directed by the federal administrative agency. This has created additional 
complexity in evaluating the impact that federal grant dollars have made towards 
minimizing gaps and shortfalls in prevention and protection efforts and the 
development of response and recovery capabilities.  
There is a reoccurring theme within the national guidance, the need for a 
“capabilities-based process for making informed decisions about managing 
homeland risk and prioritizing homeland security investments across disciplines, 
jurisdictions, regions, and levels of government.”26 After five fiscal years of 
homeland security grant funding, the nation has spent an enormous amount of 
money, but the federal, state, and local levels of government lack a mechanism 
to measure the impact that these investments have made. While states and 
locals maintain detailed records of what has been purchased, there has been 
                                            
22 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Pre-disaster Mitigation Grant Program,” 
http://www.fema.gov/government/grant/pdm/index.shtm (accessed January 12, 2009). 
23 Bureau of Justice Assistance, “Justice Assistance Grant Program,” 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/grant/jag.html (accessed January 12, 2009).  
24 U.S. Department of Transportation Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety 
Administration, “HMEP Grant Program Fact Sheet,” 
http://phmsa.dot.gov/portal/site/PHMSA/menuitem.ebdc7a8a7e39f2e55cf2031050248a0c/?vgnex
toid=2b133074e1db8110VgnVCM1000009ed07898RCRD&vgnextchannel=b9623074e1db8110V
gnVCM1000009ed07898RCRD&vgnextfmt=print (accessed January 9, 2009). 
25 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Assistance to Firefighters Grant,” 
www.firegrantsupport.com/afg/guidance/ (accessed January 12, 2009).  
26 National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, D.C.: Homeland Security Council, 
October 2007), 43. 
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little evaluation of how the equipment, planning activities, training, and exercises 
have translated into improved capabilities and/or reduced risk. As early as 2004, 
the Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General (OIG) reported that ODP, 
lacked a performance measurement system to “create a national picture of the 
increases in first responder preparedness and response capabilities and that can 
demonstrate the overall success of its grant programs.”27 Four years later, the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that this is still a major concern 
requiring congressional attention.  
DHS has taken steps to establish goals, gather information, and 
measure progress, yet its monitoring of grant expenditures does not 
provide a means to measure the achievement of desired program 
outcomes to strengthen the nation’s homeland security capabilities. 
We still know little about how states have used federal funds to 
build their capabilities or reduce risks. This is because neither 
FEMA nor its predecessor for grant management (from fiscal years 
2003 through 2007) has yet developed a system to compile grant 
information in a manner that allows for effective analysis of the 
obligation, expenditure, and use of homeland security grants funds. 
For example, FEMA officials said that they currently rely on the 
grant monitoring process to assess the extent that states and urban 
areas are building capabilities. However, these efforts do not 
provide information on how states and localities finance their efforts 
in this area, how federal funds have been used, the extent to which 
federal funds supplement or supplant ongoing state and local 
expenditures, and the effectiveness of those funds in improving the 
nation’s capabilities or reducing risk.28  
Performance evaluation is a requirement of federal financial assistance 
programs, but in the arena of homeland security, it has been challenging to 
quantify the impact that the grant funds have had in meeting strategic objectives,  
 
                                            
27 An Audit of Distributing and Spending “First Responder” Grant Funds (Washington, D.C.: 
Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, March 2004), 17, 
www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_ODP_03-04.pdf (accessed August 7, 2008).  
28 GAO, “Homeland Security: DHS Improved its Risk-Based Grant Programs’ Allocation and 
Management Methods, but Measuring Programs’ Impact on National Capabilities Remains a 
Challenge,” GAO-08-488T, March 11, 2008, www.gao.gov/new.items/d08488t.pdf (accessed 
June 5, 2008). 
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minimizing threats and vulnerabilities, and increasing capacity to respond and 
recover should an event occur.29 Former FEMA Administrator, David Paulison, 
acknowledged the difficulty of measuring progress of the HSGP.  
We’ve put a lot of money in the system and now we want to see 
what type of impact we’ve had and what our recognition in 
Congress is going to be to move on with the project.30  
Since the creation of the DHS in 2003, DHS has awarded over 28.7 billion 
dollars31 in grant funds to states, locals, territories and tribal entities to enhance 
prevention, protection, response, and recovery efforts.3233 In fiscal year 2008, the 
Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP), DHS identified three overarching 
priorities for the implementation of all grant programs, the first of which was the 
ability to measure the progress towards meeting the National Preparedness 
Guidelines (NPG).34 Designed to assist homeland security professionals 
prioritize preparedness efforts, the NPG is composed of the national 
preparedness vision, the fifteen National Planning Scenarios, Universal Task List 
(UTL), and Target Capability List (TCL). A recent CNA report, though, highlighted 
that top-down frameworks, such as the NPG, actually lead to a weakened 
                                            
29 Electronic Code of Federal Regulations, “Title 44: Emergency Management Assistance, 
Part 13 Uniform Administrative Requirements for Grants and Cooperative Agreements to State 
and Local Governments, Subpart C-Post-Award Requirements Reports, Records Retention, and 
Enforcement, 13.40 Monitoring and Reporting Program Performance,” 
http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text/text-
idx?c=ecfr&sid=ca75ca22190756eb143a9a98bb4255fc&rgn=div8&view=text&node=44:1.0.1.1.14
.3.22.16&idno=44 (accessed January 27, 2009).  
30 Corey McKenna, “Grants Gaining Traction on Reducing Risk, Chertoff Says,” Government 
Technology, July 31, 2008, www.govtech.com/gt/print_article.php?id=382935 (accessed August 
1, 2008). 
31 As of March of 2009, the FY 2009 Preparedness grants have been appropriated, but have 
not been awarded to state and local jurisdictions.  
32 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “DHS Announces Release of Application 
Guidance for over $3 Billion in Grant Programs.” 
33 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “DHS Announces Fiscal Year 2009 Grant 
Guidance for over $3 Billion in Preparedness Grant Programs,” 
www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1225900531284.shtm (November 12, 2008).  
34 Fiscal Year 2008 Homeland Security Grant Program: Guidance and Application Kit 
(Washington, D.C., United States Department of Homeland Security, February 2008), 3, 
www.fema.gov/pdf/government/grant/hsgp/fy08_hsgp_guide.pdf (accessed February 4, 2008). 
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preparedness system because they do not generate action among the field 
personnel who complete the required security related tasks.35 This can be seen 
with the TCL and UTL. Both guidance documents are cumbersome for state and 
local stakeholders to evaluate their individual jurisdiction capabilities against a 
national standard. Each region, state, and locality faces unique threats and 
hazards, making it extremely difficult to overlay a universal measurement system. 
States and locals also struggle to plan against the National Planning Scenarios 
due to the catastrophic nature of the scenarios. These events often overwhelm 
local capacity and force the planning entities to focus on the integration of state 
and federal assets.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
After five years of HSGP spending, it is apparent that all levels of 
government struggle to define the return on investment. While all grant managers 
can provide a detailed list of how the funds were used to support equipment, 
planning, training and exercise activities, the current system lacks a means to 
translate how investments have increased local, state and national 
preparedness. A recent Government Accountability Office report noted that DHS 
does not have a monitoring process in place to measure the impact of homeland 
security grant programs.36 The federal grant guidance packages have directed 
states and locals to develop measurable performance metrics, but there is 
currently no mechanism for states and locals to evaluate preparedness activities 
across the numerous homeland security grant related programs. DHS and FEMA 
have taken steps to increase accountability and oversight of homeland security 
spending, by requiring Strategies, Enhancement Plans and State Preparedness 
                                            
35 Robert Bach and David J. Kaufman, A Social Infrastructure for Hometown Security: 
Evolving the Homeland Security Paradigm (Washington, D.C.: CNA Analysis and Solutions, 
January 23, 2009), 5, 
www.cna.org/documents/Social%20Infrastructure%20for%20Hometown%20Security.pdf 
(accessed January 29, 2009). 
36 GAO, “Homeland Security: DHS Improved its Risk-Based Grant Programs’ Allocation and 
Management Methods, But Measuring Programs’ Impact on National Capabilities Remains a 
Challenge,” GAO-08-488T, 18. 
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Reports, and investment justifications, yet, connecting investments to the 
reduction of threats, mitigation of vulnerabilities, and the development of 
capabilities to respond to and recover should an event occur remains a great 
challenge. This thesis attempts to identify the difficulties that local, state and 
federal stakeholders face, explore the prevalence of these challenges, and 
provide recommendations for improving the capability to measure the impact the 
HSGP has made on preparedness. 
 12
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
Federal grant programs to state and locals for prevention, protection, 
response and recovery to acts of terrorism began long before the creation of 
DHS. In the wake of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the 1995 Tokyo 
subway sarin attack, and the 1995 Oklahoma City Murrah building bombing, 
Congress passed the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici amendment37 to appropriate funds 
to enhance Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) training and planning at the 
federal, state, and local levels of government.38 This federal initiative was 
plagued with criticisms of “duplication, poor coordination, incoherence, and 
unclear or incorrect priorities.”39  
Prior to the September 11th attacks, a WMD attack requiring the 
coordination and cooperation of local, state and federal response partners was 
viewed as being highly improbable. The National Strategy for Homeland Security 
acknowledged that prior to the 9/11 homeland security was a:  
patchwork of efforts undertaken by disparate departments and 
agencies across all levels of government…we [United States] 
lacked a unifying vision, a cohesive strategic approach, and the 
necessary institutions within government to secure the Homeland 
against terrorism.40  
The term “homeland security” did not exist within the American lexicon. 
With the release of the 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Strategy, the 
Federal Government attempted to define homeland security, prioritize mission-
                                            
37 Also known as the Defense against Weapons Destruction Act of 1996.  
38 Richard Falkenrath, “Problems of Preparedness: U.S. Readiness for a Domestic Terrorist 
Attack,” International Security 25, no. 4 (Spring 2001): 162, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0162-
2889%28200121%2925%3A4%3C147%sAPOPURF%3E2.0.CO%3B2-8 (accessed: December 
30, 2007).  
39 Ibid., 166.  
40 National Strategy for Homeland Security (2007), 3. 
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critical activities, and clarify the role of non-federal government partners.41 A 
series of strategies, guidance documents and presidential directives soon 
followed. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5) established the 
National Incident Management System (NIMS) to ensure that the local, state, and 
federal responders could efficiently and effectively manage the response to 
domestic incident.42 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8) called 
for the creation of a National Preparedness Goal,43 now known as the National 
Preparedness Guidelines (NPG), to develop performance metrics for 
preparedness activities to increase the national capacity to prevent, protect, 
respond and recover from acts of terrorism and natural disasters.44 The NPG 
was designed to provide a capabilities-based framework for assessing risk and 
prioritizing limited resources across jurisdictions, disciplines, regions, and states 
to evaluate “how prepared we are, how prepared we need to be, and how we 
prioritize efforts to close the gap.”45  
In a recent article, Josh Filler, a former director of SLGCP, noted that the 
three main challenges to the successful implementation of homeland security 
grant programs are establishing a management structure, developing a risk-
based strategy; and creating a system to track and measure the impact 
investments are making toward meeting the strategic goals and objectives.46 
Filler’s comments precisely pinpoint the underlying challenges that states and  
 
                                            
41 National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, D.C.: The White House, July 16, 
2002), 4. 
42 Homeland Security Presidential Directive / HSPD-5 (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 
2003), www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-5.html (accessed October 11, 2007).  
43 As of September 2007, the National Preparedness Goal became the National 
Preparedness Guidelines.  
44 Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-8 (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 
2003), 3, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/print/20031217-6.html (accessed October 
11, 2007). 
45 National Strategy for Homeland Security (2007), 43. 
46 Joshua D. Filler, “Not Just a Check from Uncle Sam,” Homeland Security Today, 
September 30, 2008, http://hstoday.us/content/view/5405/201/ (accessed October 16, 2008). 
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locals face as they implement the HSGP. For this reason, the literature reviewed 
focused on 1) Grant Management, 2) Risk Management, and 3) Performance 
Management.  
A.  GRANT MANAGEMENT  
In April of 2002, Patricia Dalton, Director of Strategic Issues for the GAO, 
testified before the House Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial 
Management and Intergovernmental Relations, Committee on Government 
Reform. During her testimony, she expressed a need for, “definition and 
clarification of the roles and responsibilities of federal, state, and local entities.”47 
With over 40 federal agencies involved in homeland security, the GAO identified 
fragmentation, overlap/duplication of programs, and accountability as problems 
with federal preparedness programs.48 The GAO commented that these 
challenges made it extremely difficult for states and locals to partner with the 
federal government.49 
With the release of the FY03 SHSP and UASI grant programs, ODP 
encouraged states and locals to develop state and urban area working groups 
focused on the coordination of homeland security mission capabilities. ODP 
identified the principal first responders necessary for mounting a swift and 
effective response to a terrorism incident. The critical disciplines included law 
enforcement, emergency medical services, emergency management, fire, 
hazardous materials, public works, government, public safety communications, 
health care, and public health.50,51 The State Administrative Agency52 was 
                                            
47 GAO, “Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Cooperation in the Development of a 
National Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness,” GAO-02-550T, April 2, 2002, 2, 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02550t.pdf (accessed January 6, 2008). 
48 Ibid., 2.  
49 Ibid. 
50 Fiscal Year 2003 Urban Area Security Initiative Grant Program II: Program Guidelines and 
Application Kit (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office for Domestic 
Preparedness, n.d.), 5. 
51 In Fiscal Year 2004, non-profit organizations were added as a required discipline. 
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charged with the identification of the Urban Area Working Groups (UAWG) Points 
of Contact in conjunction with the Mayor and Chief Elected Official from the core-
city and core-county.53 The UAWG was then tasked with establishing a 
governance structure to identify the geographic boundaries of the urban area, 
assess the region’s risk, and develop an investment strategy. While ODP 
identified critical disciplines vital to national preparedness, the composition of the 
steering committee was left to the discretion of the SAA, core-city, and core-
county representatives. This had the potential to aggravate existing political 
tension because it placed the large metropolitan areas in control of the vast 
majority of homeland security dollars and created animosity between city and 
county officials as to who would control the funds.  
Complicating the situation were the requirements to identify 
representatives for the UAWG, define the geographic boundaries of the Urban 
Area, and develop the investment strategy for the FY 2003 grant dollars. While 
some urban areas had success in creating a regional steering body, many 
struggled with political turf issues that hindered an integrated planning approach. 
The journal articles reviewed are critical of the Department of Homeland 
Security’s slow response to publish guidance to the states and locals. As Peter 
Eisinger notes, states and locals have been looking to the federal government to 
clearly delineate the roles and responsibilities for each layer of government to 
provide a coordinated approach to achieving national preparedness.54 DHS has 
recognized that governance is a critical component of program implementation 
and that many jurisdictions still have not formalized a process. In the FY08  
 
 
                                            
52 The State Administrative Agency (SAA) is the lead state agency charged with managing 
the policy, programmatic, and fiscal requirements of the HSGP.  
53 The core-city is the recognized Urban Area Security Initiative City. The core county is the 
county in which the core-city resides.  
54 Peter Eisinger, “Imperfect Federalism: The Intergovernmental Partnership for Homeland 
Security,” Public Administration Review 66, no. 4 (July 2006): 542. 
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HSGP grant guidance, DHS has required each urban area to develop an official 
UAWG charter to solidify membership, roles and responsibilities, voting rights, 
and funding allocation methodology.55  
1.  Grants Reporting  
As a means to report and monitor homeland security and emergency 
preparedness spending, DHS implemented an electronic data collection tool, 
called Grants Reporting Tool (GRT).56 In the initial iterations of the GRT, 
reporting consisted of the designated SAA completing the Initial Strategy 
Implementation Plan (ISIP) at the beginning of each new grant fiscal year. The 
ISIP is the projected spending plan for each particular grant program. Semi-
annually, SAAs and local sub-recipients are then required to upload funding 
allocations per grant program, critical discipline, and allowable cost category for 
the Bi-annual Strategy Implementation Report (BSIR).  
With the shift to a competitive grant program in 2006, eligible jurisdictions 
were required to submit investment justifications detailing the purpose and scope 
of each project proposal. The GRT provided a platform to upload the state and 
urban area strategies as well as the investment justifications. The goal of the 
investment justification process was to gather a better understanding of state and 
local capabilities, resources, preparedness plans, and strategies for 
implementation of the proposed initiatives.57 Once jurisdictions received 
notification of the actual grant award amount, they were then required to enter 
projects to be funded into the ISIP. Every six months thereafter, the SAA and 
local sub-recipients are required to update the BSIR to show how funds have 
been allocated and/or expended per project during the previous reporting period. 
                                            
55 Fiscal Year 2008 Homeland Security Grant Program: Guidance and Application Kit, 31. 
56 Formerly under the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP); The GRT is now coordinated 
through the Federal Emergency Management National Preparedness Directorate (NPD).  
57 Grants Reporting Tool, “Grant Reporting Lifecycle Overview,” 
https://www.reporting.odp.dhs.gov/docs/GrantReportingLifecycleOverview.pdf (accessed January 
14, 2008).  
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Once grant funds have been expended, the SAA completes the grant close-out 
report, showing that all funds have been expended. See Figure 1 for a graphic 
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The federal grant guidance packages have directed states and locals to 
develop performance measures and to show measurable progress towards 
meeting the NPG. Released in September of 2007, the NPG serves to assist 
decision makers with implementing a capability-based and risk-based planning 
process to ensure that investments are strengthening national preparedness.58 
The NPG calls for the development of readiness metrics to gauge progress and 
determine the local, state, and federal capacity to respond to a future incident.59 
While the NPG provides a good framework for identifying the necessary 
preparedness activities, there is minimal guidance and accountability for 
developing measurable performance metrics across the numerous homeland 
security grant related programs that may flow into a state, region or locality. A 
one-stop-repository does not exist to determine how much money flows into a 
region for the purpose of homeland security and emergency preparedness. While 
FEMA can run reports and query data of all HSGP spending, the GRT is 
structured around individual grant funding streams, leaving states and locals with 
a limited capacity to track the accomplishments of the numerous grant programs, 
fiscal years, and the activities of contiguous jurisdictions/sub-recipients.  
The GRT has been used to streamline reporting processes, but the 
current system is aggregating data into stovepipes and minimizing the capability 
for state and local partners to view a complete picture of the impact that grant 
spending has had on improving preparedness within their locality. Instead of 
leveraging all available grant opportunities towards the implementation of 
strategic goals, program managers are reporting on spending in a piece meal 
fashion. Since each grant program has unique grant guidance, cover a specific 
geographic location and are awarded to numerous local and regional sub-
recipients, stakeholders struggle to coordinate all of the grant related activities. 
Figure 2 provides a graphic depiction of the disparate grant reporting by the state 
and local grant recipients. 
                                            




Figure 2.   National Preparedness Directorate: Users Guide-Grants Reporting 
Tool–Implementation at the Local level60  
Homeland security and emergency preparedness grant funding 
opportunities have served to bolster the local, regional, and state homeland 
security efforts, but the receiving entity ultimately has the authority to decide 
which priorities the funds will support. There is also no mechanism to confirm 
contiguous jurisdictions are leveraging individual grant programs to support local 
and regional homeland security initiatives.  
                                            
60 National Preparedness Directorate: Users Guide-Grants Reporting Tool (Washington, 
D.C., FEMA, December 2007), 6. 
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2.  Bi-annual Strategy Implementation Report 
The Bi-annual Strategy Implementation Report captures the funding 
strategy for each grant program under the HSGP umbrella. Figure 3 provides a 
graphic depiction of the GRT reporting options.  
 
 
Figure 3.   BSIR Grantee Welcome Page 
States and local sub-recipients are required to update the allocation plan 
every six months. The total grant award is broken down into projects. Each 
project is then tied to an investment justification, state and urban area strategy 
goals and objectives, target capabilities, and national priorities that will be 
enhanced. Recipients and sub-recipients then must enter the funding plan. The 
HSGP is divided into six authorized solution areas: equipment, training, planning, 
organization, exercise, and management and administration. Within each 
solution area, allocations are aggregated by discipline and allowable cost 
category also known as the Authorized Equipment List (AEL) category. DHS has 
identified the critical disciplines eligible for the HSGP, which include law 
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enforcement, fire, emergency medical, emergency management, hazmat, public 
safety communications, public health, health care, public works, government, and 
non-profit entities. The Authorized Equipment List is the master list of eligible 
expenditures for the HSGP. Table 3 outlines the 21 authorized equipment list 
categories.61 
Table 3.   Authorized Equipment List Categories 
1. Personal Protective  
    Equipment 
 
8. Decontamination 15. Inspection and  
      Screening 
2. Explosive Device  
    Mitigation and  
    Remediation  
9. Medical Supplies and  
    Limited  
    Pharmaceuticals 
16. Agriculture Terrorism 
      Prevention, 
      Response and 
      Mitigation 
 
3. Search & Rescue 
 
10. Power Equipment 17. Watercraft  
4. Information  
    Technology 
 
11. Reference Materials 18. Aviation Equipment 
5. Cyber Security 12. Incident Response  
      Vehicles 
 
19. Logistical Support  
      Equipment 
6. Interoperable  
    Communications 
 
13. Terrorism Incident  
       Prevention 
20. Intervention 
7. Detection 14. Physical Security  
      Enhancements 
21. Other Authorized  
       Equipment 
 
The BSIR report captures a historical record of individual grant programs, 
but the aggregation of data by AEL category and discipline provides only general 
information on which disciplines are receiving funds and broad focus areas in 
which funds are allocated. The data collected could easily be taken out of 
context, misleading policy makers to overestimate or even underestimate state 
and local capabilities. Reporting grant funds allocations does not necessarily 
mean that jurisdictions have increased capabilities. For example, if policy makers 
                                            
61 The Authorized Equipment List (AEL) can be found at www.rkb.us. Within the AEL, there 
is a breakdown of types of allowable equipment by category. 
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were to request information on the current state of interoperable 
communications, FEMA could generate a report of the interoperable 
communications cost category through the GRT, but there is no explanation of 
how these investments translated into increased communication capabilities or to 
what threshold states/locals even need to develop their individual capacity. How 
can policy-makers make effective decisions based on how much money was 
spent on a specific allowable category, with no understanding of what was 
purchased? It could be the difference between purchasing portable radios for an 
individual department and developing an 800 MHz system that allows police, fire, 
public health and emergency management to communicate effectively. One of 
the primary functions of the GRT is to provide DHS with an electronic database 
to query in the event of a Congressional data call. In its current collection format, 
the FEMA can only answer how much money was allocated to a specific 
discipline with any certainty. This is the 30,000-foot level view and does not 
provide the clarity of what was purchased and/or how it enhanced the capacity of 
the local jurisdiction or region. To gather that level of detail, FEMA would have to 
poll all of the states and sub-recipients or look through paper budget detail 
worksheets. This would only serve to stress overloaded state and local partners, 
by creating additional requirements.  
Once the grant recipient has completed the allocations section of the 
BSIR, they are then transferred into the metrics component of the system. Based 
on the solution areas funded, the recipient must respond to the pre-identified 
metrics. The recipient has the option of clicking yes, no, not applicable, or no 
metrics associated with this project. If the recipient has allocated funds for 
equipment, two pre-identified metrics will be displayed, the number of critical 
infrastructures hardened and the number of Community Emergency Response 
Team (CERT)62 kits purchased. While the number of critical infrastructures 
hardened may be a key component of the Buffer Zone Protection Program and 
                                            
62 CERT is a citizen preparedness initiative in which citizens receive 16 hours of training on 
how to be better prepared in the case of catastrophic emergencies when emergency services will 
be overwhelmed.  
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the CERT kits are a vital statistic for the Citizen Corps Grant Program, this does 
not reflect the overarching strategy for the UASI, SHSP, or LETTP grant 
programs. If these two metrics are not applicable to the particular project, then 
the sub-recipients click the no metrics applicable button to proceed. Since the 
majority of funding is dedicated to equipment expenditures, these pre-identified 
metrics fail to provide any additional insight into spending patterns. Further, the 
segregation of grant programs by year creates the illusion that each project is 
independent of previous funding opportunities. The tool does not ask if the 
initiative is a continuation of a previous project, nor does it ask if the investment 
completes the build out of the primary target capability for the receiving 
jurisdiction or region.  
The pre-identified metrics for planning and training also fail to provide an 
accurate picture of state and local capacity. In most cases, approved training is 
limited to the pre-approved DHS training courses through the National Domestic 
Preparedness Consortium.63 If the training course is approved, grant funds can 
be allocated for travel, overtime, backfill, registration, etc. The Consortium 
courses are currently free of charge to state and local participants, so there is no 
cost to the jurisdiction. If grant funding is not utilized, then the individuals who 
attended the training cannot be counted towards the overall numbers in the 
metric component of this solution area. The planning metrics focus on risk and 
vulnerability assessments, emergency operation plans, risk communication, and 
citizen outreach. Again, sub-recipients are limited in accounting for only those 
plans or planning activities directly supported by grant funds. Even if general fund 
dollars are dedicated for personnel working on critical infrastructure/key 
resources assessments relevant to the LETPP or BZPP grant programs, the sub-
recipient cannot report the activity through the GRT. Since the metrics are pre- 
 
 
                                            
63 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “National Domestic Preparedness Consortium 
(NDPC),” http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/training_ndpc.htm (accessed February 24, 2008).  
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identified and are limited to yes, no, or not applicable, there is no option for state 
and local grant managers to provide additional feedback as to the capabilities 
being enhanced through other indirect means.  
3.  Challenges for State and Local Partners 
As the Homeland Security Grant Program has matured, the GRT has 
been modified and adapted for changing reporting requirements. State and urban 
area strategies are now collected and stored within the GRT, but due to 
limitations of the tool, state and local partners are unable to analyze the data. 
This tool has become merely a one-way data entry portal. The tool lacks an 
output mechanism or query capability that can assist states and locals with future 
strategic planning. Local planners are unable to view how contiguous counties 
and partners are investing homeland security funds. Creating greater operational 
awareness will enhance regional relationships through the sharing of mutual aid 
assets and allow regional partners to share the burden of sustainment.  
B.  RISK MANAGEMENT 
Risk management is a “strategy for helping policy makers make decisions 
about assessing risk, allocating resources, and taking actions under conditions of 
uncertainty.”64 As a requirement of the FY 2003 SHSP and UASI grants, states 
and urban areas were required to complete a risk assessment. This assessment, 
though, was heavily focused on the state and local capacity to respond to a 
terrorist attack.65 Furthermore, the urban area assessments were centered on 
the core-city/core-county. Since fiscal year 2006, DHS has encouraged urban 
areas to regionalize and expand their geographical boundaries to include a 10-
mile buffer zone around the core-city. In FY 2008, DHS expanded the 10-mile 
                                            
64 GAO, “Homeland Security: Applying Risk Management Principals to Guide Federal 
Investments,” GAO-07-386T, February 7, 2007, 3, www.gao.gov/new.items/d07386t.pdf 
(accessed June 6, 2008).  
65 Dave Kaufman, formerly of DHS Grants and Training, personal communication, July 11, 
2008. 
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buffer zone to include the Metropolitan Statistical Areas for determining the 
eligibility of the program.66 Even with the expansion of the geographic 
boundaries, states or urban areas have not been required to update their risk 
assessments. Without revisiting the additional risk factors, such as critical 
infrastructure and potential threat elements, states and urban areas may not 
have a clear understanding of how investments are addressing the reduction of 
threat, minimization of vulnerability, and mitigation of consequences. Further, the 
lack of understanding of the regional risk makes it extremely difficult to evaluate 
the impact the numerous grant programs have made toward improving 
preparedness. The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act 
(PKEMRA) (Public Law 109-295) requires that DHS evaluate the impact that 
federal financial assistance has made on the development of target capabilities 
as well as led to the reduction of risk.67 While all states and urban areas have 
complied with the grant requirements, the implementation of a comprehensive 
risk management program continues to be difficult.  
The diversity of disciplines, activities, and grant programs that fall under 
the homeland security umbrella, creates a challenge for measuring the impact 
the HSGP has had on reducing risk. Risk is dynamic, so while the money may be 
invested wisely, it is extremely difficult to directly correlate grant investments to 
the reduction of risk. Further, some critics feel that Washington has failed to 
assist states and urban areas with identifying vulnerabilities.68 With little 
guidance, states and locals began spending the grant funds on wants versus 
assessing their respective risk and vulnerability.69 As Veronique de Rugy of 
American Enterprise Institute points out, the risk of terrorism is hard to quantify, it 
                                            
66 Fiscal Year 2008 Homeland Security Grant Program, 30. 
67 Public Law 109-295 (Washington, D.C.: 109th Congress, October 2006), sec 652, 
www.iaem.com/committees/GovernmentAffairs/documents/PL109-
295DHSAppropFY07andFEMAReform.pdf (accessed January 29, 2009).  
68 Peter Eisinger, “Imperfect Federalism,” 542. 
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is possible that states and locals would inflate their risk to justify additional 
homeland security funding.70 Worse, jurisdictions may underestimate current 
capacity by inflating capability shortfalls to justify continued homeland security 
appropriations. Either way, the reverse engineering of investment justifications to 
receive homeland security funding is only creating a further drain on the federal 
budget and not necessarily increasing the local, regional, state or federal 
capacity to prevent, protect, respond or recover from acts of terrorism or other 
natural disasters.  
C.  PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT 
In 1993, Congress passed the Government Performance and Results Act 
(GPRA) to “improve the confidence of the American public in the capability of the 
federal government, by systematically holding federal agencies accountable for 
achieving program results.”71 Recognizing that the implementation of federal 
programs is largely dependent on state and local government agencies for the 
accomplishment of goals and objectives, Congress followed the GPRA by 
passing the Federal Financial Assistance Management Improvement Act of 
1999.72,73 The purpose was to improve the performance of federal grant 
programs, simplify application and reporting requirements, improve service 
                                            
69 Patrick S. Roberts, “Shifting Priorities: Congressional Incentives and the Homeland 
Security Granting Process,” Review of Policy Research 22 no. 4 (July 2005), 440, 
http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db+bth&AN
=17380596&site=ehost-live&scope=site (accessed December 30, 2007). 
70 Veronique de Rugy, “What Does Homeland Security Spending Buy?” American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research, Working Paper #107 (April 2005), 2, 
www.aei.org/doclib/20050401_wp107.pdf (accessed December 30, 2007).  
71 Government Performance Results Act of 1993 (Washington, D.C.: 103rd Congress of the 
United States of America, January 5, 1993), 2, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/mgmt-
gpar/gplaw2m.html (accessed August 7, 2008).  
72 Also known as Public Law 106-107 (P.L. 106-107). 
73 Shelley H. Metzenbaum, Strategies for Using State Information: Measuring and Improving 
Program Performance (Washington, D.C.: IBM Center for The Business of Government, 
December 2003), 4, 
www.businessofgovernment.org/publications/grant_reports/details/index.asp?GID=112 (accessed 
August 7, 2008). 
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delivery, and foster greater coordination amongst stakeholders.74 The act also 
required agencies to “establish performance measures and a process for 
assessing the extent to which specified goals and objectives have been 
achieved.”75  
Performance measurement requirements are not meant to be an exercise 
in futility, but rather to gather data on the outcomes, activities, inputs and outputs 
and put them into a format that can be shared with other stakeholders.76 It 
provides for greater transparency and a clearer understanding of the purpose of 
the programs. Federal grant guidance packages and the NPG have directed 
states and locals to develop measurable performance metrics, but the GAO 
continues to report that DHS does not have a monitoring process in place to 
measure the impact of the HSGP.77 
The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act required a Federal 
Preparedness Report and individual State Preparedness Reports.78 This 
included an assessment of current capabilities, an assessment of resources 
necessary to attain the preparedness priorities; and an explanation of how the 
previous funding had been used to improve preparedness capabilities.79 The 
2009 Federal Preparedness Report acknowledges that the capability to evaluate 
grant effectiveness is still in its infancy.  
 
                                            
74 Grants.gov, “Grants Streamlining Initiative,” 
http://atweb.grants.gov/aboutgrants/streamlining_initiatives.jsp (accessed August 7, 2008). 
75 GAO, “Grants Management: Additional Actions Needed to Streamline and Simplify 
Processes,” GAO-05-335, April 2005, 11, www.gao.gov/new.items/d05335.pdf (accessed August 
7, 2008).  
76 Shelley H. Metzenbaum, Strategies for Using State Information, 6, 
www.businessofgovernment.org/publications/grant_reports/details/index.asp?GID=112 (accessed 
August 7, 2008).  
77 GAO, “Homeland Security: DHS Improved its Risk-Based Grant Programs’ Allocation and 
Management Methods, But Measuring Programs’ Impact on National Capabilities Remains a 
Challenge,” GAO-08-488T, March 11, 2008, 18. 
78 Public Law 109-295, sec. 652. 
79 Ibid. 
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We [DHS] have had less success in the Evaluate and Improve area 
where the lack of risk-informed performance measures, data, and 
analytical approaches has hampered our ability to assess the 
effectiveness of our investments and preparedness efforts.80  
To meet the requirements of PKEMRA, DHS is in the process of collecting 
additional assessment data, evaluating the existing capability assessment tools, 
and revising the Target Capability List.81 Currently, DHS has six assessment 
systems, which include: NIMS Compliance Assessment Support Tool 
(NIMSCAST), Gap Analysis Program (GAP), Pilot Capabilities Assessment 
(PCA), National Preparedness System (NPS), State Preparedness Reports 
(SPR), and Capabilities Assessment for Readiness (CAR).82 DHS is in the 
process of evaluating all systems to determine if one system could be 
transformed, if two or more of the tools could be merged, or if a new system is 
necessary to meet the comprehensive assessment system requirement. A 
new/modified system will utilize the target capabilities list (TCL) metrics (currently 
under revision). The updated TCL is expected to contain capability 
classifications, objectives and requirements to meet performance standards.83 
The performance classification and objectives will assist jurisdictions with 
identifying the threshold they should develop capabilities based on their 
individual risk and threat profile.84  
The literature reviewed was consistent in that a national preparedness 
system will take time to develop. With each successive year, the federal 
guidance becomes more direct in delineating the roles and responsibilities of 
each layer of government. The grant guidance packages have directed states 
and locals to develop investment proposals that support state strategies and 
                                            
80 Federal Preparedness Report (Washington, D.C.: The U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, January 13, 2009), v, https://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/dhs/nps36-012709- 
(accessed January 29, 2009).  
81 Federal Preparedness Report, 109.  
82 Ibid., 112. 
83 Ibid., 31.  
84 Ibid. 
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contain measurable performance metrics. The challenge continues to be that 
while striving to develop a national preparedness system, each region, state, and 
locality has a varied threat and vulnerability profile, leaving states and localities 
struggling to identify at what point have jurisdictions invested enough to be 
considered prepared. Disasters are often not confined to a particular jurisdiction 
or geographic area, which makes contingency planning an infinite and enormous 
task for states and locals. Also, the focus catastrophic disasters, immediately 
overwhelms the capacity of the locals, so planning becomes focused on the 
integration of state and federal resources. While the development of the 
comprehensive assessment system and the updated target capability list will 
assist states and locals with developing risk-based investment strategies, these 
processes and documents will take time to develop. For these tools to be 
successful, states and locals must derive some value from complying with these 
new requirements. As Josh Filler noted, “meeting these [risk and capabilities 
assessments] requirements has become a ‘check the box’ form any urban areas 
that are drowning in federal requirements and don’t see the value or results from 
compliance.”85  
D.  SUMMARY 
Since 2001, the federal government has awarded over 145 grant 
programs to states, locals, territories and tribal entities to enhance prevention, 
protection, response, and recovery efforts.86 There is not a one-stop-shop for 
determining how much money flows into a region for the purpose of homeland 
security and emergency preparedness. Although Congress has recognized the 
complexity created by the numerous homeland security grant programs, both the 
House of Representatives and the Senate have been unable to pass legislation 
that will simplify the grant process. Academics highlight the inefficiency of the 
current congressional appropriation system, but they too, fall short in evaluating 
                                            
85 Filler, “Not Just a Check from Uncle Sam.” 
86 See Section I.  
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the role states and locals play in building the national preparedness system. 
There has been limited evaluation of the role states and locals play in the 
development of strategies and spending plans that will ultimately enhance or 
detract from national preparedness goals. Little analysis has been done on how 
the shift to a competitive application process for the UASI and SHSP has had on 
refocusing states’ and locals’ strategies toward enhancing the 37 target 
capabilities and the 15 National Planning Scenarios. While the literature identifies 
the difficulties that states and locals experience due to the array of homeland 
security related grant programs, no commentary exists on improvements states 
and locals can implement to minimize the complexity and avoid duplication of 
effort.  
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III.  METHODOLOGY 
The research for this thesis was conducted using a hybrid approach 
including a national survey of homeland security professionals and a case study 
of the United Kingdom’s preparedness structure. The intent of these two 
methodologies was to identify universal challenges faced by federal, state, and 
local stakeholders, explore the prevalence of these difficulties, and provide 
recommendations for improving the capability to measure the impact of the 
HSGP.  
A.  MEASURING PREPAREDNESS SURVEY 
For this component of the research process, homeland security 
professionals were surveyed through the on-line tool, Survey Monkey. 
Participants were solicited through three professional e-mail listservs: the Urban 
Area Security Initiative Conference, the International Association of Emergency 
Managers, and the Big 30 Emergency Management Directors. The survey was 
open from November 18 to December 12, 2008. Two hundred and five people 
started the survey and of that, 140 individuals completed the survey.  
The on-line survey consisted of 20 questions broken into four sections, 
which included affiliation, general perceptions, perceptions on preparedness, and 
recommendations. The first section focused on the respondent association to the 
HSGP process. This included the level of government in which the respondent 
participated (local not affiliated with an Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) City; 
local affiliated with a UASI; state or territory; federal; or private sector). 
Respondents were then asked to specify the primary discipline they represented 
and the HSGP grant(s) that they participated. This information was used to 
categorize and filter respondents for more in-depth analysis. Personal 
information was not requested or captured to ensure that respondents would be 
as honest as possible in completing the survey.  
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The second section was designed to obtain information on the cost and 
benefits of participation in the HSGP as well as the usefulness of current 
reporting tools to assist states and locals with tying investments to improved 
capabilities. Respondents were asked to comment on the level of coordination 
and the cost to coordinate the multiple HSGP and emergency preparedness 
grant programs distributed to the states and locals.  
The third section focused on the participants’ perception of current 
preparedness capabilities. Respondents were asked to rate preparedness for 
their locality and the nation based on the four mission areas of homeland security 
(prevention, protection, response and recovery) and the 15 National Planning 
Scenarios. The respondents were also asked to rate their understanding of their 
jurisdictions investment strategy.  
The final section of the survey was designed to solicit feedback from the 
participants on how to optimize future investment strategies and strengthen 
preparedness. Respondents were asked a series of questions on how future 
investments should be prioritized at the federal, state, and local level of 
government. Respondents were asked to provide recommendations for 
enhancing future grant reporting.  
Using a Likert scale,87 the survey participants were asked their 
perceptions using a rating scale of none, low, medium, high and very high. The 
survey tool captured the number of respondents per rating scale value. This data 
was then used to calculate frequency and central tendency.  
1.  Frequency 
To standardize the data, the number of responses was converted into the 
frequency of responses. This allowed for the inclusion of all survey responses 
including those respondents that did not complete the survey. The frequency of 
each particular rating scale value was calculated by dividing the number of 
                                            
87 Likert Scales are used in social science research to measure attitudes. 
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responses per scale by the total number of responses for the question and then 
converting the value into a percentage. For example, survey respondents were 
asked to rate the cost to participate in the HSGP process. Of the 152 participants 
that responded: 10 selected none; 29 low; 57 medium; 39 high; and 17 very high.  
 Frequency = [# Responses per Rating ÷ Total Number of Responses] x 100 
  Frequency (None)  = (10 ÷ 152) = 6.6% 
  Frequency (Low)  = (29 ÷ 152) = 19.1% 
Frequency (Medium) = (57 ÷ 152) = 37.5% 
Frequency (High)  = (39 ÷ 152) = 25.7% 
Frequency (Very High) = (17 ÷ 152) = 11.2% 
This normalized the data from question to question and provided an analysis of 
the percentage of respondents per rating scale. Histograms were then drawn to 
provide graphical analysis.  
2.  Central Tendency 
For the evaluation of central tendency, each rating scale was assigned a 
numerical conversion value. 
  None   = 1 
  Low   = 2 
  Medium  = 3 
  High  = 4 
  Very High = 5 
The rating scale value was calculated by multiplying the number of respondents 
by the assigned numerical value. The average rating was calculated through the 
summation of each individual rating scale value and dividing by the total number 





Using the same example as above,  
Avg. Rating = [sum of (# of respondents per rating scale × numerical conversion)]  
 total # of responses 
 
 Avg. Rating = [(10 × 1) + (29 × 2) + (57 × 3) + (39 × 4) + (17 × 5)]  
       152 
 Avg. Rating = 3.16 
This calculation provided the central tendency or average rating of all 
respondents. It can be converted back into the Likert scale as a medium value.  
3.  Analysis 
A more thorough analysis was conducted by aggregating the data by the 
respondents’ discipline and affiliation. This allowed for the evaluation of biases 
that may be linked to a particular level of government and/or discipline that each 
respondent represented. At the conclusion of the mathematical analysis, the 
participant comments were reviewed. Universal themes were identified as 
respondents provided both positive and negative antidotal stories of the grant 
reporting processes. From this data, recommendations were developed that 
could potentially improve the implementation and overall coordination of the 
HSGP.  
B.  CASE STUDY: THE UNITED KINGDOM 
The case study methodology was selected to evaluate an alternative 
approach to implementing a national preparedness system. The United Kingdom 
faces similar terrorism threats and natural hazards, but they have adopted a 
different method for managing risk and encouraging the coordination between 
the local, regional and national public safety agencies. This case study focuses 
on understanding the strengths of the U.K.’s preparedness system including: 
local/regional resiliency forums, risk assessment processes, and performance 
assessments. The intent is to recommend smart practices and determine the 
applicability and feasibility of implementing these philosophies within the United 
States.  
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IV. MEASURING PREPAREDNESS SURVEY  
A.  POTENTIAL BIAS 
As described in Section I, a national survey was conducted to solicit 
feedback from HSGP stakeholders. This survey was distributed to homeland 
security professionals through industry recognized e-mail distribution lists 
including the National UASI Conference, International Association of Emergency 
Managers, and the Big 30 Emergency Management Directors. Due to the 
recruitment method used, some potential bias existed that could shape the 
survey findings. First, the National UASI Conference and listserv were developed 
to promote information sharing amongst UASI cities. The International 
Association of Emergency Managers listserv is a platform for sharing amongst 
the international emergency management community. Further, the Big 30 
Emergency Management Directors listserv was initiated to engage the largest 30 
metropolitan area emergency management directors. Due to the distribution 
method, the survey findings could be potentially swayed by the opinions of the 
respondents who are affiliated with UASI cities and the Emergency Management 
discipline.  
B.  SURVEY SECTION: AFFILIATION 
In this section, the respondents were asked a series of questions on their 
affiliation: the level of government, discipline, and the HSGP programs that the 












Local including Tribal-not affiliated with an Urban Area 
Security Initiative (UASI) City 
7.1% 13 
Local including Tribal-affiliated with a UASI City 48.9% 90 
State or Territory 17.4% 32 
Federal 14.1% 26 
Private Sector 4.9% 9 
Other (please specify) 7.6% 14 
answered question 184 
 
To ensure clarity of analysis, the Local–not affiliated with a UASI will be referred 
to as local and the Local–affiliated with an Urban Area will be referred to as 
UASI. Respondents were then asked to identify the primary discipline 
represented. Table 5 provides the breakdown of the disciplines represented in 
the survey.  
Table 5.   Disciplines Represented 




Critical Infrastructure 0.0% 0 
Emergency Management 45.9% 84 
Emergency Medical Services (EMS) 1.6% 3 
Fire Service 13.7% 25 
Government Agency 10.4% 19 
HazMat 1.1% 2 
Health Care 1.1% 2 
Homeland Security 11.5% 21 
Law Enforcement 9.3% 17 
Military 0.0% 0 
Nonprofit 0.0% 0 
Public Health 2.7% 5 
Public Safety Communications 2.2% 4 
Public Works 0.5% 1 
answered question 183 
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As mentioned in Section 1, the HSGP contains five separate grant programs.88 
To determine if the challenges associated with participation are universal across 
the grant programs, it was vital that the respondents provided the grant 
program(s) they participated. Table 6 provides the percentage of respondents 
participating in the grant programs within the HSGP umbrella.  
 
Table 6.   Homeland Security Grant Program Participation 
Grant Program % Participation 
Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) 84.80% 
State Homeland Security Program (SHSP) 90.12% 
Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP) 75.17% 
Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) 72.26% 
Citizen Corps Program (CCP) 75.48% 
 
C.  SURVEY SECTION: GENERAL PERCEPTIONS 
Using a Likert scale,89 the respondents were asked a series of questions 
on their perception of the HSGP administration. Granted, not all of the 
respondents are the primary recipients of the grant program(s), but many are 
sub-recipients and/or participated in the planning and allocation processes and 
have experienced some of the reporting requirements. Respondents were asked 
to rate the cost to participate versus the benefits gained from participation in the 
grant programs. A histogram of the data (Figure 4) reveals that the majority of 
respondents perceive the cost to participate to be lower than the benefits gained 




                                            
88 The LETPP grant was rolled into the UASI and SHSP grant as of fiscal year 2008. Prior to 
FY08 it was a separate grant program.  
89 Respondents were asked to rate their level of agreement, using the Likert scale, of no/no 
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Figure 4.   What is your perception of the cost to your organization/jurisdiction 
to participate in the grant program (e.g., attending planning 
meetings; writing investment justifications; completing procurement 
processes, monitoring, and auditing requirements, etc.)? What is 
your perception of the benefits gained from participation (e.g., 
equipment received; coordination and planning; training and 
exercises, etc.)? 
By segregating the data by discipline and affiliation, this data was analyzed 
further. Table 7 provides the cross-tabulation of the five major disciplines90 
including emergency management agencies (EMA), fire service (FS), 
government agencies (GA), homeland security (HS), and law enforcement (LE).  
                                            
90 The remaining disciplines were excluded from this analysis due to the small number of 
respondents. The information would not be statistically significant and assertions could not be 
made that would represent the discipline. The following disciplines were excluded: Critical 
Infrastructure, Emergency Medical Service (EMS), Hazardous Materials, Military, Nonprofit, 
Public Health, Public Safety Communications, and Public Works.  
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Table 7.   Costs versus Benefits by Discipline  
  EMA FS GA HS LE 
Cost to Participate Overall Average 3.18 (136) 
None (1) 6% 0% 0% 20% 7% 
Low (2) 14% 23% 33% 13% 27% 
Medium (3) 40% 50% 8% 40% 40% 
High (4) 32% 18% 33% 13% 7% 
Very High (5) 8% 9% 25% 13% 20% 
Average Rating 3.24 (72) 3.14 (22) 3.50 (12) 2.87 (15) 3.07 (15) 
Benefits Gained Overall Average 3.90 (131) 
None (1) 3% 0% 8% 14% 0% 
Low (2) 7% 0% 0% 7% 0% 
Medium (3) 23% 10% 17% 29% 21% 
High (4) 30% 71% 50% 36% 36% 
Very High (5) 37% 19% 25% 14% 43% 
Average Rating 3.91 (70) 4.10 (21) 3.83 (12) 3.29 (14) 4.21 (14) 
Overall, the fire service and law enforcement agencies perceive the 
benefits of participation to be greater than the average (4.1 and 4.2 to 3.9) while 
homeland security professionals rated the benefits lower than average (3.29 to 
3.9). Since these grants have been structured as equipment grants, law 
enforcement and fire agencies may have received new equipment such as 
mobile command vehicles, decontamination tents and trailers, and urban search 
and rescue vehicles/trailers. The fact that equipment is tangible and resonates 
with the fire and law enforcement community may have elevated the perception 
of benefits over disciplines that are utilizing funds for planning, training, and/or 
exercises. Overall, government agencies perceive a much higher cost for 
participation (3.5 to 3.18, respectively), while the homeland security discipline 
found the cost to be lower than average (2.87 to 3.18, respectively). This 
deviation may be due the administrative burden placed on governmental 
agencies over other disciplines such as homeland security. On average, the 
private sector perceived their cost to participate as low and the benefits gained 
as minimal. The low ratings by the private sector could be expected since the 
private sector is not an official critical discipline as identified by DHS. This means 
that the HSGP cannot be used to support private sector homeland security 
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projects financially.91 When this same data was aggregated by the respondents’ 
affiliation, the data showed that UASIs perceived greater benefits from 
participation, but they also reported that the cost to participate was higher as 
well. Table 8 provides the breakdown for the local, UASI, state, federal and 
private sector partners.92  
Table 8.   Costs versus Benefits by Affiliation  
  Local UASI State Federal Private 
Cost to Participate Overall Average 3.14 (140) 
None (1) 0% 1% 8% 20% 33% 
Low (2) 38% 10% 23% 33% 50% 
Medium (3) 46% 46% 35% 13% 17% 
High (4) 8% 35% 19% 20% 0% 
Very High (5) 8% 8% 15% 13% 0% 
Average Rating 2.85 (13) 3.38 (80) 3.12 (26) 2.73 (15) 1.83 (6) 
Benefits Gained Overall Average 3.88 (135) 
None (1) 9% 0% 0% 20% 20% 
Low (2) 0% 5% 4% 7% 20% 
Medium (3) 18% 19% 35% 13% 40% 
High (4) 55% 40% 35% 20% 20% 
Very High (5) 18% 36% 27% 40% 0% 
Average Rating 3.73 (11) 4.06 (78) 3.85 (26) 3.53 (15) 2.60 (5) 
To understand the costs to administer the program better, the respondents 
were queried on the usefulness of current reporting tools to connect investments 
to improved capabilities. The respondents were asked to rate the required 
strategies, investment justifications, Bi-Annual Strategy Implementation Report 
(BSIR), Programmatic Monitoring Visits, and State Preparedness Reports (SPR).  
                                            
91 The exception to this is the Infrastructure Protection Grants administered by FEMA.  





























Figure 5.   Rate the usefulness of current reporting tools to connect 
investments to improved capabilities within your locality?  
As the graph shows, the majority of respondents felt that strategies and 
investment justifications were more effective than the BSIR, programmatic 
monitoring visits, and SPRs. Strategies and investment justifications are a 
requirement for both the state and UASI jurisdictions, so it is reasonable that 
these tools would be perceived as a more effective method for connecting 
investments to increased capabilities. While the strategy document is a thirty 
thousand foot view of the state/UASI goals and objectives, investment 
justifications are written to outline how a future investment supports the 
implementation of the strategy and also to identify the potential return on 
investment. Since Fiscal Year 2006, the states and UASI investment justifications 
have been subjected to a peer review process, which is one component of the 
grant award process. This process encourages states and UASIs to submit 
comprehensive investment justifications and to update their strategies on a 
regular basis to ensure that peer reviewers can understand the state/UASI 
intentions.  
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Unlike the strategy and investment justification process, on average, the 
respondents viewed the BSIR as the least effective tool in translating 
investments into capability gains. As one state level respondent noted,  
The BSIR does not help local jurisdictions or states at all. It is 
purely a federal reporting tool that supposedly is used to provide 
the federal government information about how the funding is being 
allocated among disciplines and between allowable grant 
categories. It is purely a requirement for local jurisdictions; 
however, they gain no benefit from it (SAA included).  
While the BSIR collects a large quantity of data from state and locals, it lacks an 
analytical capability to tie how the funds invested increased capabilities. As 
mentioned in Section II, the HSGP was structured to be an equipment grant and 
the metrics associated with equipment purchases within the BSIR are limited to 
the number of Community Emergency Response Kits (CERT) purchased and the 
number of critical infrastructure hardened. These two metrics fail to address the 
development/sustainment of the thirty-seven target capabilities.  
Also, Programmatic Monitoring Visits are viewed as a poor tool for 
connecting investments to increased capabilities. The purpose of the 
programmatic monitoring visit is to evaluate the implementation of the program. It 
is completed independently of fiscal monitoring. Urban areas receive a 
programmatic monitoring visit every other year, but as one respondent noted the 
overlap of grant programs and the multiple “open” fiscal years makes it extremely 
difficult to identify clearly which grant was responsible for the improved capability. 
Also, the process is structured to ask the jurisdiction to identify the percentage of 
completion, but does not require the jurisdiction to provide solid support of this 
improved capability. As one respondent noted, “the data collected can not be 
relied upon for accurate analysis.”  
The SPR is a relatively new reporting requirement. A Post-Katrina 
Emergency Management Reform Act requirement, the SPR replaced the State 
Enhancement Plan. As multiple respondents noted, the short time frame for 
completion and limited guidance from the federal level, has left many feeling as if 
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the SPRs are being developed in a vacuum. In time, the SPR may be viewed as 
a more effective tool, but there needs to be a greater connection between the 
SPR, state and urban area strategies, and investment justifications. While 
reporting requirements come with federal grants, the respondents agree that 
there is room to improve the methods used to gather and analyze the data. 
Multiple federal respondents highlighted that due to the lack of electronic 
connectivity between reports, there are “buckets of information” with limited 
means to analyze and identify trends across state and jurisdictional lines.  
Question seven assessed the respondents’ perceptions of the benefits 
gained from participation in the HSGP program. Figure 6 provides a line graph of 

























Figure 6.   Rate the benefits you locality has gained from participation in the 
HSGP. 
Overwhelmingly, respondents perceive the equipment purchased as the greatest 
benefit of the HSGP. Coordination and Planning is also rated high, but training 
and exercises are perceived less favorably. When cross-tabulated by discipline, 
the fire service and law enforcement responded with the highest values on the 
equipment received, where as government agencies and homeland security 
perceived the benefit of equipment below average. Across the board, the local 
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respondents perceived a lower than average benefit from equipment, 
coordination and planning, training, and exercises. This could be attributed to the 
smaller percentage of funds distributed to non-UASI jurisdictions. Some 
respondents noted that training and exercise dollars are under-utilized due to 
perceived or real limitations on the use of grant funds. 
As noted in Section I, numerous homeland security and emergency 
preparedness grant programs provide financial assistance to states and locals. 
The final question of this section asked the respondents to rate the coordination 
of the multiple homeland security and emergency preparedness grant programs. 
Respondents were also asked to rate the political, social, and financial cost to 
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Figure 7.   Rate the coordination between the multiple homeland security and 
emergency preparedness grant programs (DHS/FEMA, Health and 
Human Services, Center Disease Control, Agriculture, Commerce, 
etc.)? Rate the political, social, and financial cost to coordinate 
these grant programs?  
On average, the respondents perceived the cost to coordinate to be greater than 
the level of coordination taking place. The comments from the state, UASI, and 
local respondents confirm the perception that the grant programs are stove piped 
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and that little coordination is occurring as programs are administered at the 
federal level. This makes it extremely difficult for states, UASIs and locals to 
coordinate the multiple programs.  
D.  SURVEY SECTION: VIEWS ON PREPAREDNESS 
In this section, respondents were asked a series of questions on the 
perception of current homeland security capabilities based on the four mission 
areas of preparedness and the fifteen national planning scenarios. Question nine 
asked the respondents their level of understanding of their locality’s investment 
strategy. Overwhelmingly, 66.2% of respondents said that they could explain how 
their locality had invested funds to enhance both day-to-day operations as well 
as to improve terrorism prevention, protection, response, and recovery efforts. A 
minimal 6.3% of respondents were incapable of explaining their locality’s 
investment strategy. This data supports the notion that most jurisdictions are 
working to tie investments to improved capabilities.  
Questions 8-9 were designed to identify baseline preparedness levels 
within the respondent’s jurisdiction and on a national scale. Respondents were 
asked to rate four mission areas of preparedness (prevention, protection, 
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Figure 8.   Based on the four mission areas of preparedness, how would you 
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Figure 9.   Nationally, how would you rate preparedness for the four homeland 
security mission areas?  
Comparing both charts simultaneously, one can see that the respondents 
perceive the jurisdictional level to have a higher response capability than the 
national capability. Prevention, protection, and recovery capabilities appear to be 
relatively constant between the locality and the national level. When cross-
tabulated by discipline and affiliation, the federal level and the fire service rated 
their jurisdictional prevention activities lower than the average. The fire service 
and law enforcement disciplines rated protection efforts lower than average. 
Homeland Security professionals rated their jurisdictional response capabilities at 
a lower level than the majority and the local and UASI respondents rated 
recovery lower than average.  
Delving deeper into the perceptions of preparedness, respondents were 
asked to rate the capabilities to prevent, protect against, respond to and recover 
from the fifteen national planning scenarios. Figures 10-24 provide histogram 
comparisons of the jurisdictional to national perception of preparedness for each 

















































Figure 10.   Scenario 1: 10 Kiloton 
Improvised Nuclear Device
Figure 11.   Scenario 2: Aerosol 
Anthrax 








































Figure 12.   Scenario 3: Pandemic 
Influenza 





















































Figure 14.   Scenario 5: Blister Agent Figure 15.   Scenario 6: Toxic 
Industrial Chemicals 
































































































Figure 18.   Scenario 9: Major 
Earthquake 
Figure 19.   Scenario 10: Major 
Hurricane 







































Figure 20.   Scenario 11: Radiological 
Dispersal Device 
Figure 21.   Scenario 12: Improvised 
Explosive Device 
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Figure 22.   Scenario 13: Food 
Contamination 
Figure 23.   Scenario 14: Foreign 
Animal Disease 




















Figure 24.   Scenario 15: Cyber Attack  
On average, respondents perceived their jurisdiction as moderately prepared for 
all scenarios except the 10-kiloton nuclear detonation and cyber attack. 
Respondents felt that their jurisdictions are less prepared for the 10-kiloton 
nuclear detonation and the cyber attack. Respondents felt that their jurisdictions 
are most prepared for toxic industrial incidents, chlorine tank explosions, and 
improvised explosive devices. Interestingly, when compared with the perception 
of national capabilities, the chlorine tank explosion scenario was the only 
scenario to receive a high preparedness rating. The majority perceived that the 
nation is least prepared for the 10 Kilo-ton nuclear. All of the remaining scenarios 
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averaged medium preparedness ratings. Respondents perceive their jurisdiction 
to be more prepared for pandemic influenza, plague, blister agents, toxic 
industrial chemical explosions, and improvised explosive devices than the 
collective national capabilities. In contrast, respondents felt that their jurisdictions 
are less prepared for earthquakes and major hurricanes than the nation as a 
whole.  
The final question of this series sought the respondent’s opinion on the 
prioritization of investments to optimize and strengthen preparedness. The 
respondents were eligible to select more than one answer.  
Table 9.   In your opinion, where should future investments be focused in order 
to optimize benefits and strengthen preparedness?  
Level of 
Government 
Prevention Protection Response Recovery Other Response 
Count 
Local Level 63% 61% 69% 47% 4% 137 
State Level 53% 52% 49% 66% 1% 117 
Regional Level 51% 46% 52% 53% 2% 117 
National Level 67% 43% 37% 65% 0% 116 
 
At the local level, the majority of respondents felt that the focus should be 
on response activities (69%), with second and tertiary focuses on prevention 
(63%) and protection (61%), respectively. The overwhelming majority of 
respondents felt the state should focus on recovery efforts (66%). At the regional 
level, respondents were more closely grouped within the recovery (53%), 
response (52%), and prevention (51%) areas. The respondents felt that the 
federal level should focus on prevention (67%) and recovery (65%) efforts. Due 
to the delay in response capability, many respondents noted that the state and 
federal government should focus on recovery efforts. 
 54
E.  SURVEY SECTION: RECOMMENDATIONS 
In the final section, respondents were asked to provide recommendations 
on how to improve grant-reporting systems and enhance the ability to tie 
investments to improved capabilities. When asked what would make the HSGP 
more successful, 57% of respondents felt that there should be a greater focus on 
local priorities. Granted, with the overwhelming number of UASI and local 
respondents, it is difficult to accept this assertion as a majority opinion of the 
entire homeland security community. Very few respondents (13.9%) felt that the 
current system adequately addressed local, state, and national preparedness 
priorities. This supports the assertion that the system could be more effective. 
Many respondents noted that there could be better coordination between levels 
of government in terms of grant reporting and the development of capabilities. 
The UASI and local respondents provided numerous anecdotal stories 
highlighting the need to focus on jurisdictional risk factors to optimize planning 
efforts. The federal mandates to focus on particular mission responsibilities, such 
as evacuation planning, improvised explosive devices deterrence and response, 
has forced jurisdictions to tackle scenarios that do not necessary align with their 
perceived priorities and has pulled personnel and resources away from other 
jurisdictional activities.  
Respondents were also asked to provide recommendations for improving 
the capability to measure the impact grant spending has made on preparedness. 
Forty-six percent of respondents felt that a national preparedness assessment of 
current capabilities was needed. Following closely behind, 41% of respondents 
felt that a performance management system should be integrated into existing 
reporting processes. A smaller percentage felt that a final grant close out report 
(35.5%) should be implemented to address accomplishments of each particular 
grant. Only 7% of respondents felt that the current reporting processes 
sufficiently addressed how investments were improving preparedness 
capabilities. Even though the majority of respondents favored additional 
requirements, the comments highlighted that the existing grant reporting 
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requirements are causing too much strain on the limited resources. Question 17 
further pressed the respondents to identify which partner or level of government 
should be responsible for measuring the impact of the grant programs. The 
majority of respondents (32.8%) felt that this issue could not be tackled by any 
one agency or level of government and that it required a concerted effort of all 
levels of government, the private sector, and the civil sector. Interestingly though, 
when cross-tabulated by affiliation, 33% of locals and 24% of UASI respondents 
felt that the locals should be accountable for this effort, while 41% of state and 
45% of federal respondents felt this responsibility should fall to the state level.  
Survey question 18 queried the respondent’s opinion on future investment 
planning strategies. For this question, respondents were eligible to make multiple 
selections. The slight majority (54.3%) felt that a risk-based planning process 
should be the primary driver of future investments. Following closely behind was 
the capability-based and local/regional scenario-based planning options (39.1% 
and 37.7%, respectively). The outlier was the use of the national planning 
scenarios to direct future investments. Only 4% of respondents felt that this was 
good strategic driver. As one local respondent commented,  
the use of scenario-based planning is a military convention that 
does not appear to be the best use of planning within civil 
government capacity. These civil government plans should follow 
the functional planning approach–identifying the functions common 
to all emergencies, and then identifying the roles and 
responsibilities of local governments to execute those functions.  
Another respondent noted that the challenges associated with measuring against 
the National Planning Guidelines stem from the fact that local jurisdictional needs 
do not always coincide.  
At the conclusion of the survey, respondents were provided an opportunity 
to share any additional comments on how participation in the HSGP has 




reporting processes. Respondents reported frustration due to the numerous 
administrative reporting requirements. One federal respondent eloquently 
summarized these frustrations,  
to spend so much time measuring the capabilities seems like a 
drain on the funding to increase capabilities. All of the money the 
federal government is spending on creating new tools to measure 
capabilities and progress, so that they can report to Congress, 
could alternatively be spent to fund more emergency planners, 
managers, and first responders at the local and regional levels. 
That would build capabilities.  
Respondents also commented that the HSGP has been like shooting at a moving 
target. To measure progress over time, respondents vocalized the need for a 
consistent methodology that does not vary as dramatically as the HSGP has over 
the past five years.  
F.  EMERGING THEMES 
In a recent article, Josh Filler summarized the challenges facing states 
and locals, when he wrote, 
urban areas can, at best, provide only an itemized list of things it 
purchased, such as the type of first responder equipment or the 
number of people trained on a given topic. However, it can not 
explain those acquisitions and activities in the context of value-
added risk management and capability enhancements based on a 
comprehensive plan.93  
After careful analysis of the survey results and the corresponding comments, 
several themes emerged. Respondents recognize that reporting requirements 
are a necessary responsibility, but all are looking for more efficient and cost 
effective ways to complete these requirements. Respondents would like to see   
 
 
                                            
93 Filler, “Not Just a Check from Uncle Sam.” 
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more streamlined processes that provide value for all stakeholders. Table 10 
provides the breakdown of the themes based on items that could potentially be 
eliminated, reduced, raised or created. 
 
Table 10.   Emerging Themes 
Eliminate Raise 
Fragmentation of grant reporting Coordination between grant programs 
Duplicative reporting requirements 
 
Connectivity between Reporting 
Condensed Timelines Strategic planning capability 
 
 Stakeholder buy-in of strategic goals 
and objectives 
 
 Coordination and communication 
between federal, state and Locals 
  
Reduce Create 
Grant program silos Performance Management 
 
Number of reporting requirements Risk-based investment planning 
Bureaucracy and Red tape  Analytics 
 
Time and effort required to fulfill 
requirements 
Local/regional planning scenarios 
 National capabilities assessment 
  
 
The elimination of the fragmented grant reporting systems would reduce stove 
piping and improve the coordination between the various grant programs. 
Further, reducing the number of reporting requirements and eliminating 
duplicative reports would minimize the resource drain on states and locals and 
could ultimately lead to improved accuracy in reporting. Numerous respondents 
noted that the short submission timelines has severely hampered the integrity of 
the final product. By minimizing the bureaucratic red tape and amount of time 
and effort required to complete the reporting requirements, states and locals may 
have more time to dedicate to strategic planning. This in itself will improve the 
efficacy of reporting and provide a greater opportunity for stakeholder to make 
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wiser investment decisions. In terms of creating new requirements, the majority 
of respondents felt that a national capabilities assessment was needed to 
determine the state of preparedness. Also, respondents felt that a performance 
management system, risk management program, and analytical capabilities were 
necessary for a comprehensive assessment tool. A new tool should allow for 
individual jurisdictional analysis as well as the ability to roll-up the data and 
evaluate national preparedness.  
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V. CASE STUDY: THE UNITED KINGDOM  
The United Kingdom has taken a different course of action for initiating 
preparedness programs. Instead of using grant funding as a means for 
enhancing preparedness, the U.K. has passed legislation requiring localities to 
adopt a risk management program. While DHS cannot officially mandate states 
and locals implement a risk management program, DHS has encouraged the 
adoption of risk-based investment planning. The Fiscal Year 2009 HSGP 
guidance is an example of how DHS is trying to coerce states and locals tactfully 
to focus on measuring the impact the grant programs have made toward 
achieving the National Preparedness Guidelines. DHS identified overarching 
national priorities, which include the following. 
• Addressing capability requirements and measuring progress in 
achieving the National Preparedness Guidelines 
• Strengthening Planning and Citizen Preparedness Capabilities94  
While states and locals seek analytical capabilities to make informed, risk-based 
investment decisions, the reporting requirements are overshadowing the 
preparedness planning effort. The U.K. provides some insight into the 
development of a national preparedness system.  
A.  STRENGTHS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM’S RISK MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEM 
Committed to addressing “the underlying drivers of security and insecurity, 
rather than just the immediate threats and risk,” the U.K. has implemented a risk 
management program that evaluates the threats, vulnerability, and underlying 
causes to gain a better understanding on how to prevent terror attacks, respond 
                                            
94 Fiscal Year 2009 Homeland Security Grant Program Guidance and Application Kit 
(Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Homeland Security, November 2008), I, 
http://www.fema.gov/government/grant/hsgp/index.shtm#more (accessed December 1, 2008). 
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and manage when they do occur, and minimize the consequences post-event.95 
Recognizing that the U.K. needed a formal civil protection structure, Parliament 
passed the Civil Contingency Act of 2004. The goal of the Civil Contingency Act 
was to have a single civil protection framework to meet the challenge of natural, 
accidental, and intentional disasters.96 Part 1 of the Act outlines the roles and 
responsibilities for the local and regional civil protection efforts.97 Through this 
legislation, the U.K. has established Local and Regional Resiliency Forums 
(LRFs and RRFs), a risk assessment process, and performance oversight to 
ensure that the national, regional, and local levels of government are effectively 
managing risk. While the U.K. acknowledges that not all risks can be mitigated or 
prevented, they have taken a proactive approach toward managing risk. 
1. Local / Regional Resiliency Forums 
The U.K. risk management philosophy is that the lowest level of 
government should have responsibility for managing risk.98 In keeping with this 
risk management approach, Local Resiliency Forums (LRFs) were formed. The 
LRF are composed of the “core first responders”99 including the local police, 
British Transport Police, fire, ambulance service, Maritime and Coast Guard, 
local elected officials, Port Health Authorities, primary care, Acute, and 
Foundation Trusts, local Boards of Health, Health Protection Agency, and the 
Environmental Agency.100 Utilizing the established police districts as the 
                                            
95 The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an Interdependent 
World (London, United Kingdom: Cabinet Office, March 2008), 4.  
96 Civil Contingencies Act of 2004: A Short Guide (revised) (London, United Kingdom: 
Cabinet Office: Civil Contingencies Secretariat, n.d.). 
www.ukresilience.gov.uk/preparedness/~/media/assets/www.ukresilience.info/15mayshortguide%
20pdf.ashx (accessed July 13, 2008), 2. 
97 Ibid., 2.  
98 Risk: Improving Government’s Capability to Handle Risk and Uncertainty (London, United 
Kingdom: Strategy Unit, November 2002), 11, 
www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/strategy/work_areas/~/media/assets/www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/strategy
/su%20risk%20summary%20pdf.ashx (accessed July 13, 2008).  
99 Also called Category 1 Responders. 
100 Civil Contingencies Act of 2004, 7.  
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geographic boundaries, the LRFs are responsible for the multi-jurisdictional 
coordination of the required Category 1 civil protection duties as mandated in the 
Civil Protection Act of 2004.101 The Act requires that Category 1 responders 
assess the risk of emergencies, develop emergency and business continuity 
plans, share and coordinate plans with other local responders; and have the 
ability to warn and inform the civilian population in the event of a disaster.102 The 
risk assessments are limited to only those emergencies or disasters likely to 
occur within the defined geographic area. The LRF is then responsible for 
coordinating all of the risk assessments, developing an agreed upon risk profile, 
and coordinating cross-disciplinary emergency response and continuity of 
operations planning.103  
The Regional Resilience Forums (RRFs) are responsible for coordinating 
the civil protection duties for Category 1, Category 2104 responders, and the 
Central Government. The RRF builds on the work of the LRF, but assesses the 
regional threats and impacts of a disaster. The RRF links the risks faced by the 
local entities with the strategic threat that the Central Governing bodies are 
concerned. This coordinated effort provides for comprehensive and uniform 
emergency planning across the entire country and feeds into the National Risk 
Assessment that evaluates the vulnerability, likelihood, and consequences of an 
event over a five-year period.105  
                                            
101 Emergency Preparedness: Guidance on Part 1 of the Civil Contingency Act of 2004, Its 
Associated Regulations and Non-statutory Arrangements (Easingwald, UK: HM Government, 
2005), 11, www.ukresilience.gov.uk/preparedness/ccact/eppdfs.aspx (accessed July 13, 2008).  
102 Civil Contingencies Act of 2004, 3-4.  
103 Emergency Preparedness: Guidance on Part 1 of the Civil Contingency Act of 2004, 11. 
104 Category 2 responders include utilities, transport and rail network, passenger and freight 
operators, London Underground, Transport for London, Airport operations, harbor authorities, 
Highway Agency, Strategic Health Authorities, and the Health and Safety Executive.  
105 UK Resilience, “UK Resilience-EP-Risk,” 
www.ukresilience.gov.uk/preparedness/risk.aspx (accessed July 13, 2008).  
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2. Risk Assessment Process  
In dealing with the internal threat and the external threat to U.K. interests, 
the U.K. has identified three critical roles of government. Government must be 
concerned with regulation of risk imposed by individuals/businesses against one 
another; stewardship of risk that is not directly attributed to a person/business 
and must be protected or mitigated; and management of risks that may impact 
their citizens or businesses.106 The U.K. has adopted a six-step risk assessment 
process that can be broken down into three phases: contextualization, risk 
evaluation, and risk treatment.107 In the contextualization phase, the LRFs and 
RRFs identify the risks that each area/region faces, define the scope, and 
develop a management process.108 Once the risks have been identified, the 
LRFs/RRFs evaluate the likelihood and consequences of each risk to develop a 
risk score.109 During the risk treatment phase, the LRF/RRFs evaluate the risk 
scores and determine which risks must be addressed first. The LRFs and RRFs 
then develop a strategy for the mitigation of those risks that can be eliminated 
and prepare contingency plans for those that cannot.110 As the nature of the 
threat changes, the risk assessments are updated.  
3.  Performance Assessment 
Recognizing the need for a mechanism to measure performance toward 
meeting the Civil Contingency Act of 2004, the U.K. selected the Audit 
Commission to complete the Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) 
Framework. The CPA is an existing government wide tool that is used to 
                                            
106 Risk: Improving Government’s Capability to Handle Risk and Uncertainty, 5.  
107 Emergency Preparedness: Guidance on Part 1 of the Civil Contingency Act of 2004, 40.  
108 Ibid.  
109 Ibid.  
110 Ibid. 
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measure the effectiveness of local council’s public service delivery.111 This 
assessment provides each council the opportunity evaluate their current service 
delivery and identify areas in need of improvement and then combines this with 
the external auditor’s assessment to produce a numerical score. This numerical 
score is then published. This audit is performed every three years and under the 
initiative for ‘Safer and Stronger Communities.’112 
B.  COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
While the United States can learn from the United Kingdom’s national 
implementation of a risk management program, the U.S. political system 
prevents the federal government from mandating actions of states and locals. 
Founded on the principle of federalism, the U.S. is structured to encourage 
coordination between levels of government while at the same time supporting the 
sovereignty of federal, state, and local governments.113 Whereas, the U.K.’s 
constitutional monarchy is based on a centralist state structure which places a 
greater authority with the central government.114 Since the U.K. does not have a 
written constitution, Parliament can implement legislative changes by passing 
Acts such as the Civil Contingency Act of 2004.115 The United States civil 
protection framework delineates public safety and law enforcement to the lowest 
level of government. As the National Response Frameworks highlights, 
“[i]ncidents begin and end locally, and most are wholly managed at the local 
                                            
111 Civil Contingencies Act of 2004: Performance Assessment Frameworks (London: Cabinet 
Office: Civil Contingencies Secretariat, July 28, 2006), Annex A, 
www.ukresilience.gov.uk/preparedness/~/media/assets/www.ukresilience.info/performance28070
6%20pdf.ashx (accessed July 13, 2008).  
112 Ibid., Civil Contingencies Act of 2004: Performance Assessment Frameworks, Annex A.  
113 The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, 11.  
114 Colin Talbot, “UK Public Services and Management (1979-2000): Evolution or 
Revolution?” The International Journal of Public Sector Management 4, no. 4 (2001): 289. 
http://proquest.umi.com.library.nps.edu/pgdweb?index=O&did=21756516&SrchMode=1&Sid=2&
Fmt=6 (accessed August 29, 2008).  
115 Ibid., 282.  
 64
level.”116 If the local level of government becomes overwhelmed, a request for 
additional resources can be made through mutual aid compacts from neighboring 
jurisdictions or the state. If state resources become overwhelmed, then the state 
can request assistance from the federal government. While this bottom up 
approach has served the United States well when responding to small scale 
emergencies, it poses a great challenge when considering the integration of 
resources into a national preparedness system.  
C.  SUMMARY 
The United Kingdom and the United States share a growing dilemma that 
the general public is willing to accept fewer risks to their health and security. At 
the same time, though, the public wants the freedom to take on additional risks, 
as well as have access to high quality public services.117 As the U.K. system 
highlights, the engagement of the general public is a vital step in the 
development of preparedness efforts. Public rapport can be gained from 
improving confidence that the federal, state, and local levels of government are 
effectively implementing the HSGP to reduce threats, minimize vulnerabilities, 
and increase the capability to respond and recover. The U.K. has taken steps to 
clearly define their goals for improving public trust by outlining strategic 
objectives of government institutions; creating transparency in decision making; 
basing decisions on evidence; allowing the public to share concerns and weigh in 
on decisions; providing sufficient information to stakeholders so that individuals 
can make informed decisions; and providing timely acknowledgement of 
mistakes with a plan for corrective action.118  
The Government Accountability Office has reported that the DHS faces 
three critical challenges in the implementation of a risk management program 
                                            
116 The National Response Framework (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of 
Homeland Security, January 2008), 10, www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-core.pdf (accessed 
August 29, 2009).  
117 Risk: Improving Government’s Capability to Handle Risk and Uncertainty, 4. 
118 Ibid., 16.  
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“improving risk communication, political obstacles to allocating resources based 
on a consideration of risk, and a lack of strategic thinking about managing 
homeland security risks.”119 While grant funding opportunities have been 
allocated for the improvement of state and local capacity to prevent, protect, 
respond and recover from an emergency, the current grant system lacks a 
mechanism to evaluate the impact spending has had on reducing threats, 
minimizing vulnerabilities, and lessening the consequences of a natural, 
accidental or intentional disaster. A recent GAO report noted that the public has 
an expectation that the government will be more open about the risks faced,  
they [the public] seek reassurance from government, but are 
skeptical of what they are told unless they can clearly see it is not 
influenced by vested interests. They want openness and 
independent advice. High levels of public expectation are set 
against a backdrop of declining trust in institutions, declining 
deference, and increased activism around specific issues, with 
messages amplified by news media seeking market share and 
aiming to meet the demands of round the clock coverage.120  
                                            
119 GAO, “Risk Management: Strengthening the Use of Risk Management Principles in 
Homeland Security,” GAO-08-904, June 25, 2008, 2, 
www.gao.gov/docsearch/locate?to=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.gao.gov%2Fnew.items%2Fd08904t.pdf 
(accessed July 9, 2008). 
120 Ibid., 7.  
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The more interdependent we become, the more we require order. 
Walter Issacson, President and CEO of Aspen Institute121 
 
The lack of a common preparedness vision, the numerous homeland 
security/emergency preparedness grant programs, and the time compressed 
requirements have all contributed to the inability to measure the impact the 
HSGP has made on preparedness. The survey participants acknowledged the 
importance of measuring progress and the need to explain how the funds have 
been invested, but their comments highlight that the time and effort required 
could be better directed toward improving planning and coordination activities.  
Since the beginning of the HSGP, states and locals have repeatedly 
requested that the administrative requirements remain relatively constant from 
year to year. This was recognized by FEMA and its predecessors who modified 
the grant processes minimally between FY06 and FY09. For this reason, this 
thesis does not recommend broad sweeping changes, but rather recommends 
minor adjustments to the already existing infrastructure. The overall intent is to 
bring the nation closer to answering “how prepared we are, how prepared we 
need to be, and how we prioritize efforts to close the gap.”122  
A.  INITIATE A NATIONAL CAPABILITIES ASSESSMENT 
To answer how prepared the nation is today, a national capability 
assessment should be initiated. This will assist states and urban areas with 
developing a baseline level that can be used to benchmark future progress. This 
assessment process should be a collaborative effort between the federal, state 
                                            
121 Mark Gerencser, Reginald Van Lee, Fernando Napolitano, and Christopher Kelly, 
Megacommunities: How Leaders of Government, Business, and Non-profits Can Tackle Today’s 
Global Challenges Together (New York City, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), 1.  
122 National Strategy for Homeland Security (2007), 43. 
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and local levels of government and should focus on the education of 
stakeholders. This could be an opportunity for partners to explain their unique 
reporting requirements and to develop innovative solutions that benefit all 
stakeholders. As survey respondents noted, the BSIR holds minimal value for 
state and local partners. If there is a platform for discussion and understanding, 
stakeholders may be more inclined to participate and have a vested interested in 
collecting the most accurate information.  
The first task should be the engagement of federal, state and local 
stakeholders in updating the Target Capabilities List and Universal Task List. 
FEMA has currently undertaken this process. Future revisions of the TCL and 
UTL need to address universal and cross-disciplinary performance metrics as 
well as provide an opportunity for jurisdictions to tailor performance goals to their 
unique threats and hazards. The updated TCL should also define minimum and 
maximum thresholds to assist state and local partners with setting attainable 
short-term and long-term goals. Some of the survey respondents also proposed 
shifting from the National Planning Scenarios to state/local specific planning 
scenarios. Planning efforts could then be focused on the prevalent localized 
threats and hazards. Each state and urban area faces unique hazards and some 
of the survey respondents commented that the heavy focus on national scenarios 
is pulling limited resources away from the more prevalent hazards.  
Technical Assistance programs should be established to assist state and 
local stakeholders with understanding how the revised TCL, UTL, and localized 
planning scenarios can be utilized to measure preparedness. Subject matter 
experts (SME) could be identified to assist in the evaluation of each state and 
urban area capabilities. The SME panel should be comprised of local, state, and 
federal officials, as well as the private sector and the general public. The panel 
should be representative of the critical disciplines. Due to the time constraints of 
an extensive assessment process, the amount of data collected may need to be 
minimized to the assessment of the ten most prominent target capabilities within  
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each state/urban area. Likert-based scales could be used in the initial 
assessment. This will provide a relatively straightforward process for evaluation 
and will generate results that can be analyzed.  
State and local respondents acknowledged the need for a systematic 
means to evaluate capabilities, but the fear of reprisal for negative findings looms 
in the background. One state respondent commented, “an independent, ‘no fault’ 
assessment of results of states might encourage candor and reasonable, 
practical recommendations.” The success of a national assessment process will 
reside in the development and roll out of the process. If all partners are treated 
as equals with knowledge and expertise to shape the outcome, then this 
assessment has the potential to be a success. If this process is driven from the 
top-down with limited stakeholder involvement, it is possible the assessment will 
be viewed unfavorably by state and local partners. This, in turn, could minimize 
the efficacy of the results.  
B.  INITIATE A NATIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT  
States and urban areas were required to complete a risk assessment as a 
component of the 2003 SHSP and UASI grant programs. Even though the 
geographic area of the urban areas has been expanded to include the 
metropolitan statistical areas, an updated risk assessment has not been required. 
Building on the U.K. experience, risk may be better managed by the lowest 
possible level community (e.g., public, private and/or civil sectors). Revisiting the 
state and urban area risk assessments may enhance local, state and regional 
planning efforts by providing a clearer operating picture of the current threats that 
each jurisdiction faces as well as assisting with prioritizing future preparedness 
activities. The risk assessment process could identify previously unknown 
equipment, training, planning, and exercise shortfalls. It may also create 
organizational structure to connect spending to the reduction of risk factors. This 
will assist state and locals in answering how prepared does each jurisdiction 
need to be.  
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Risk is dynamic and can change from day to day. A technical assistance 
program could improve state and local stakeholders understanding of risk, and 
assist with the integrating a risk management program into daily operations. A 
recent GAO report highlighted the need for risk management education to foster 
risk-based decision making.123 DHS has created an algorithm for evaluating state 
and urban area risk scores, but this score is one dimensional and does not 
provide the operating picture needed to make investment decisions. A national 
risk assessment process could assist jurisdictions with identifying and managing 
the potential threats, vulnerabilities, and the resulting consequences. This may 
enable practitioners to more effectively communicate funding needs and assist 
decision makers with prioritizing future resources.  
C.  INSTITUTE AN INTEGRATED TECHNOLOGY PLATFORM 
States and locals are significantly burdened with numerous and lengthy 
reporting requirements. Six different national assessment systems exist including 
the NIMS Compliance Assessment Tool, Gap Analysis Program, Pilot 
Capabilities Assessment, National Preparedness System, State Preparedness 
Reports, and Capabilities Assessment for Readiness. DHS is also in the process 
of developing the Cost-to-Capability assessment tool. While all of these systems 
hold value, they are not connected, drain state and local resources, and could 
lead to duplicative reporting. One federal respondent noted,  
There are too many reporting tools, and the move to consolidate 
back to one reporting tool is going to have much complexity and 
probably lots of growing pains, but it is the right move. The State 
Preparedness Reports are a positive step, but becoming another 
mountainous effort requested of over-worked State EM/HS 
[Emergency Management/Homeland Security] officials. 
                                            
123 GAO, “Homeland Security Risk Management Forum: Strengthening the Use of Risk 
Management Principals in Homeland Security,” GAO-08-627SP, April 2008, 
http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/locate?to=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.gao.gov%2Fnew.items%2Fd086
27sp.pdf (accessed June 9, 2008). 
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A future technology platform should integrate the capability assessment, 
updated risk assessment, and performance management tracking so that state 
and local partners can show how investments are reducing risk, building 
capabilities, and achieving results. This would help to answer how each 
jurisdiction, state and the nation are progressing toward the quintessential 
preparedness capabilities. Stakeholder contribution and buy-in of the new 
technology platform are vital to the successful implementation.  
D.  AUGMENT CONNECTIVITY OF FEDERAL GRANT REPORTING 
SYSTEMS  
The initiation of a new integrated technology platform will take a significant 
amount of time to develop. In the interim, FEMA could address the limited 
connectivity between systems. This limitation has suppressed coordination 
across grant programs and the ability to analyze the impact investments are 
making toward improved preparedness.  
One respondent commented,  
the biggest problem with the reporting system is that none of them 
are electronically connected. We end up with buckets of 
information, with no way to analyze them to determine trends or 
easily coordinate across State and jurisdictional lines. 
Due to the diversity of partners, activities, and grant programs that fall under the 
homeland security umbrella, the federal government may want to focus 
resources towards the integration and connectivity of the various reporting tools. 
This challenge has been recognized and federal partners are currently working to 
enhance data collection and analysis capabilities.124  
Additional modifications could be made to improve performance 
evaluation in the interim. FEMA could establish a post-award process whereby 
grant recipients complete detailed work plans that identify performance 
benchmarks for the successful implementation of projects. Grant reporting 
                                            
124 The Federal Preparedness Report, 114. 
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systems could be modified to capture performance metrics and allow grant 
recipients to track investment progress during the performance period. This 
approach would allow state and local stakeholders to define their strategic 
objectives and identify how spending will be measured over the course of each 
grant program. This may provide DHS, FEMA, and other federal agencies with a 
better understanding of the current capacities of state and local entities as well 
as define the expected accomplishments prior to the release of federal dollars. 
The federal administrative agency could have the capability to monitor progress 
and it may provide a platform for state and local partners to communicate when 
jurisdictional goals do not fit within the confines of a particular grant program. The 
danger of this approach would be that jurisdictional objectives may not always fall 
in line with the national priorities. It also puts a greater responsibility on the state 
and federal administrative agencies to monitor state and local implementation, so 
that the grant dollars are spent according to the initial implementation plan. From 
the state/local perspective, the downside of this approach may in the flexibility to 
change direction if a project is no longer feasible.  
E.  AUGMENT FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL PARTNERSHIPS 
The foundation of preparedness activities resides in the relationships that 
have been built between and amongst the federal, state, local, private sector, 
and civilian communities. The survey comments, though, highlighted that each 
level of government holds some animosity against the other layers of 
government. The reasons vary from time compressed requirements to the 
perceived lack of understanding of stakeholder intentions. Reframing how 
partners are engaged could dramatically improve stakeholder participation and 
support of a national preparedness system. Mark Gerencser, Reginald Van Lee, 
Fernando Napolitano and Christopher Kelly recently released a book that could 
assist homeland security professionals with reconciling autonomy concerns 
amidst the interdependency of preventing, protecting, responding and recovering 
from a catastrophic disaster. The term mega-community has been coined to 
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describe “communities of organizations whose leaders and members have 
deliberately come together across national, organizational and sectoral 
boundaries to reach the goals they cannot achieve alone.”125 Figure 25 is a 
graphic depiction of a mega-community. 
 
 
Figure 25.    Mega-Community Diagram 
For homeland security purposes, though, a one-dimensional depiction does not 
adequately address the autonomy of the federal, state and local level of 
government. A three-dimensional, pyramid-shaped mega-community more 
accurately addresses the roles and responsibilities of all layers of government, 
the private sector, and the civilian population. Each layer of government has a 
unique homeland security role and strategy that coalesces and supports the 
national preparedness system. For this reason, it is most practical to differentiate 
each layer as a unique mega-community intertwined with the other mega-
communities. Figure 26 provides a graphic depiction of the pyramid mega-
community concept.  
 
 
                                            
125 Gerencser, Van Lee, Napolitano, and Kelly, Megacommunities: How Leaders of 
Government, Business, and Non-profits Can Tackle Today’s Global Challenges Together, 28. 
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Figure 26.   Pyramid Mega-Community Diagram 
The pyramid shape ensures autonomy while at the same time highlights the 
interconnectivity of layers working towards mutual goals such as national 
preparedness.126  
Since all disasters start and end at the local level, it is vital that the local 
level be treated as an equal partner in the development of a national 
preparedness system. Following the U.K. LRF model, the local mega-community 
could be compromised of the local first response community, private sector 
critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR), and civic/volunteer 
organizations such as the American Red Cross, Salvation Army, and Citizen 
Corps. The local mega-community contributes innovative investment strategies 
to address the unique threats and hazards prevalent within each locality.  
States are charged with the protection of their citizenry. In the HSGP 
process, they play an intermediary role between the federal level and the local 
levels of government. Some respondents noted frustration with the states’ 
authoritative role and infringement on what some believe are local issues. The 
clear delineation of responsibilities may reduce this friction. The state/regional 
                                            
126 Gerencser, Van Lee, Napolitano, and Kelly, Megacommunities: How Leaders of 
Government, Business, and Non-profits Can Tackle Today’s Global Challenges Together, 28. 
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mega-community could encompass the state and regional homeland security 
councils, private sector partners, and statewide civic and volunteer associations. 
The state/regional mega-community could focus on the issues that extend 
beyond the confines of a single locality and identify/develop solutions to address 
cascading impacts of a disaster. Due to the interconnectedness of critical 
infrastructure, the state/regional mega-community could also take steps to 
mitigate and develop response strategies to potential state/region-wide failures.  
From a national perspective, the national mega-community could integrate 
the national intelligence community, federal response agencies, national and 
multi-national corporations, and international response and relief organizations. 
The national mega-community could focus on horizon scanning and the analysis 
of the changing threat environment to develop strategies to mitigate national risks 
that extend beyond the confines of a particular state or region. The national 
mega-community could evaluate the interdependence of global critical 
infrastructure and key resources and develop mitigation and response strategies 
to potential enterprise-wide failures.  
While states and locals have called for a national approach to 
preparedness, the survey respondents are critical of federal requirements and 
mandates. Some respondents perceive that state and local stakeholders have 
not been included in decision making that directly impacts resources at the state 
and local level. The pyramid mega-community could tackle this issue head on by 
reminding stakeholders that each layer has an equal responsibility to participate 
and support the development of a national preparedness system. The issue of 
national preparedness is too broad for any one layer to tackle alone. Only when 
all three mega-communities are put together into the pyramid it is possible to 
begin to develop a shared, layered strategy for preparedness. Goals can then be 
broken down into mission critical responsibilities for each individual mega-
community. Based on the strengths and skill sets of the mega-community 
partners, the activities can be parceled out to the stakeholder best suited to the 
task. This concept already exists. States and locals have developed multi-
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disciplinary working groups to address homeland security issues. The challenge 
the homeland security community faces is developing an implementation strategy 
that dissolves the animosity between partners and sells that idea that this is an 
equal partnership.  
F.  IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES 
FEMA recently commissioned a panel of federal, state and local officials to 
assess the federal preparedness requirements. This report confirmed that state 
and local stakeholders feel the reporting requirements are “voluminous and time 
consuming.”127 The stakeholders surveyed requested the elimination of all 
unnecessary reporting.128 Of the states surveyed, 100% felt that they needed 
additional resources to administer the grants.129 The respondents also requested 
greater flexibility in how the funds were used to hire personnel to plan and 
coordinate the implementation of programs as well as sustain the capabilities that 
had been created with the HSGP.130 Large quantities of data are currently 
collected through numerous reporting processes such as Strategies, Investment 
Justifications, BSIR, SPRs, and programmatic monitoring visits. These 
requirements are time intensive and provide only moderate flexibility among the 
diverse grant recipients/sub-recipients. A new or modified grant reporting system 
would have to consider the constraints of the end-user. Concessions would be 
necessary to minimize time requirements. This would include reducing the 
amount of data collected. End-users may in turn have to compromise on the 
flexibility of the grant programs and the reporting processes.  
                                            
127 Analysis of State and Local Officials’ Views on Federal Preparedness Requirements 
(Washington, D.C.: Federal Emergency Management Agency, January 2009), 28, 
www.llis.dhs.gov/docdetails/details.do?contentID=34103 (accessed January 31, 2009). 
128 Ibid., 22.  
129 Ibid., 28.  
130 Ibid. 
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G. IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY  
To assist with the packaging and dissemination of these 
recommendations, a strategy canvas was developed. The strategy canvas, a 
concept of the 2005 book, Blue Ocean Strategy, provides a means to assess 
industry competition and identify innovative strategies to migrate into new, 
untapped, and profitable markets.131 The purpose of this planning technique is to 
assess current market forces and evaluate performance across these factors. 
The canvas can be then used to illustrate an action plan for improving operations 
and creating new market space.132 However, for this particular issue, the strategy 
canvas does not focus on competitive forces, instead, it is structured to enhance 
grant-reporting processes, improve the ability to measure preparedness, and 




Figure 27.   Strategy Canvas  
The horizontal axis of the canvas captures the areas that federal, state, and local 
stakeholders currently invest or have been encouraged to invest resources for 
                                            
131 W. Chan Kim and Renee Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy (Boston, MA: Harvard 
Business School Press, 2005), 4.  
132 Ibid., 25.  
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the administration of the HSGP. The vertical axis captures the stakeholder 
perception of value for the identified factors. The perception of value for current 
grant reporting systems is represented by the red boxes. A value curve has been 
plotted to show the relative performance of current HSGP reporting. The 
perceived values for the modified grant reporting system have been depicted by 
the blue triangles. The recommended modifications have been plotted against 
the same profile to show the variation in perceived value. The profile has been 
further sub-divided into three sections: criteria that exist, but can be 
compromised to suit available resource constraints; criteria that exist, but could 
be augmented; and criteria that do not currently exist within the global system 
and that should be instituted. This canvas could be used as a blueprint for 
institutionalizing behaviors/operational activities that will help to answer “how 
prepared we are, how prepared we need to be, and how we prioritize efforts to 
close the gap.”133  
                                            
133 National Strategy for Homeland Security (2007), 43. 
 79
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The 2009 Federal Preparedness Report highlighted that the “lack of risk-
informed performance measures, data, and analytical approaches has hampered 
our [DHS’s] ability to assess the effectiveness of our investments and 
preparedness efforts.”134 This research has attempted to delve deeper into the 
root causes of these issues, explain why these challenges prevail, and provide 
recommendations to improve the capability to measure the return on investment. 
Five recommendations have been offered to resolve or minimize these 
challenges for stakeholders. The recommendations include the initiation a nation-
wide capabilities assessment. This will assist state and locals with creating a 
realistic capabilities baseline founded on analysis rather than perception. In 
concert, the homeland security community should initiate of a nation-wide risk 
assessment. This activity will assist states and locals with developing an 
analytical methodology for evaluating threat, vulnerability and consequences that 
may impact their jurisdiction. These processes alone will enhance coordination 
and strategic planning amongst stakeholders and develop the foundation for 
implementing performance management and risk management practices.  
To track progress and measure the impact the grant programs are making 
toward the reduction of risk, an integrated technology platform should be 
developed. Numerous reporting systems exist that have been developed or are 
under construction that can collect a large amount of data. To convert this data 
into knowledge, though, it must be analyzed. The existing systems are not 
electronically connected, which limits the capacity to analyze the various reports.  
It may be implausible to develop a single integrated reporting system 
since there are numerous federal agencies that have a homeland security 
function. An alternative would be to augment the connectivity between reporting 
systems. This may assist with developing a more comprehensive picture of 
                                            
134 The Federal Preparedness Report, v.  
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preparedness. The ability to analyze expenditures across programs and 
jurisdictions could strengthen local, state and national preparedness activities 
and assist with directing future grant funding towards identified shortfalls in 
prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery efforts. With the current grant 
reporting systems, it is difficult to get a handle on the disparate homeland 
security initiatives developing at the state, regional, and local level.  
The implementation of national assessments and integrated technology 
platforms will take time to develop and roll-out. In the interim, the homeland 
security community could focus on relationship building. Following the example 
of the United Kingdom, states and locals could adopt the local/regional resiliency 
forum concept. This process serves to bring all of the partners together that have 
a vested interest in managing risk. Collectively, the group, also referred to a 
pyramid mega-community, can more efficiently manage resources towards the 
reduction and mitigation of risk. If the foundation of these planning activities is not 
equitable, participation may dwindle and the data collected could be 
compromised. In turn, this would diminish the validity of findings.  
The number of widgets purchased will not measure the success of 
national preparedness, but rather the strength of the relationships developed in 
the process will. States and locals will be more apt to contribute to this endeavor 
if they are considered equal partners in the process. States and locals want to 
understand how the data will be analyzed, how it will be packaged for decision 
makers, and how the results may impact future funding. While this information is 
not secret, the lack of transparency creates the illusion that the analysis may 
negatively impact future grant opportunities. Overall, stakeholder buy-in is and 
will continue to be the critical component of national preparedness.  
The Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) was created to target 
specific shortfalls in the state and local capacity to equip, plan, train, and 
exercise to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from a terrorist 
incident. The current reporting systems have left the federal, state and local 
partners with an incomplete picture of what these grant programs have 
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accomplished. The homeland security community should initiate a national 
capability assessment, national risk assessment, and an integrated technology 
platform that connects how the HSGP investments are reducing risk, building 
capabilities, and measuring progress toward meeting preparedness goals. These 
recommended actions will take a significant amount of time to complete. In the 
mean time, all stakeholders should continue to integrate/connect reporting 
systems, enhance coordination amongst grant programs, and strengthen 
partnerships within the homeland security community. As this process unfolds, 
stakeholders will have to come to a consensus on the amount/type of data that 
will be collected, the flexibility that will be afforded to state and local recipients, 
and the time commitment required for the completion of reporting. 
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APPENDIX. 













































































































































Discipline Represented    
Answer Options 





Local including Tribal-not 
affiliated with an Urban 
Area Security Initiative 
(UASI) City 
9 1 0 0 2 7.3% 12 
Local including Tribal-
affiliated with a UASI City 43 20 4 5 10 49.7% 82 
State or Territory 12 1 6 6 3 17.0% 28 
Federal 
10 0 7 9 0 15.8% 26 
Private Sector 4 1 1 1 0 4.2% 7 
Other (please specify) 
















3. Discipline Represented  
  
Discipline Represented    
Answer Options 





Critical Infrastructure 0 0 0 0 0 0.0% 0 
Emergency Management 84 0 0 0 0 50.6% 84 
Emergency Medical 
Services (EMS) 0 0 0 0 0 0.0% 0 
Fire Service 0 25 0 0 0 15.1% 25 
Government Agency 0 0 19 0 0 11.4% 19 
HazMat 0 0 0 0 0 0.0% 0 
Health Care 0 0 0 0 0 0.0% 0 
Homeland Security 0 0 0 21 0 12.7% 21 
Law Enforcement 0 0 0 0 17 10.2% 17 
Military 0 0 0 0 0 0.0% 0 
Nonprofit 0 0 0 0 0 0.0% 0 
Public Health 0 0 0 0 0 0.0% 0 
Public Safety 
Communications 0 0 0 0 0 0.0% 0 














4. Please specify the HSGP grant program(s) that your agency/organization has 
participated in or will be participating in the future.  
  
Discipline Represented    
  
EMA FS GA HS LE 
Response 
Count 
Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) 
Yes 67 23 14 14 14   
No 14 2 2 6 1   
Total 81 25 16 20 15 157 
State Homeland Security Program (SHSP) 
Yes 75 23 16 13 16   
No 6 2 1 6 0   
Total 81 25 17 19 16 158 
Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP) 
Yes 58 11 14 10 15   
No 15 6 2 8 1   
Total 73 17 16 18 16 140 
Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) 
Yes 57 18 12 11 7   
No 19 4 3 7 6   
Total 76 22 15 18 13 144 
Citizen Corps Program (CCP) 
Yes 65 14 13 9 9   
No 15 5 3 8 3   














5. What is your perception of the cost to your organization/jurisdiction to participate in the 
grant program (e.g. attending planning meetings; writing investment justifications; 
completing procurement processes, monitoring, and auditing requirements, etc.)? What is 
your perception of the benefits gained from participation (e.g. equipment received; 
coordination and planning; training and exercises, etc.)?  
  
Discipline Represented    
  





Cost to Participate 
None 4 0 0 3 1    
Low 10 5 4 2 4    
Medium 29 11 1 6 6    
High 23 4 4 2 1    
Very High 6 2 3 2 3    
Average 3.24 (72) 3.14 (22) 3.50 (12) 2.87 (15) 3.07 (15) 3.18 136 
Benefits Gained 
None 2 0 1 2 0    
Low 5 0 0 1 0    
Medium 16 2 2 4 3    
High 21 15 6 5 5    
Very High 26 4 3 2 6    
Average 3.91 (70) 4.10 (21) 3.83 (12) 3.29 (14) 4.21 (14) 3.90 131 












6. How would you rate the usefulness of current reporting tools to connect investments to 
improved capabilities within your locality? Rate the following tools: 
Discipline Represented    




No connection 5 1 0 1 0   
Low 12 7 2 3 1   
Medium 28 11 5 7 10   
High 20 3 3 2 4   
Very High 6 1 0 0 0   
N/A 1 0 2 2 0   
Count 72 23 12 15 15 137 
Avg. Rating 3.14 2.83 3.10 2.77 3.20   
Investment Justifications 
No connection 4 1 0 0 0   
Low 15 6 1 3 4   
Medium 26 7 7 8 7   
High 24 8 2 2 4   
Very High 2 1 0 0 0   
N/A 1 0 2 2 0   
Count 72 23 12 15 15 137 
Avg. Rating 3.07 3.09 3.10 2.92 3.00   
Bi-Annual Strategy Implementation Report (BSIR) 
No connection 4 3 2 2 2   
Low 31 4 5 6 3   
Medium 23 8 2 5 8   
High 9 3 2 0 1   
Very High 2 0 0 0 0   
N/A 3 4 1 2 1   
Count 72 22 12 15 15 136 
Avg. Rating 2.62 2.61 2.36 2.23 2.57   
Programmatic Monitoring Visits 
No connection 6 1 1 1 0   
Low 24 8 4 6 4   
Medium 25 6 3 4 8   
High 10 6 2 1 1   
Very High 5 1 1 1 1   
N/A 2 0 1 2 1   
Count 72 22 12 15 15 136 










6. How would you rate the usefulness of current reporting tools to connect investments to 
improved capabilities within your locality? Rate the following tools: 
Discipline Represented    
EMA FS GA HS LE 
Response 
Count 
State Preparedness Reports 
No connection 2 2 0 2 0   
Low 30 9 3 4 5   
Medium 23 4 6 5 6   
High 13 5 1 2 4   
Very High 3 1 1 0 0   
N/A 1 1 1 2 0   
Count 72 22 12 15 15 136 













7. How would you rate the benefits your locality has gained from participation in the 
Homeland Security Grant Program? 
Discipline Represented    




No Benefit 1 1 1 1 0   
Low 4 0 0 0 1   
Medium 6 1 1 2 2   
High 24 4 5 4 2   
Very High 34 16 4 4 10   
N/A 2 1 1 4 0   
Count 71 23 12 15 15 136 
Avg. 
Rating 4.25 4.55 4.00 3.91 4.40   
Coordination and Planning 
No Benefit 3 1 1 1 0   
Low 6 2 0 0 1   
Medium 20 8 3 3 6   
High 20 6 5 6 5   
Very High 20 5 2 2 3   
N/A 2 1 1 3 0   
Count 71 23 12 15 15 136 
Avg. 
Rating 3.70 3.55 3.64 3.67 3.67   
Training 
No Benefit 1 1 1 1 0   
Low 6 3 1 1 1   
Medium 25 7 2 6 5   
High 20 5 4 3 5   
Very High 17 6 3 1 4   
N/A 2 1 1 3 0   
Count 71 23 12 15 15 136 
Avg. 
Rating 3.67 3.55 3.64 3.17 3.80   
Exercises 
No Benefit 4 2 1 1 0   
Low 9 4 1 1 3   
Medium 22 6 3 5 8   
High 20 6 4 4 2   
Very High 13 4 2 1 2   
N/A 2 1 1 3 0   
Count 70 23 12 15 15 135 
Avg. 














8. Within your locality, how would you rate the coordination between the multiple homeland 
security and emergency preparedness grant programs (DHS/FEMA, Health and Human 
Services, Center Disease Control, Agriculture, Commerce, etc.)? How would you rate the 
political, social, and financial cost to coordinate these grant programs?  
Discipline Represented    




None 4 2 1 1 1   
Low 28 8 3 4 5   
Moderate 27 8 5 5 5   
High 11 3 1 5 3   
Very High 2 2 1 0 1   
Count 72 23 11 15 15 136 
Avg. 
Rating 2.71 2.78 2.82 2.93 2.87   
Cost to Coordinate 
None 4 1 1 0 0   
Low 13 5 2 4 4   
Moderate 35 10 2 7 3   
High 16 5 5 2 7   
Very High 2 1 1 1 0   
Count 70 22 11 14 14 131 
Avg. 












9. Do you feel that you could explain how your locality has invested HSGP funds to improve 
preparedness?  
  Discipline Represented  
  





Not at all. 2 1 1 2 0 4.7% 6 
I could explain what 
my individual agency 
has received from the 
HSGP funding. 
13 7 1 2 4 20.9% 27 
I could explain how the 
equipment my agency 
has received improved 
daily operations. 
13 6 0 2 6 20.9% 27 
I could explain how the 
equipment, planning, 
and training/exercises 
has improved my 
agency's capability to 
respond to a terrorism 
incident. 
22 7 3 5 6 33.3% 43 
I could explain how my 
locality has invested 
HSGP funds to 
enhance both day-to-
day operations as well 
as my locality's ability 




45 19 5 8 10 67.4% 87 








11. How would you rate your locality's preparedness for the following scenarios?  
Affiliation Answer 
Options 
EMA FS GA HS LE 
Response 
Count 
10 Kilo-ton Nuclear Detonation 
None 12 7 1 1 4   
Low 31 10 3 8 8   
Medium 14 5 3 1 2   
High 5 0 0 1 0   
Very High 1 0 0 0 0   
N/A 4 0 3 2 0   
Count 67 22 10 13 14 126 
Avg. Rating 2.24 1.91 2.29 2.18 1.86   
Aerosolized Anthrax Attack 
None 2 1 0 0 1   
Low 18 8 1 3 6   
Medium 31 9 5 6 5   
High 11 4 2 2 2   
Very High 2 0 0 0 0   
N/A 2 0 2 2 0   
Count 66 22 10 13 14 125 
Avg. Rating 2.89 2.73 3.13 2.91 2.57   
Pandemic Influenza 
None 0 0 0 0 1   
Low 8 6 1 3 1   
Medium 40 10 5 4 8   
High 15 4 2 4 4   
Very High 3 2 0 0 0   
N/A 1 0 2 2 0   
Count 67 22 10 13 14 126 
Avg. Rating 3.20 3.09 3.13 3.09 3.07   
Plague 
None 0 2 0 0 0   
Low 17 8 3 5 4   
Medium 37 9 4 5 8   
High 9 2 1 1 2   
Very High 2 1 0 0 0   
N/A 2 0 2 2 0   
Count 67 22 10 13 14 126 






11. How would you rate your locality's preparedness for the following scenarios?  
Affiliation Answer 
Options 
EMA FS GA HS LE 
Response 
Count 
Blister Agent Attack 
None 3 2 0 0 1   
Low 18 2 2 4 8   
Medium 30 13 5 4 5   
High 11 3 1 2 0   
Very High 2 2 0 1 0   
N/A 3 0 2 2 0   
Count 67 22 10 13 14 126 
Avg. Rating 2.86 3.05 2.88 3.00 2.29   
Toxic Industrial Chemical Incident 
None 0 0 0 0 1   
Low 6 1 1 2 2   
Medium 24 5 4 3 7   
High 24 13 2 4 2   
Very High 12 3 1 2 2   
N/A 1 0 2 2 0   
Count 67 22 10 13 14 126 
Avg. Rating 3.64 3.82 3.38 3.55 3.14   
Nerve Agent Attack 
None 2 0 0 0 1   
Low 23 7 2 3 8   
Medium 26 8 5 5 4   
High 12 5 1 2 1   
Very High 2 2 0 1 0   
N/A 2 0 2 2 0   
Count 67 22 10 13 14 126 
Avg. Rating 2.83 3.09 2.88 3.09 2.36   
Chlorine Tank Explosion 
None 0 0 0 0 1   
Low 5 1 0 1 3   
Medium 17 7 5 4 4   
High 27 10 2 4 2   
Very High 16 3 1 2 4   
N/A 2 1 2 2 0   
Count 67 22 10 13 14 126 






11. How would you rate your locality's preparedness for the following scenarios?  
Affiliation Answer 
Options 




None 5 2 2 0 1   
Low 18 8 0 4 2   
Medium 23 7 1 1 5   
High 7 4 2 3 3   
Very High 2 1 0 0 1   
N/A 12 0 5 5 2   
Count 67 22 10 13 14 126 
Avg. Rating 2.69 2.73 2.60 2.88 3.08   
Major Hurricane 
None 5 1 1 1 2   
Low 8 6 1 2 3   
Medium 9 5 1 2 1   
High 18 4 0 2 2   
Very High 7 2 2 1 2   
N/A 20 4 5 5 4   
Count 67 22 10 13 14 126 
Avg. Rating 3.30 3.00 3.20 3.00 2.90   
Radiological Dispersal Device 
None 1 0 0 0 1   
Low 19 7 2 3 8   
Medium 29 9 4 5 2   
High 14 4 2 3 1   
Very High 3 2 0 0 1   
N/A 1 0 2 2 0   
Count 67 22 10 13 13 125 
Avg. Rating 2.98 3.05 3.00 3.00 2.46   
Improvised Explosive Device 
None 1 0 0 0 0   
Low 5 2 2 2 1   
Medium 21 4 2 2 5   
High 31 11 3 7 3   
Very High 8 5 1 0 5   
N/A 1 0 2 2 0   
Count 67 22 10 13 14 126 








11. How would you rate your locality's preparedness for the following scenarios?  
Affiliation Answer 
Options 




None 1 0 0 0 1   
Low 15 8 3 3 5   
Medium 28 5 2 3 7   
High 17 5 1 5 0   
Very High 3 3 1 0 1   
N/A 2 0 3 2 0   
Count 66 21 10 13 14 124 
Avg. Rating 3.09 3.14 3.00 3.18 2.64   
Foreign Animal Disease 
None 2 0 0 0 1   
Low 23 12 3 5 7   
Medium 27 6 3 4 6   
High 11 2 0 2 0   
Very High 1 1 1 0 0   
N/A 3 1 3 2 0   
Count 67 22 10 13 14 126 
Avg. Rating 2.78 2.62 2.86 2.73 2.36   
Cyber Attack 
None 2 0 0 0 0   
Low 26 11 3 5 5   
Medium 27 6 4 5 5   
High 7 2 1 1 2   
Very High 1 1 0 0 2   
N/A 4 2 2 2 0   
Count 67 22 10 13 14 126 









12. Nationally, how would you rate preparedness for the four homeland security mission 
areas?  
  Discipline Represented  




None 0 0 0 1 0   
Low 17 5 3 3 5   
Medium 34 14 8 7 6   
High 14 3 0 3 1   
Very High 1 0 0 0 2   
Count 66 22 11 14 14 127 
Avg. Rating 2.98 2.91 2.73 2.86 3.00   
Protection (Mitigation / Target Hardening) 
None 0 0 0 1 0   
Low 19 7 1 5 5   
Medium 32 13 8 7 8   
High 14 2 2 1 1   
Very High 1 0 0 0 0   
Count 66 22 11 14 14 127 
Avg. Rating 2.95 2.77 3.09 2.57 2.71   
Response 
None 0 0 0 1 0   
Low 4 2 1 1 1   
Medium 22 13 8 4 6   
High 30 7 2 8 3   
Very High 9 0 0 0 4   
Count 65 22 11 14 14 126 
Avg. Rating 3.68 3.23 3.09 3.36 3.71   
Recovery 
None 0 1 0 1 0   
Low 22 7 5 7 4   
Medium 28 13 6 2 8   
High 15 1 0 4 2   
Very High 1 0 0 0 0   
Count 66 22 11 14 14 127 









13. How would you rate national preparedness for the following scenarios?  
  Discipline Represented  
Answer Options EMA FS GA HS LE 
Response 
Count 
10 Kilo-ton Nuclear Detonation 
None 2 3 0 0 1   
Low 41 13 6 7 6   
Medium 13 5 2 5 6   
High 7 1 0 1 1   
Very High 1 0 0 0 0   
N/A 2 0 1 0 0   
Count 66 22 9 13 14 124 
Avg. Rating 2.44 2.18 2.25 2.54 2.50   
Aerosolized Anthrax Attack 
None 0 0 0 0 0   
Low 26 8 3 4 4   
Medium 28 12 6 7 6   
High 11 2 0 2 4   
Very High 1 0 0 0 0   
N/A 0 0 0 0 0   
Count 66 22 9 13 14 124 
Avg. Rating 2.80 2.73 2.67 2.85 3.00   
Pandemic Influenza 
None 0 0 0 0 0   
Low 18 6 1 3 3   
Medium 29 12 7 7 7   
High 16 4 1 3 4   
Very High 3 0 0 0 0   
N/A 0 0 0 0 0   
Count 66 22 9 13 14 124 
Avg. Rating 3.06 2.91 3.00 3.00 3.07   
Plague 
None 1 0 1 0 0   
Low 24 10 3 5 3   
Medium 31 11 5 4 8   
High 6 1 0 4 3   
Very High 2 0 0 0 0   
N/A 2 0 0 0 0   
Count 66 22 9 13 14 124 






13. How would you rate national preparedness for the following scenarios?  
  Discipline Represented  
Answer Options EMA FS GA HS LE 
Response 
Count 
Blister Agent Attack 
None 2 0 0 0 0   
Low 23 10 5 4 4   
Medium 33 7 4 5 7   
High 5 4 0 4 3   
Very High 2 1 0 0 0   
N/A 1 0 0 0 0   
Count 66 22 9 13 14 124 
Avg. Rating 2.72 2.82 2.44 3.00 2.93   
Toxic Industrial Chemical Incident 
None 1 0 0 0 0   
Low 9 2 3 0 1   
Medium 23 10 5 7 6   
High 23 7 1 6 7   
Very High 9 3 0 0 0   
N/A 0 0 0 0 0   
Count 65 22 9 13 14 123 
Avg. Rating 3.46 3.50 2.78 3.46 3.43   
Nerve Agent Attack 
None 2 0 0 0 0   
Low 23 8 5 3 4   
Medium 27 8 4 7 8   
High 11 5 0 3 2   
Very High 2 1 0 0 0   
N/A 1 0 0 0 0   
Count 66 22 9 13 14 124 
Avg. Rating 2.82 2.95 2.44 3.00 2.86   
Chlorine Tank Explosion 
None 0 0 0 0 0   
Low 7 2 2 0 1   
Medium 17 7 6 6 5   
High 33 10 1 7 6   
Very High 8 2 0 0 2   
N/A 1 0 0 0 0   
Count 66 21 9 13 14 123 






13. How would you rate national preparedness for the following scenarios?  
  Discipline Represented  




None 1 0 0 0 0   
Low 10 3 2 1 1   
Medium 35 11 5 5 6   
High 14 8 2 7 5   
Very High 6 0 0 0 2   
N/A 0 0 0 0 0   
Count 66 22 9 13 14 124 
Avg. Rating 3.21 3.23 3.00 3.46 3.57   
Major Hurricane 
None 0 0 0 0 0   
Low 4 0 1 0 1   
Medium 30 12 6 4 5   
High 21 7 2 7 4   
Very High 11 3 0 2 3   
N/A 0 0 0 0 1   
Count 66 22 9 13 14 124 
Avg. Rating 3.59 3.59 3.11 3.85 3.69   
Radiological Dispersal Device 
None 1 0 0 0 0   
Low 18 7 1 2 5   
Medium 36 11 8 8 6   
High 9 4 0 3 3   
Very High 2 0 0 0 0   
N/A 0 0 0 0 0   
Count 66 22 9 13 14 124 
Avg. Rating 2.89 2.86 2.89 3.08 2.86   
Improvised Explosive Device 
None 0 0 0 0 0   
Low 9 4 1 1 1   
Medium 24 8 7 5 5   
High 28 7 0 7 5   
Very High 5 2 1 0 3   
N/A 0 0 0 0 0   
Count 66 21 9 13 14 123 








13. How would you rate national preparedness for the following scenarios?  
  Discipline Represented  




None 0 0 0 0 0   
Low 19 7 5 2 2   
Medium 26 11 4 2 9   
High 19 3 0 8 2   
Very High 2 0 0 0 1   
N/A 0 0 0 0 0   
Count 66 21 9 12 14 122 
Avg. Rating 3.06 2.81 2.44 3.50 3.14   
Foreign Animal Disease 
None 1 0 0 0 0   
Low 22 8 4 2 5   
Medium 29 13 4 6 6   
High 13 0 1 5 3   
Very High 0 0 0 0 0   
N/A 1 0 0 0 0   
Count 66 21 9 13 14 123 
Avg. Rating 2.83 2.62 2.67 3.23 2.86   
Cyber Attack 
None 0 0 0 1 0   
Low 29 7 4 2 5   
Medium 25 12 5 7 4   
High 9 1 0 3 4   
Very High 2 0 0 0 1   
N/A 0 1 0 0 0   
Count 65 21 9 13 14 122 










14. In you opinion, where should future investments be focused in order to optimize benefits 
and strengthen preparedness?  
Discipline Represented    




Prevention 39 12 6 9 10   
Protection 43 7 5 11 9   
Response 43 17 8 10 8   
Recovery 33 7 5 7 7   
Other 3 0 0 1 0   
Count 161 43 24 38 34 300 
State Level 
Prevention 31 10 4 3 8   
Protection 31 12 4 4 7   
Response 29 5 6 5 7   
Recovery 38 12 6 6 9   
Other 1 0 0 0 0   
Count 130 39 20 18 31 238 
Regional Level 
Prevention 36 10 4 2 6   
Protection 25 13 3 3 8   
Response 26 10 5 10 5   
Recovery 29 8 6 10 8   
Other 1 1 0 0 0   
Count 117 42 18 25 27 229 
National Level 
Prevention 43 14 6 1 9   
Protection 26 10 3 3 5   
Response 19 8 4 3 5   
Recovery 37 10 8 9 6   
Other 0 0 0 0 0   
Count 125 42 21 16 25 229 












15. Do you feel that the HSGP would be more successful if there was:  
Discipline Represented  
  





Greater focus on local 
priorities. 32 12 5 11 8 54.8% 68 
Greater focus on state 
priorities. 12 5 4 2 3 21.0% 26 
Greater focus on 
national priorities. 7 4 1 4 0 12.9% 16 
Greater transparency 
and communication on 
what was purchased 
and for what purpose. 
28 7 3 3 3 35.5% 44 
The current status 
adequately addresses 
local, state, and national 
preparedness priorities. 
8 2 2 0 3 12.1% 15 
Other (please specify) 














16. What recommendation(s) would you make for improving the capability to measure the 
impact that grant spending has made towards national preparedness?  
Discipline Represented  
  





Requiring quarterly reporting 
on the progress of 
investments. 
10 2 4 3 2 16.8% 21 
Requiring a final grant close 
out report that addresses 
accomplishments. 23 7 5 5 3 34.4% 43 
Increasing programmatic 
monitoring by FEMA 
representatives. 
12 4 1 4 2 18.4% 23 
Initiating a national 
preparedness assessment to 
evaluate current capabilities. 27 15 5 8 2 45.6% 57 
Integrating a performance 
management system into 
grant reporting processes. 25 12 7 5 3 41.6% 52 
Modifying the current grant 
reporting processes is not 
necessary. The process 
sufficiently addresses how 
investments are improving 
national preparedness 
capabilities. 
6 0 0 0 3 7.2% 9 
Other (please specify) 









17. In the FY08 and FY09 HSGP Grant Guidance, DHS has identified measuring the 
progress of investments against the National Preparedness Guidelines as a high 
priority. Which agency, jurisdiction, or partner should be responsible for measuring 
the impact of the HSGP?  
Discipline Represented    





Locals-the locals receive 
80% of the funds, they are 
accountable for how the 
funds are spent and should 
be responsible for 
measuring the impact of the 
funds. 
11 3 2 3 5 19.4% 24 
The State Administrative 
Agency-the SAA is the 
recipient of the HSGP and 
are in the best position to 
evaluate how the grant 
funds are improving 
statewide preparedness 
efforts 
18 6 4 3 0 25.0% 31 
FEMA Grants 
Preparedness Division-
states and locals provide 
data on how the funds are 
allocated through the 
Grants Reporting Tool, 
Strategic Plans, State 
Preparedness Reports, 
Enhancement Plans, and 
Budget Worksheets. FEMA 
has the necessary data to 
evaluate national 
preparedness. 
10 5 1 0 1 13.7% 17 
No one agency or level of 
government has the 
capacity to measure 
national preparedness and 
it requires a concerted effort 
amongst all levels of 
government, the private 
sector and the civil sector. 
21 6 4 5 6 33.9% 42 










18. What method(s) should be used to drive future investment planning and the 
measurement of accomplishments?  
  Discipline Represented  
  






development of core 
capabilities around the 
Target Capability List 
(TCL). 
27 8 5 6 3 39.2% 49 
Scenario driven-
development of 
capabilities around the 
national planning 
scenarios. 






25 11 5 5 1 37.6% 47 
Risk based-
development of 
capabilities based on 
the reduction and 
mitigation of threats, 
vulnerabilities, and 
consequences. 
35 10 6 10 9 56.0% 70 

























Affiliation   





Local including Tribal-not 
affiliated with an Urban 
Area Security Initiative 
(UASI) City 
13 0 0 0 0 7.6% 13 
Local including Tribal-
affiliated with a UASI City 0 90 0 0 0 52.9% 90 
State or Territory 0 0 32 0 0 18.8% 32 
Federal 
0 0 0 26 0 15.3% 26 
Private Sector 0 0 0 0 9 5.3% 9 
Other (please specify) 
















3. Discipline Represented  
Affiliation 
  





Critical Infrastructure 0 0 0 0 0 0.0% 0 
Emergency 
Management 9 43 12 10 4 46.2% 78 
Emergency Medical 
Services (EMS) 0 2 0 0 0 1.2% 2 
Fire Service 1 20 1 0 1 13.6% 23 
Government Agency 0 4 6 7 1 10.7% 18 
HazMat 0 2 0 0 0 1.2% 2 
Health Care 0 1 0 0 1 1.2% 2 
Homeland Security 0 5 6 9 1 12.4% 21 
Law Enforcement 2 10 3 0 0 8.9% 15 
Military 0 0 0 0 0 0.0% 0 
Nonprofit 0 0 0 0 0 0.0% 0 
Public Health 1 0 3 0 0 2.4% 4 
Public Safety 
Communications 0 3 0 0 1 2.4% 4 
Public Works 0 0 0 0 0 0.0% 0 















4. Please specify the HSGP grant program(s) that your agency/organization has 
participated in or will be participating in the future.  
Affiliation   





Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) 
Yes 5 89 23 17 2   
No 5 1 3 8 6   
Count 10 90 26 25 8 159 
State Homeland Security Program (SHSP) 
Yes 13 82 30 17 2   
No 0 2 0 7 6   
Count 13 84 30 24 8 159 
Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP) 
Yes 9 65 19 11 0   
No 3 8 4 10 8   
Count 12 73 23 21 8 137 
Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) 
Yes 5 65 20 16 1   
No 4 12 5 8 7   
Count 9 77 25 24 8 143 
Citizen Corps Program (CCP) 
Yes 5 66 22 16 1   
No 4 10 3 8 7   










5. What is your perception of the cost to your organization/jurisdiction to participate in the 
grant program (e.g. attending planning meetings; writing investment justifications; 
completing procurement processes, monitoring, and auditing requirements, etc.)? What is 
your perception of the benefits gained from participation (e.g. equipment received; 
coordination and planning; training and exercises, etc.)?  
  
Affiliation   
  







Cost to Participate 
None 0 1 2 3 2   
Low 5 8 6 5 3   
Medium 6 37 9 2 1   
High 1 28 5 3 0   
Very High 1 6 4 2 0   
Average 2.85 (13) 3.38 (80) 3.12 (26) 2.73 (15) 1.83 (6) 3.14 140 
Benefits Gained 
None 1 0 0 3 1   
Low 0 4 1 1 1   
Medium 2 15 9 2 2   
High 6 31 9 3 1   
Very High 2 28 7 6 0   
Average 3.73 (11) 4.06 (78) 3.85 (26) 3.53 (15) 2.60 (5) 3.88 135 




6. How would you rate the usefulness of current reporting tools to connect investments to 
improved capabilities within your locality? Rate the following tools: 
Affiliation   






No connection 4 2 1 0 3  
Low 1 15 4 3 1  
Medium 5 33 15 9 0  
High 1 24 6 0 1  
Very High 1 5 0 0 0  
N/A 0 0 1 3 1  
Count 12 79 27 15 6 139 




6. How would you rate the usefulness of current reporting tools to connect investments to 
improved capabilities within your locality? Rate the following tools: 
Affiliation   






No connection 2 1 1 0 3  
Low 2 16 4 3 1  
Medium 5 30 13 7 0  
High 2 27 6 2 1  
Very High 0 5 0 0 0  
N/A 1 0 2 3 1  
Count 12 79 26 15 6 138 
Avg. Rating 2.64 3.24 3.00 2.92 1.80   
Bi-Annual Strategy Implementation Report (BSIR) 
No connection 3 6 4 1 2  
Low 1 27 9 7 3  
Medium 6 27 9 3 0  
High 1 11 4 0 0  
Very High 0 1 0 1 0  
N/A 1 6 1 3 1  
Count 12 78 27 15 6 138 
Avg. Rating 2.45 2.64 2.50 2.42 1.60   
Programmatic Monitoring Visits 
No connection 1 4 3 0 2  
Low 3 31 7 5 3  
Medium 6 25 9 6 0  
High 2 12 5 1 0  
Very High 0 5 3 0 0  
N/A 0 1 0 3 1  
Count 12 78 27 15 6 138 
Avg. Rating 2.75 2.78 2.93 2.67 1.60   
State Preparedness Reports 
No connection 1 4 2 0 2  
Low 2 37 7 3 2  
Medium 7 21 9 6 1  
High 2 12 7 2 0  
Very High 0 3 2 1 0  
N/A 0 1 0 3 1  
Count 12 78 27 15 6 138 







7. How would you rate the benefits your locality has gained from participation in the 
Homeland Security Grant Program? 
Affiliation   






No Benefit 0 0 1 2 3  
Low 2 4 0 0 1  
Medium 1 8 4 0 0  
High 4 21 9 5 0  
Very High 5 47 12 2 0  
N/A 0 1 1 5 2  
Count 12 81 27 14 6 140 
Avg. 
Rating 4.00 4.39 4.19 3.56 1.25   
Coordination and Planning 
No Benefit 2 0 0 1 3  
Low 0 9 0 0 1  
Medium 7 23 8 2 0  
High 3 26 10 6 0  
Very High 0 22 8 1 0  
N/A 0 1 1 4 2  
Count 12 81 27 14 6 140 
Avg. 
Rating 2.92 3.76 4.00 3.60 1.25   
Training 
No Benefit 0 1 0 1 2  
Low 3 11 0 1 0  
Medium 6 27 10 4 2  
High 3 25 6 3 0  
Very High 0 16 10 1 0  
N/A 0 1 1 4 2  
Count 12 81 27 14 6 140 
Avg. 
Rating 3.00 3.55 4.00 3.20 2.00   
Exercises 
No Benefit 2 2 1 1 3  
Low 1 14 2 2 0  
Medium 4 33 6 2 1  
High 4 20 9 4 0  
Very High 0 11 8 1 0  
N/A 0 1 1 4 2  
Count 11 81 27 14 6 139 
Avg. 















8. Within your locality, how would you rate the coordination between the multiple homeland 
security and emergency preparedness grant programs (DHS/FEMA, Health and Human 
Services, Center Disease Control, Agriculture, Commerce, etc.)? How would you rate the 
political, social, and financial cost to coordinate these grant programs?  
Affiliation   






None 2 3 2 1 2   
Low 4 26 8 6 4   
Moderate 6 31 10 3 0   
High 1 14 6 4 0   
Very High 0 6 1 0 0   
Count 13 80 27 14 6 140 
Avg. 
Rating 2.46 2.93 2.85 2.71 1.67   
Cost to Coordinate 
None 1 2 1 1 2   
Low 3 16 4 1 3   
Moderate 4 36 16 7 1   
High 3 21 3 5 0   
Very High 1 2 2 0 0   
Count 12 77 26 14 6 135 
Avg. 











9. Do you feel that you could explain how your locality has invested HSGP funds to improve 
preparedness?  
  Affiliation 
  







Not at all. 1 0 0 2 5 6.1% 8 
I could explain what 
my individual 
agency has 
received from the 
HSGP funding. 
5 14 6 3 0 21.4% 28 
I could explain how 




5 17 6 1 0 22.1% 29 




has improved my 
agency's capability 
to respond to a 
terrorism incident. 
4 24 14 2 0 33.6% 44 
I could explain how 
my locality has 
invested HSGP 
funds to enhance 
both day-to-day 
operations as well 
as my locality's 






6 65 14 2 0 66.4% 87 
Other (please 








10. Based on the four mission areas of preparedness, how would you rate your locality's 
current capabilities?  
Affiliation 
  






None 0 1 0 1 0   
Low 2 25 4 4 2   
Medium 8 32 13 4 2   
High 1 17 6 2 2   
Very High 0 2 0 0 0   
Count 11 77 23 11 6 128 
Avg. Rating 2.91 2.92 3.09 2.64 3.00   
Protection (Mitigation / Target Hardening) 
None 0 1 0 1 0   
Low 5 19 7 3 2   
Medium 6 48 11 3 1   
High 0 8 5 4 2   
Very High 0 1 0 0 1   
Count 11 77 23 11 6 128 
Avg. Rating 2.55 2.86 2.91 2.91 3.33   
Response 
None 0 0 0 1 0   
Low 1 1 0 0 1   
Medium 3 17 9 2 1   
High 8 44 12 8 3   
Very High 0 15 2 0 1   
Count 12 77 23 11 6 129 
Avg. Rating 3.58 3.95 3.70 3.55 3.67   
Recovery 
None 0 0 0 1 0   
Low 4 32 3 3 1   
Medium 7 31 13 2 3   
High 1 12 7 3 2   
Very High 0 2 0 2 0   
Count 12 77 23 11 6 129 








11. How would you rate your locality's preparedness for the following scenarios?  
Affiliation Answer 
Options 





10 Kilo-ton Nuclear Detonation 
None 3 19 3 2 0  
Low 6 42 8 3 3  
Medium 1 12 7 1 1  
High 0 2 2 1 1  
Very High 0 1 0 0 0  
N/A 2 1 2 4 1  
Count 12 77 22 11 6 128 
Avg. Rating 1.80 2.00 2.40 2.14 2.60   
Aerosolized Anthrax Attack 
None 1 3 0 0 0  
Low 7 17 9 4 2  
Medium 3 44 8 1 2  
High 0 12 5 1 1  
Very High 0 1 0 0 0  
N/A 1 0 0 4 1  
Count 12 77 22 10 6 127 
Avg. Rating 2.18 2.88 2.82 2.50 2.80   
Pandemic Influenza 
None 0 1 0 0 0  
Low 1 12 3 0 2  
Medium 11 42 12 4 1  
High 0 20 6 3 1  
Very High 0 2 1 0 1  
N/A 0 0 0 4 1  
Count 12 77 22 11 6 128 
Avg. Rating 2.92 3.13 3.23 3.43 3.20   
Plague 
None 0 2 0 0 0  
Low 7 22 4 1 3  
Medium 5 42 14 5 1  
High 0 9 3 1 1  
Very High 0 1 0 0 0  
N/A 0 0 1 4 1  
Count 12 76 22 11 6 127 






11. How would you rate your locality's preparedness for the following scenarios?  
Affiliation Answer 
Options 





Blister Agent Attack 
None 1 5 0 0 0  
Low 5 19 6 3 3  
Medium 4 37 11 4 2  
High 0 14 2 0 0  
Very High 1 2 1 0 0  
N/A 1 0 2 4 1  
Count 12 77 22 11 6 128 
Avg. Rating 2.55 2.86 2.90 2.57 2.40   
Toxic Industrial Chemical Incident 
None 0 1 0 0 0  
Low 2 3 5 0 2  
Medium 6 26 7 3 2  
High 3 30 8 4 1  
Very High 0 17 2 0 0  
N/A 1 0 0 4 1  
Count 12 77 22 11 6 128 
Avg. Rating 3.09 3.77 3.32 3.57 2.80   
Nerve Agent Attack 
None 1 3 0 0 0  
Low 6 23 8 3 3  
Medium 4 31 10 3 1  
High 0 18 2 1 1  
Very High 1 2 1 0 0  
N/A 0 0 1 4 1  
Count 12 77 22 11 6 128 
Avg. Rating 2.50 2.91 2.81 2.71 2.60   
Chlorine Tank Explosion 
None 0 1 0 0 0  
Low 4 4 2 0 1  
Medium 4 22 7 4 2  
High 2 30 10 3 1  
Very High 2 19 2 0 1  
N/A 0 1 1 4 1  
Count 12 77 22 11 6 128 






11. How would you rate your locality's preparedness for the following scenarios?  
Affiliation Answer 
Options 






None 1 9 3 1 0  
Low 3 20 6 0 1  
Medium 4 22 6 2 2  
High 2 8 3 4 1  
Very High 0 4 0 0 1  
N/A 2 14 4 4 1  
Count 12 77 22 11 6 128 
Avg. Rating 2.70 2.65 2.50 3.29 3.40   
Major Hurricane 
None 0 7 3 0 1  
Low 4 12 1 1 2  
Medium 2 11 3 0 1  
High 0 12 6 5 2  
Very High 0 11 3 1 0  
N/A 6 24 6 4 0  
Count 12 77 22 11 6 128 
Avg. Rating 2.33 3.15 3.31 3.86 2.67   
Radiological Dispersal Device 
None 1 2 0 0 0  
Low 5 21 9 4 3  
Medium 5 34 8 2 0  
High 1 14 5 1 2  
Very High 0 5 0 0 0  
N/A 0 0 0 4 1  
Count 12 76 22 11 6 127 
Avg. Rating 2.50 2.99 2.82 2.57 2.80   
Improvised Explosive Device 
None 1 0 0 0 0  
Low 2 6 3 1 2  
Medium 5 18 10 2 1  
High 4 38 9 4 1  
Very High 0 15 0 0 1  
N/A 0 0 0 4 1  
Count 12 77 22 11 6 128 








11. How would you rate your locality's preparedness for the following scenarios?  
Affiliation Answer 
Options 






None 1 1 0 0 0  
Low 4 24 3 1 2  
Medium 6 25 9 3 1  
High 1 20 8 3 1  
Very High 0 5 1 0 1  
N/A 0 0 1 4 1  
Count 12 75 22 11 6 126 
Avg. Rating 2.58 3.05 3.33 3.29 3.20   
Foreign Animal Disease 
None 1 2 0 0 0  
Low 5 36 5 1 3  
Medium 6 27 12 3 1  
High 0 8 3 3 1  
Very High 0 2 1 0 0  
N/A 0 2 1 4 1  
Count 12 77 22 11 6 128 
Avg. Rating 2.42 2.63 3.00 3.29 2.60   
Cyber Attack 
None 1 1 0 0 0  
Low 3 40 9 2 1  
Medium 6 24 8 4 2  
High 1 6 2 1 1  
Very High 0 3 1 0 1  
N/A 1 3 2 4 1  
Count 12 77 22 11 6 128 









12. Nationally, how would you rate preparedness for the four homeland security mission 
areas?  
  Affiliation 
  






None 0 0 0 1 0  
Low 3 23 6 2 2  
Medium 8 36 13 8 3  
High 1 15 3 1 1  
Very High 0 3 0 0 0  
Count 12 77 22 12 6 129 
Avg. Rating 2.83 2.97 2.86 2.75 2.83   
Protection (Mitigation / Target Hardening) 
None 0 0 0 1 0  
Low 5 24 7 2 1  
Medium 6 38 13 9 2  
High 1 14 2 0 3  
Very High 0 1 0 0 0  
Count 12 77 22 12 6 129 
Avg. Rating 2.67 2.90 2.77 2.67 3.33   
Response 
None 0 0 0 1 0  
Low 1 5 1 1 1  
Medium 6 31 12 2 1  
High 4 29 8 8 4  
Very High 0 12 1 0 0  
Count 11 77 22 12 6 128 
Avg. Rating 3.27 3.62 3.41 3.42 3.50   
Recovery 
None 0 0 0 1 0  
Low 4 31 5 4 2  
Medium 7 34 14 1 1  
High 1 10 3 6 3  
Very High 0 2 0 0 0  
Count 12 77 22 12 6 129 








13. How would you rate national preparedness for the following scenarios?  
  Affiliation 
Answer Options 





10 Kilo-ton Nuclear Detonation 
None 0 7 0 0 0  
Low 6 49 9 8 3  
Medium 4 14 8 1 2  
High 1 6 1 2 1  
Very High 0 0 1 0 0  
N/A 0 1 2 0 0  
Count 11 77 21 11 6 126 
Avg. Rating 2.55 2.25 2.68 2.45 2.67   
Aerosolized Anthrax Attack 
None 0 0 0 0 0  
Low 3 28 8 6 2  
Medium 4 38 11 3 3  
High 4 11 1 2 1  
Very High 0 0 1 0 0  
N/A 0 0 0 0 0  
Count 11 77 21 11 6 126 
Avg. Rating 3.09 2.78 2.76 2.64 2.83   
Pandemic Influenza 
None 0 0 0 0 0  
Low 2 22 6 2 2  
Medium 6 37 12 4 3  
High 3 17 2 5 0  
Very High 0 1 1 0 1  
N/A 0 0 0 0 0  
Count 11 77 21 11 6 126 
Avg. Rating 3.09 2.96 2.90 3.27 3.00   
Plague 
None 0 1 0 1 0  
Low 4 32 7 3 2  
Medium 7 33 12 5 2  
High 0 9 0 2 2  
Very High 0 1 1 0 0  
N/A 0 1 1 0 0  
Count 11 77 21 11 6 126 





13. How would you rate national preparedness for the following scenarios?  
  Affiliation 
Answer Options 





Blister Agent Attack 
None 0 1 0 0 1  
Low 5 27 8 5 3  
Medium 6 34 10 5 1  
High 0 13 1 1 1  
Very High 0 2 1 0 0  
N/A 0 0 1 0 0  
Count 11 77 21 11 6 126 
Avg. Rating 2.55 2.84 2.75 2.64 2.33   
Toxic Industrial Chemical Incident 
None 0 0 0 0 1  
Low 2 6 4 3 1  
Medium 3 37 9 2 2  
High 5 25 7 6 2  
Very High 1 8 1 0 0  
N/A 0 0 0 0 0  
Count 11 76 21 11 6 125 
Avg. Rating 3.45 3.46 3.24 3.27 2.83   
Nerve Agent Attack 
None 0 1 0 0 1  
Low 5 22 9 5 2  
Medium 4 36 8 3 3  
High 2 15 1 3 0  
Very High 0 2 1 0 0  
N/A 0 0 1 0 0  
Count 11 76 20 11 6 124 
Avg. Rating 2.73 2.93 2.68 2.82 2.33   
Chlorine Tank Explosion 
None 0 0 0 0 0  
Low 2 7 2 2 1  
Medium 3 25 12 1 4  
High 6 34 6 8 0  
Very High 0 10 0 0 1  
N/A 0 0 1 0 0  
Count 11 76 21 11 6 125 





13. How would you rate national preparedness for the following scenarios?  
  Affiliation 
Answer Options 






None 1 0 0 0 0  
Low 1 13 4 2 0  
Medium 5 40 12 5 3  
High 4 17 5 3 2  
Very High 0 7 0 1 1  
N/A 0 0 0 0 0  
Count 11 77 21 11 6 126 
Avg. Rating 3.09 3.23 3.05 3.27 3.67   
Major Hurricane 
None 0 0 0 0 0  
Low 1 3 1 1 0  
Medium 6 35 12 4 2  
High 4 24 7 3 2  
Very High 0 14 1 3 2  
N/A 0 1 0 0 0  
Count 11 77 21 11 6 126 
Avg. Rating 3.27 3.64 3.38 3.73 4.00   
Radiological Dispersal Device 
None 0 1 0 0 0  
Low 5 20 6 2 4  
Medium 5 42 13 6 2  
High 1 13 1 3 0  
Very High 0 1 1 0 0  
N/A 0 0 0 0 0  
Count 11 77 21 11 6 126 
Avg. Rating 2.64 2.91 2.86 3.09 2.33   
Improvised Explosive Device 
None 0 0 0 0 0  
Low 2 8 4 0 4  
Medium 4 29 13 6 1  
High 5 30 4 5 1  
Very High 0 9 0 0 0  
N/A 0 0 0 0 0  
Count 11 76 21 11 6 125 














13. How would you rate national preparedness for the following scenarios?  
  Affiliation 
Answer Options 






None 0 0 0 0 0  
Low 6 22 4 3 1  
Medium 4 33 11 2 2  
High 1 19 5 6 1  
Very High 0 2 1 0 1  
N/A 0 0 0 0 0  
Count 11 76 21 11 5 124 
Avg. Rating 2.55 3.01 3.14 3.27 3.40   
Foreign Animal Disease 
None 0 1 0 0 0  
Low 7 26 4 2 2  
Medium 4 37 11 4 2  
High 0 12 5 5 2  
Very High 0 0 0 0 0  
N/A 0 0 1 0 0  
Count 11 76 21 11 6 125 
Avg. Rating 2.36 2.79 3.05 3.27 3.00   
Cyber Attack 
None 0 0 0 0 1  
Low 4 35 7 3 1  
Medium 5 29 13 5 2  
High 2 8 1 3 2  
Very High 0 2 0 0 0  
N/A 0 1 0 0 0  
Count 11 75 21 11 6 124 










14. In you opinion, where should future investments be focused in order to optimize benefits 
and strengthen preparedness?  
Affiliation   






Prevention 7 52 14 5 3  
Protection 5 51 13 7 4  
Response 10 51 14 8 2  
Recovery 6 38 11 3 2  
Other 1 3 1 0 0  
Count 29 195 53 23 11 311 
State Level 
Prevention 3 30 15 6 2  
Protection 4 32 11 6 3  
Response 6 24 14 6 2  
Recovery 6 45 12 4 2  
Other 1 0 0 0 0  
Count 20 131 52 22 9 234 
Regional Level 
Prevention 4 36 8 5 2  
Protection 5 31 6 5 2  
Response 5 32 11 5 4  
Recovery 2 36 13 4 2  
Other 1 0 0 0 0  
Count 17 135 38 19 10 219 
National Level 
Prevention 7 45 10 6 2  
Protection 3 25 10 5 2  
Response 2 24 6 3 3  
Recovery 4 46 12 8 3  
Other 0 0 0 0 0  
Count 16 140 38 22 10 226 












15. Do you feel that the HSGP would be more successful if there was:  
Affiliation 
  







Greater focus on local 
priorities. 8 48 11 3 3 57.9% 73 
Greater focus on state 
priorities. 3 7 11 6 2 23.0% 29 
Greater focus on 
national priorities. 1 5 3 4 2 11.9% 15 
Greater transparency 
and communication on 
what was purchased 
and for what purpose. 
5 28 9 4 0 36.5% 46 
The current status 
adequately addresses 
local, state, and national 
preparedness priorities. 
2 10 2 2 0 12.7% 16 
Other (please specify) 













16. What recommendation(s) would you make for improving the capability to measure the 
impact that grant spending has made towards national preparedness?  
Affiliation 
  








reporting on the progress 
of investments. 
0 13 6 4 2 19.7% 25 
Requiring a final grant 
close out report that 
addresses 
accomplishments. 
1 31 11 3 1 37.0% 47 
Increasing programmatic 
monitoring by FEMA 
representatives. 
1 11 5 4 0 16.5% 21 
Initiating a national 
preparedness assessment 
to evaluate current 
capabilities. 
4 35 12 4 2 44.9% 57 
Integrating a performance 
management system into 
grant reporting processes. 4 31 10 7 1 41.7% 53 
Modifying the current grant 
reporting processes is not 
necessary. The process 
sufficiently addresses how 
investments are improving 
national preparedness 
capabilities. 
2 6 1 0 0 7.1% 9 
Other (please specify) 








17. In the FY08 and FY09 HSGP Grant Guidance, DHS has identified measuring the progress 
of investments against the National Preparedness Guidelines as a high priority. Which 
agency, jurisdiction, or partner should be responsible for measuring the impact of the HSGP? 
Affiliation   





Locals-the locals receive 
80% of the funds, they are 
accountable for how the 
funds are spent and should 
be responsible for measuring 
the impact of the funds. 
4 18 3 1 0 20.6% 26 
The State Administrative 
Agency-the SAA is the 
recipient of the HSGP and 
are in the best position to 
evaluate how the grant funds 
are improving statewide 
preparedness efforts 
2 15 9 5 1 25.4% 32 
FEMA Grants Preparedness 
Division-states and locals 
provide data on how the 
funds are allocated through 
the Grants Reporting Tool, 
Strategic Plans, State 
Preparedness Reports, 
Enhancement Plans, and 
Budget Worksheets. FEMA 
has the necessary data to 
evaluate national 
preparedness. 
0 14 2 1 2 15.1% 19 
No one agency or level of 
government has the capacity 
to measure national 
preparedness and it requires 
a concerted effort amongst 
all levels of government, the 
private sector and the civil 
sector. 
5 24 6 3 3 32.5% 41 







18. What method(s) should be used to drive future investment planning and the 
measurement of accomplishments?  
  Affiliation 
  








development of core 
capabilities around the 
Target Capability List 
(TCL). 
4 28 13 5 0 39.4% 50 
Scenario driven-
development of 
capabilities around the 
national planning 
scenarios. 






3 34 7 5 2 40.2% 51 
Risk based-
development of 
capabilities based on 
the reduction and 
mitigation of threats, 
vulnerabilities, and 
consequences. 
6 45 10 5 3 54.3% 69 




D.  MEASURING PREPAREDNESS SURVEY COMMENTS AGGREGATED 
BY AFFILIATION135 
 
Q5. What is your perception of the cost to your organization/jurisdiction to participate in 
the grant program (e.g. attending planning meetings; writing investment justifications; 
completing procurement processes, monitoring, and auditing requirements, etc.)? What is 
your perception of the benefits gained from participation (e.g. equipment received; 
coordination and planning; training and exercises, etc.)?  
 
Federal 
• As a federal employee, I see the cost to participate more as the “taxpayers” cost of 
federal government offering the program. Benefits gained are tremendous and can be 
enhanced moving forward. 
• Job/agency is all about the development and administration of the grants 
                                            
135 All references to a particular jurisdiction or state have been removed.  
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• Cost is primarily staff time to attend meetings across the Regions. The benefits are better 
knowledge of state and local capabilities. 
• In our case, involvement is attending meetings and assisting the state, local and UASI 
organizations with grant information, etc. The benefits gained include a stronger 
knowledge of the capabilities of state and local governments. 
 
State 
• We need M&A in the stonegarden grant! 
• Monitoring and auditing, attending planning meetings, strategic planning, target 
capabilities, and IJ writing takes up a significant amount of time. When we went from a 
purely base + population methodology at the federal level to a risk and “need” 
methodology, our state tracked over 2000 man-hours dedicated to completing the 
Enhancement Plan requirement and the Investment Justifications. After all of that 
investment, however, our state only increased in award by less than $1 million and our 
IJs were in the top 15% of the nation. Was 2000 man-hours, which were taken away from 
actual homeland security planning/training/exercising, to complete the application 
requirements worth that $1 million? Most would say no-as there were critical gaps that 
were not being addressed due to the administrative requirements. Similarly, the IG came 
and visited our state. They were here for nearly two months, and were very unorganized 
and wasted a significant amount of the SAA and subgrantee's time. Directly on their 
heels, DHS came out to do a monitoring visit, and now we have been notified that FEMA 
will be spending 9 months in our state monitoring our grants. We are going to have to 
take people off of the front line and put them on administrative duty to deal with the 
audits/monitoring. That does not make good business sense. 
• For FY07 and FY08 HSGP grant cycles, the amount of time and money that went in to 
developing the grant applicant (IJs) were probably too much given that the IJs really only 
counted for a maximum of 10% of the award received. I like that DHS now gives us a 
targeted allocation-this helps our planning process for the application tremendously. 
• The program has been haphazardly administered. The was no end state describe or 
identified when we started. No real standardized target for each State, in other words 50 
different approaches. Emergency Management did not reap the benefits it should have; 
the program has been overly structured toward law enforcement. During this same period 
of time federal dollars for Emergency Management has been reduced. 
• It “costs” to participate, but those costs themselves are funded in the grant. 
• The Grants Management System in our state is a complex system that requires an 
extraordinary amount of time to process financial information and payments with many 
redundancies. The time my Fiscal Officer spends on Citizen Corps Program finances with 
GMS has increased from 5% to 25% of her time. 
• We serve as the state administrative agent (SAA). I work for the State Police, Emergency 
Management and Homeland Security Division. I deal with the Citizen Corps program 
 
UASI 
• To oversee a grant program, and do so properly, takes an extreme amount of time. 
• A new Administrative branch of three staff was created to develop and prepare the 
Investment justifications required by DHS and the SAA. Their work performance along 
with the public safety practitioners to meet plan, prepare, and present for consideration is 
inordinately long compared to the outcome and receipt of funding. 
• Return on investment is extremely high (operating budget divided by grant dollars 
received). 
• As a general statement we have spent a lot of time and we have received benefits from 
the programs. Some programs more than others. 
• Our region has been the recipient of a tremendous amount of free training over the past 
18 months that has assisted the region in being prepared for a CBRNE terrorist incident. 
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• The system has improved over the years. One issue is the States involvement. The state 
is not a level of authority over jurisdictions it is a pass through. Direct funding to 
jurisdictions should be considered. 
• Unfortunately, the city controls the entire UASI program. The outlying counties in the 
UASI have no say into what IJs are developed or oversight in any of the IJs. We do get 
some benefit, but we never know what equipment we are getting until after the fact...and 
often, the equipment we get does not meet our needs at all. Until this year, we were not 
able to submit for projects with the state. In the past, state agencies decided on all the IJs 
for the locals. Then, if we got anything, we had to immediately sign the money back over 
to the state. The only money we seemed to get directly through the grant pram was the 
money for the Citizen Corps programs. It has been a very discouraging process for us 
because our needs are not being addressed (or even heard). We are hopeful that will 
change this year at the state. The UASI has shown no desire to listen to or meet our 
needs at all even though we are “part of” the UASI. 
• Participation requires a significant commitment of time and work but it's benefit far 
outweighs the individual cost. 
• Benefits exceed costs. 
• The collaborative structure begun in this region more than 5 years ago has significantly 
streamlined the grants processes for planning, training, exercising, and equipment 
justifications and procurement. It requires shared effort among all disciplines and 
jurisdictions. 
• Our City, County and Fire Department believe that there is substantial value in all of the 
Homeland Security programs. Building sustainable relationships with our regional, state, 
and Federal partners is the long-term goal. 
• “my perception” is actually high, but the costs are low....not sure how you wanted that 
answered 
• The reduction of M&A from 3% to 5% is very problematic for funding administrative staff 
when grant conditions and requirements keep increasing. 
• We have 1.5 FTE's that work on HSGP programs-these positions are funded by our cities 
general fund-not directly grant supported (they also work on other DHS grants not directly 
under the HSGP umbrella.) 
• With local dollars being stretched very thin the grant program has been a way to obtain 
needed items while not over extending the budget. 
• We have hired specific grant employees, yet our workload of our regular employees has 
been raised considerably with no ability to pay them for this extra amount of activity 
(existing employees). 
• The purchase of items through grant funds does not account for the long term cost to 
maintain the same items. 
• We all participate in the grant planning meetings, writing investment justifications, etc. but 
only a select few cities seem to receive the grant funds once released... 
• Administrative burden cannot be totally paid through HSGP funding so that is part of the 
known cost when applying for funds; however we have received many items we could not 
have afforded without the HSGP funds. 
• Feds make the investments too complicated. Problem with grants is that cities and states 
are either unwilling or unable to continue/sustain program on its own. 
• Lots of staff time and effort goes into managing these grants. 
 
Local 
• Well worth the cost of participation 
• We are a large local public health department and therefore, our participation is limited to 
helping fellow cities and tribes with fulfilling their grant deliverables. 
• The use of a regional system by our State appears to have created divisions among local 
governments that were previously cooperating. 
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• the last few grant cycles have been very frustrating for local jurisdictions, that are 
basically told what we can and cannot apply for and actually have been pretty much left 
out of the process for the last two years, unless you were affiliated with a law 
enforcement agency. emergency management programs/funding have been non existent 
for local governments. All the funding has gone to the boys and their toys. 
 
Private Sector 
• We are a hospital, and many of the grants and their structure are oriented to government. 
Because of rules, we have had only minimal usage. 
• The administrative tail to government grants (record keeping, statistical reporting etc.,) 
makes most grants unattractive 
 
Other 
• We have a small staff that deals with HS issues, this staff also deals with the admin end 
of the grants. We get good return on this investment 
• We have had some outstanding training. We also received equipment, but the use of the 
equipment and the training for it's use has been sporadic and inconsistent. 
 
 
Q6. How would you rate the usefulness of current reporting tools to connect investments 
to improved capabilities within your locality? Rate the following tools: 
 
Federal 
• There are too many reporting tools, and the move to consolidate back to one reporting 
tool is going to have much complexity and probably lots of growing pains, but it is the 
right move. The State Preparedness Reports are a positive step, but becoming another 
mountainous effort requested of over-worked State EM/HS officials. BSIR had potential, 
but isn't doing the job for at least some of the preparedness grants. Programmatic 
Monitoring Visits yield some information, but a problem I see is related to lengthy 
performance periods tied to grants that are churned out every year, resulting in 
overlapping performance periods, and some confusion resulting from the many “open” 
grants going at any given time. The monitoring visits themselves, the tools used to gather 
data, the method of gathering data, all need to be improved upon. Asking a person for the 
percentage complete on a project, but not requiring solid proof to back up the assertion is 
a little loose, and the data coming from monitoring visits cannot be relied upon for 
accurate analysis connecting investments to improved capabilities. 
• The biggest problem with the reporting system is that none of them are electronically 
connected. We end up with buckets of information, with no way to analyze them to 
determine trends or easily coordinate across State and jurisdictional lines. 
• The biggest problem with the current reporting systems is that they are not electronically 
linked. They are buckets of information that can not be easily searched or analyzed; 
making trend analysis very difficult. 
 
State 
• The BSIR does not help local jurisdictions or states at all. It is purely a federal reporting 
tool that supposedly is used to provide the federal government information about how the 
funding is being allocated among disciplines and between allowable grant categories. It is 
purely a requirement for local jurisdictions, however, and they gain no benefit from it 
(SAA included). The IJs are getting easier now that we have been using a similar 
template for 3 years running (thank you, DHS). However, it is crazy that we have to do 
strategies AND state preparedness reports, and DHS does not come out with the 
guidance in a timely manner. It makes it very difficult for states to not just write things in a 
vacuum-again, these become short term, high resource products in order to get grants. 
 147
They aren't really used very well as actual strategic tools that all stakeholders have 
bought into. This is because it is almost impossible for a SAA to “sell” a local jurisdiction 
on participating when DHS is just going to change the process and make them do 
something different the next year. 
• The SHSS, IJs, and SPR are valuable tools. However, I think there needs to be better 
explanation as to how the SPR and SHSS align with and support one another. 
• We are struggling to measure improved capabilities. 
• The controls of strategies, justifications, and monitoring and the reporting done via the 
BSIR and other DHS or federal initiatives should have “very high” usefulness. This effect 
is abated by the frequent changes in information requirements or priorities du jour. 
• Often the DHS program manager would visit but had had a limited amount of information 
to share because they weren't prepared to visit the States. Typically, the program 
manager was just out of the military (not meant negatively, purely an observation) and 
had a limited background on State Government and Emergency Management. 
• Difficult to understand question 
 
UASI 
• Sudden ”new” ideas from DHS to provide updates are time consuming and are not used 
by DHS. 
• A bureaucratic tool rather than any sort of planning and policy process. 
• Unfortunately, like most grants reporting requirements take up a considerable amount of 
time. We currently have to dedicate staff specifically to manage all of these reporting 
requirements thus reducing the effectiveness of the grant programs. 
• Strategies are wonderful tools, but DHS seems to be minimizing their role (not requiring 
updates of local UASI strategies, emphasizing the SPR, etc.) 
In our state, local jurisdictions never receive or have access to the BSIR.  
Our monitoring visit was a joke.  
Our state's SPR was developed in a vacuum...they didn't engage locals and it doesn't 
reflect any local level accomplishments or priorities. Heck, they couldn't even identify the 
number of UASIs within the state (they listed four, six and seven at different places in the 
document...there are actually five). 
• The visits are key to our success with US DHS 
• We scored in the top five percent with our IJs but the funding for our UASI was 
significantly cut. It seems that there is a definite East/West Coast bias based on density 
of population, not threat assessment. 
• See comments above 
• I have not participated or seen the BSIR or had any Programmatic Monitoring Visits. I did 
not have any knowledge. 
• Strategies, like a picture on the puzzle box, give us a view of where we want to go and 
how we should look when we get there. BSIRs allow the oversight of how we are 
spending our monies to achieve the “picture on the box.”; IJs are a statement of “if I have 
this much money, this is what I can do with it.”; But since we never receive the money 
needed to complete the work cited in an IJ, we have to do it piecemeal. And, since 
situations change (e.g., impact of a natural hazard) the next IJs may not look like the past 
IJs. Visits are well-meaning, but generally do not have a positive outcome since the 
visitor has little, if any, actual awareness of the local “ground truth”; State Preparedness 
Reports seem equally out of phase, especially in a state with wide disparities in 
geography, needs, and available resources. My region is resource-rich compared to most 
of my state and consequently we are ahead of most of the state in what we are 
accomplishing in the HLS arena. We will not “mark time”; while the state tries to catch up. 
Instead, we will continue to advance and offer our processes and products as models for 
other regions in the state. 
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• Although I'm not directly involved with the administration of the grants, I do know that 
we'd be a lot better at understanding and following the model/guidance if it didn't change 
so often. 
• I believe the BSIR is a useful tool that provides our local representatives with monetary 
picture of what homeland security project dollars have allowed us to do in terms of 
preparedness and response. 
• BISR is simply filling out a lot of information that does not really capture the programs 
and plans we have in place or are a part of our strategy. 
• The IJ process doesn't accurately capture true preparedness. The IJs are written 
purposely vague to allow for manipulation and greater level of project acceptance. The 
IJs are typically written well before a call for projects is made at the local level.  
 
The BSIR is utilized for paperwork and does not accurately portray the strategy or 
implementation of the projects at the local level. Often the BSIRs are written then 
changed as funding level or focus changes mid-year.  
 
The state preparedness report has never been a useful tool in my opinion. There simply 
is not a “one report” to fit all. I would prefer to see a comparison of rural vs. urban area 
report or regional reports conducted within FEMA regions. 
• Why aren't we utilizing information from EMAP to determine our levels of capabilities now 
and where we want to be? State Preparedness Reports are only good enough if they 
know what they're doing. Sometimes the state is reluctant to take the lead when it is their 




• Overall, I find the reports utilized by DHS on these streams of funding to not be very 
reflective of reality. I believe that reporting systems like the Comprehensive Cooperative 
Agreement -- formerly utilized by FEMA -- were much better measures of program output. 
• From a local government perspective they are not considering the needs of our 
jurisdictions, but the “regional approach” is leaving many cities in the dust. How can we 
justify radiological detection vehicles, when our own personnel don't have appropriate 
levels of PPE? 
 
Other 
• The strategies are essentially disconnected at the local level, people are trying to address 
their needs and the implementation and focused areas pushed down, seem random. 
 
 
Q7. How would you rate the benefits your locality has gained from participation in the 




• As a federal agency we do have receive funding under HSGP 
• NA-to me as a federal agency. Unless you consider, all the localities my agency assists 
in enhancing HS capabilities. I think that overall, entities/jurisdictions participating in 







• It difficult to conduct an exercise when there is no plan in place to test. 
• This question is hard to apply to the coordination of the state Citizen Corps Program. 
• The HSGP grant program has brought together localities. 
 
UASI 
• Because of manpower issues, it is often difficult for us to provide staff to participate in 
regional training exercises. 
• The exercise program isn't as robust as it could be. Would like to see more emphasis 
placed on areas of weakness identified through exercises. 
• Still in first year; no benefits realized as yet. Based on award, equipment received will 
ultimately be a high rating. 
• With specific respect to exercises, we could be benefiting to a much higher degree, but 
our state constrains us to using a single vendor, won't allow us to tailor exercises to local 
needs, and basically makes it a pretty worthless endeavor. 
• We would not be where we are without the US DHS Grant Programs 
• In 2007 our UASI (City and County) expanded to include 6 additional counties. This has 
been a fatal flaw in which the funding is now shared in the name of 
Collaboration/Regionalization. This significantly hurts the efforts on the major (core) city 
and county. the 1/7th share for the highest risk jurisdictions does little in our efforts to 
protect, prevent and mitigate acts of terrorism and other all hazard events. 
• See comments above. We have gotten equipment, but frankly, we have no idea we are 
getting anything from the UASI until we are called and told to pick up the equipment. The 
equipment we get really meets a need for the city, not something that necessarily meets 
a critical need for our County. We do receive the benefit from having a very well 
equipped, trained and exercised City...but unfortunately, we have received no training, 
coordination and planning, and exercise benefit directly for county responders from the 
grant dollars received by the state or the UASI. We are hopeful that the state has made 
the necessary changes to open up their grant dollars to local entities for FY 09. 
• Obviously a quality program. 
• Training and Exercise is being under utilized. More emphasis should be made in this area 
in our region.  
• We've gained these benefits because to be successful the process requires collaboration. 
While we have a history of collaboration on issues such as fire or law mobilization, HLS 
has required us to expand our collaborative efforts to non-traditional responders including 
the private sector. For example, we modeled our Terrorism Early Warning group on the 
Los Angeles model, but early on we recognized that we needed to include more than just 
law enforcement. We expanded our TEW to include all of Public Safety and then the 
Private Sector. We've broken down many barriers to information sharing and cooperation. 
We've been collaborating like this for more than 7 years; a success of which we're very 
proud. 
• I think the training piece or component should extend further and in time I am sure it will. 
• The equipment we have purchased would not be here without the grants. The 
coordination and planning efforts have resulted in a multi-county work group that never 
worked together before and should continue to work together long after these grants are 
gone. 
• Our UASI monies are invaluable. 
 
Local 
• Equipment procurement is excellent, but planning and training fall more to local 
responsibility. 
• Overall, since the inception of a regional system within the State, our county has received 
very little to no funding. And, we are the second largest county in the state. 
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• Again, too much emphasis on the big ticket items rather than the needs of the local 




• We had $60,000 set aside for training reimbursement we were unable to use it as the 
rules were too restricted. The return on investment was a negative number. 
Other 
• We have gotten great equipment that is necessary and we would not have received 
otherwise. Training also. I think improved coordination and planning is a byproduct of the 
grant process we use in the city. 
• we are a rural county 
 
Q8. Within your locality, how would you rate the coordination between the multiple 
homeland security and emergency preparedness grant programs (DHS/FEMA, Health and 
Human Services, Center Disease Control, Agriculture, Commerce, etc.)? How would you 
rate the political, social, and financial cost to coordinate these grant programs?  
 
Federal  
• Always an area that can be improved upon. At federal levels, agencies know they have 
work to do, and I see active, engaged participation for the most part, among the 
referenced agencies. 
• High for HHS and CDC 
Low for Agriculture and Commerce 
• Not applicable 
• Coordination between the various Federal preparedness grant programs needs much 
improvement. 
• There needs to be more field support from the FEMA Regions for grants 
 
State 
• It is complete lip service that DHS and HHS/CDC have worked together. There are 
innumerable letters where one federal agency is pointing to another federal agency with 
requirements. There is NO coordination. 
• As far as I can tell, there is little coordination between the different emergency 
preparedness grant programs. Perhaps this is occurring, but not to a great degree at my 
level. In my State, the SAA is responsible for HSGP, but not ASPR/CDC, Ag or any other 
funding streams. 
• The state has broken down to seven regions. It has brought together many jurisdictions. 
 
UASI 
• Federal grants to agencies (health in particular) often create competition and duplication 
of effort. In my jurisdiction, there are 6 FTE dedicated to Emergency Preparedness in 
Health, only 2 for the legally designated agency for Emergency Management/Homeland 
Security. Silos still exist in grant programs from the federal level, creating issues at the 
local and state level. 
• Coordination has been good, however the process was more to share based upon role 
rather than define a specific policy direction or the selection of the best alternatives, much 
was discipline driven 
• Often difficult to identify the grant opportunities because of the numerous programs. 
Many times there is little coordination and administration is complex. 
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• In our County, we have tremendous cooperation from all agencies that receive grant 
dollars, both in the private sector (the hospital) and the public sector (i.e., health 
department). 
• some agencies are high others are not 
• Our homeland security personnel work with these grants in our office. I specialize in the 
UASI grant program. I did not comment. 
• Coordination between DHS/FEMA and HHS seems minimal at best. Coordination 
between DHS/FEMA and Commerce has definitely improved, especially when dealing 
with port security issues. I'm not in a position to see the connections with Agriculture. 
• I am a Committee chair for the UASI and the North Central Region of our State. The 
committee I chair has little or no interaction with the list above except that the UASI and 
NCR coordinate very well and have joint committees for the 37 target capabilities. 
• Outside of the “homeland security grants” we have limited or no information on the other 
grants (Health and Human Services, CDS, Agriculture, etc.). 
• The Office of Emergency Management is the focal point for coordinating these programs 
and we have been able to leverage our coordination with only a moderate expenditure of 
resources (staff). Our governing body and executive group have supported our initiatives. 
 
Local 
• I would like to cite a particular instance of funding provided to the State University 
Medical Center to do training and exercises. Because the stream of funding originated 
within DHHS, there was no requirement that the resulting exercise be HSEEP compliant. 
As a result, a major effort of coordination went into an activity that could not count toward 
exercise compliance through DHS because the activity was not HSEEP compliant. This 
stems from the lack (in my opinion) of a requirement for Federal Cabinet Secretaries to 
coordinate their program requirements and streams of funding. 
• There has been no coordination from my perspective as a local jurisdiction. 
 
Q9. Do you feel that you could explain how your locality has invested HSGP funds to 
improve preparedness?  
 
Federal 
• Federal agency-n/a 
• Again, as a federal agency we do not receive HSGP funding. 
• As Federal agency rep, I could give information based on reporting, but the reporting is a 
bit unwieldy to unravel and analyze. 
• These questions are not applicable to be as a Federal employee 
• Since I'm with the Federal Gov't, we do not receive funding. 
 
UASI 
• Add all hazards. 
 
Other 
I can also explain what is going on with the other disciplines, as they could for me. 
 
 
Q14. In you opinion, where should future investments be focused in order to optimize 
benefits and strengthen preparedness?  
 
Federal  




• Funding should be equitable at all levels of government. Unfortunate but true, typically 
investments have been driven by Homeland Security personnel who are well meaning 
but clearly not familiar with Regional (FEMA Regions), State or local governments. A 
large majority of DHS funding has been driven by the Law Enforcement community. It this 
was meant to be an across the board build-up of capabilities, it didn't work. 
 
UASI 
• Block grants, support for staffing at the local level, and a consistent way to assess 
preparedness. If the TCL is the standard, let's assess against it and fund local levels to 
meet them. 
• The local level is where it all happens, this is where capabilities need to be maximized. 
• medical (hospital, Public Health and EMS) preparedness in protection and recovery 
• Whether it's a terrorist attack or a natural calamity, it's all about recovery: bouncing back 
quickly and effectively. 
• It's a huge undertaking, but we all have our role in the process. I'm most disappointed 
that the regions have not taken a role in the Stafford Act disaster declaration process and 
have not been eligible for the EMPG program to sustain the regions long-term. 
• Immediate response should and prevention should be focused at local level, followed by 
regional and state level of assistance. The recovery efforts will need to be supplemented 
by the State, Regional and National partners, especially in the area of funding (FEMA 
Reimbursements) for cleanup, etc. 
• All disasters are local and immediate response is necessary to deal with any incident 
minor, major or catastrophic. Only in long term disaster recovery situations will State and 
Federal resources have an impact. It takes people and equipment to deal with a disaster 
and resources other than local cannot respond quickly enough. 
 
Local 
• I believe that prevention is not a legitimate part of the emergency management cycle. If 
the questions were phrased to offer the choices of mitigation, preparedness, response, 
and recovery -- these are the areas in which we should be investing. I believe the 
prevention of terrorist activities is a law enforcement specific responsibility. 
• It starts with the local jurisdiction, that's obvious as every disaster begins and ends with 
us. regardless of who rides in on a white horse. most local agencies are strapped 
financially and don't even have full time emergency coordinators who do the work. So 
how can we even think about going up the chain until our “house” is taken care of. 
Other 
• I am struggling with the protection answer, I'm not sure where that lies-it depends on the 
strategy and the scenario used to combat a threat or risk that is unique to a specific local. 
 
Q15. Do you feel that the HSGP would be more successful if there was:  
 
State 
• Giving better definition of what should be accomplished using the grant (outcome) or in 
some other way limiting the scope of the grant would be beneficial. 
• Regional priorities (FEMA) should be considered. The system is already like an Area 
Command, why not use the structure. 
• The state priorities can leverage resources for local priorities 
• I believe the current strategy of developing capabilities is the correct one. I think funding 





• UASI funding should bypass the state and be awarded directly to locals. States are 
obstructionist and fail to engage major urban areas in a meaningful way. We lose funds 
(M&A) and performance period to the state. In most cases, what we are doing is far more 
consistent with DHS priorities (and our own risk profile) than the state. 
• All incidents are local and the capabilities at the local level should be where we 
concentrate. 
• We must focus on the jurisdictions who are at risk. The current lack of definition of 
collaboration and regionalization must be corrected. The risk base concept of Metro 
Statistical Area (MSA) must be clarified as well. In addition, monies received for each 
investment must be know and tracked. Deviations must be validated and approved by 
DHS. SAA must be held accountable and in how they manage the program as well as 
how they spend monies (20%) received from grant, in support of the jurisdiction (UASI) 
etc. 
• The Feds need to make a commitment. The annually changing federal emphasis (LETTP 
in/out; IEDs in/out) coupled with the split in funding UASIs/States often leads to 
conflicting processes and weakened effectiveness. The ever-changing landscape (e.g., 
new UASIs or others demoted) and federal requirements are indicative of a lack of a 
clear commitment to a long-term, systematic path to achieving the goals of HLS. 
• We've invested billions in the regional system model with little accountability except at the 
state and local level. Let's focus on the regions and their long-term success. There are 
huge economies to scale and they provide for the leveraging of resources. Formalize, 
legitimize, and sustain the regional component of Homeland Security. 
• Generally, funding to support local preparedness, response , prevention, and recovery 
will support the overall preparedness of the region, state and the nation. 
• The locals understand their needs and unique situations of their communities. At the 
State and Federal level, there are too many mandates to address issues that may not be 
as critical at the local level. For example, the need to develop an evacuation plan for an 
entire city, located in the Midwest, in response to the evacuation issues surrounding the 
Florida and Louisiana hurricanes, was a waste of time and energy. There are no 
scenarios in which our city would need to evacuate, on a preplanned basis, to any event, 
yet we were all tasked to develop such a plan. 
• Much better coordination as to the purchases-duplication of effort at the regional level is 
wasting money 
• Less specification on spending. One size does not fit all. 
• priorities need to first be established at the national level using a national assessment. 
How can you prioritize without knowing where you are at for the 37 capabilities? 
• Local priorities will differ depending on location, size, population, C/I, etc. 
• The initial response to major incident rests at the local level for the first 8-12 hours. 
Regionally we are very well prepared due to our infrastructure. However recent events 
have demonstrated the personnel and equipment can and are consumed very quickly. 
Long term maintenance is an issue. 
• Basically we all need to be cognizant of each levels priorities, local, state and federal and 
need to work together to get them into sync. 
• I believe there is a dearth of sharing good ideas among the states and localities due to 
the competitive nature of the grants. 
 
Local 
• There needs to be a higher degree of working relationship existing between the SAA and 
the local governments within our state. In our case, the SAA is not the State Emergency 
Management Agency. I believe a large part of our problems stem from this issue. 
• Already stated, but it has to focus on local governments first, then maybe we wouldn’t 
need to have the State or Feds intervene if we all started from a level playing field. 
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Private Sector 
• Since disasters happen to locals help them improve capabilities this includes personnel 
 
Other 
• The system has evolved over time to be pretty reflective of what the strategic issues and 
priorities currently are. 
 
Q16. What recommendation(s) would you make for improving the capability to measure 
the impact that grant spending has made towards national preparedness?  
 
Federal 
• Developing a system that actually shows what we are getting for the dollars spent. 
 
State 
• national assessments have been done “on the fly” in the past and have yielded one-sided 
results that are not representative of the preparation given by the states. An independent, 
“no fault” assessment of results of states might encourage candor and reasonable, 
practical recommendations. 
• take out the BSIR and require a final grant close out report. Do not ADD requirements, 
but think about what is really needed and only require those. We have too many 
requirements right now and can't focus on our mission due to the administrative burden. 
• A standard, national capability and risk assessment model. The DHS Comprehensive 
Assessment System (CAS) that I have heard about sounds like it may be the answer, but 
I will not know until Summer 2009 when it is rolled out. 
• We need a systematic way to evaluate current capabilities. 
• Replace report writing with a competency based demonstration. 
 
UASI 
• establishing the standards and then provide funding to support their development! 
• Program evaluation for investments, evaluation of programs selected over those not 
selected, validation and jurisdiction for expenditures. 
• None at this time, the local jurisdictions already have enough on their plate. Some locals 
EMAs have only one or two people doing everything. Another required federal reporting 
requirement just takes more time away from getting important things done in our 
communities. 
• A national assessment is a great idea but the issue as always becomes “who”. Who will 
do it? Is there a goal other than increasing our capability and what is the goal? At what 
level are jurisdictions completely capable? 
• Honestly, this would be a waste of time and money in my opinion. I believe, based on 
what I have seen over the past five years, Whatever system is put in place will be 
effectively “gamed” by the “haves” to exclude the “have nots” I have seen so much grant 
money wasted and abused that we, who do not get much, if any grant money, so 
desperately need. Adding another level of oversight and/or reports won't help matters. Its 
the whole allocation process that needs to change, in my opinion. 
• The challenge is how to improve accountability and focus funding to achieve results. It 
seems that there as so many perspectives out there that it becomes just another battle to 
share Federal grant dollars. And yes, everyone has legitimate needs. 
• To create more reports or grant close out requirements would only create more paper 
work. The true test or measurement of success lies at the local level. Can the locals 
explain what they have purchased, why, and demonstrate how it is being used. This 
would require someone in the FEMA to get out and visit the locals-not for a monitoring 
visit, to really sit down and discuss the overall strategy and review the overall process in 
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implementing that strategy. There is no simple report that can replace this type of 
interaction. 
• How about DHS informing us what the performance measures are and how they will be 
measured. If you call and ask, you'll get a different response each time. Primarily, I've 
been told to develop my own measurement system. 
• we have been doing annual capabilities assessments for the last 4 years using a 
modified version of the DHS Pilot tool which has been tremendously helpful in measuring 
impact of the grant funding 
• Problem has been in determining best methods to measure preparedness. Utilize 
colleges and universities who have think tanks capable of coming up with additional 
forms of measurement! 
 
Local 
• The current economic situation is incurring massive, substantial personnel layoffs and 
financial cutbacks to local agencies that undermines the current reporting system. 
Address this reality. 
• I believe a narrative tool -- similar to the Comprehensive Cooperative Agreement (CCA) 
formerly utilized by FEMA would be a more suitable device with which to measure 
capability improvement. 
• the only true measure of how effective the grant funds are is when there is a crisis, I don't 
see any improvement from 911 to Katrina to today. the response priorities are like the 
flavor of the month, whatever disaster we face we focus all our attention on that until 
something else happens. Look at Ike you still had thousands that did not evacuate, 
there's been no work on a mass evacuation plan. 
 
Private Sector 
• Paper trail is too time consuming 
• have the grantee show how it has made things safer 
 
Other 
• Show up and ask to spenders or execs within the spending agency/jurisdiction to justify 
and explain how the investment improved a capability, that simple-no fancy surveys, 
national studies. 
• I do not think long reports are beneficial. Emergency Managers and First Responders do 
not have time and/or they do not want to read them. I think we need an easy to ready 
catalog/database of what resources (physical and non-physical) are available at the 
federal, state, regional, and local levels. 
• All of these are currently being performed in some manner (from our view at the regional 
level). Most of these are addressed at the state level, since they are the SSA. At the 
regional level (8 counties), we place most emphasis upon tracking our own 
accomplishments through annual objectives and the TCL process. 
 
Q17. In the FY08 and FY09 HSGP Grant Guidance, DHS has identified measuring the 
progress of investments against the National Preparedness Guidelines as a high priority. 
Which agency, jurisdiction, or partner should be responsible for measuring the impact of 
the HSGP?  
 
Federal  
• This reminds me of when someone says-hey we wrote a plan ten years ago, why are we 
still doing this? Preparedness is a constant. To spend so much time measuring the 
capabilities seems like a drain on the funding to increase capabilities, to me. All the 
money the federal government is spending on creating new tools to measure capabilities 
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and progress, so that they can report to Congress, could alternatively be spent to fund 
more emergency planners, managers, and first responders at the local and regional 
levels. That would build capabilities. 
 
State 
• Really, this should be a collaborative effort among all levels of gov't and the private and 
civil sectors. The problem is that locals rarely adopt and really are conversant in the 
National Priorities; they are 'buzz words' to securing funding. Once the funding is 
secured, the accountability for meeting those goals seems to be lost. 
• Should be a team approach from all levels of government, non-profit organizations and 
the private sector. 
 
UASI 
• every grant recipient should be required to map how the resources are applied to achieve 
the identified goals/expectations. 
• The SAA is an administrative pass through with no operational capabilities. They have no 
institutional knowledge and are politically appointed. The locals are the operational 
component who do the heavy lifting. Having said that there should be a third party 
evaluator (possibly FEMA or a Contractor) 
• The state takes 20% of all the grant funds so they should have the resources available. 
Homeland Security at the local level is our second job- we all have a first one- like being 
a district fire chief, so let the SAA and the Feds conduct meaningful assessments. 
• The problem is the measurement against the “National Preparedness Guidelines” and 
“National Strategies” which may not always coincide with the local needs or issues. 
These national guidelines should serve as exactly that-a guideline. Locally, we should 
establish what our needs are, articulate those needs in the process, and demonstrate 
how we have met those needs with the grant funds. 
 
Local 
• To the extent that the National Preparedness Goals are based on the National Planning 
Scenarios, they are faulty. The National Planning Scenarios are faulty and do not 
accurately represent the full range of threats likely to be experienced in the United States 
of America. In addition, there was extremely limited stake holder involvement in the 
creation of the National Planning Scenarios. Further, the use of scenario-based planning 
is a military convention that does not appear to be the best use of planning within the civil 
government capacity. These civil government plans should follow the functional planning 
approach -- identifying the functions common to all emergencies, and then identifying the 
roles and responsibilities of local governments to execute those functions. 
 
Other 
• See above, responsibility probably resides in DHS or FEMA 
• The state has the best perspective. We are a large non-UASI region; if we had to pick up 
many of the monitoring tasks that are done by the SSA at the state level, it would be a 
substantial admin burden. 
 
Q18. What method(s) should be used to drive future investment planning and the 
measurement of accomplishments?  
 
Federal 




• The Target Capabilities List do not account for differences in governmental levels or 
geographic areas. Investment plans should be built around a combination of risk analysis, 




• realistic risks and capabilities. Not everyone can prepare for a major hurricane-what 
about a crippling ice storm? 
• System and standard based assessment of system capabilities 
• We're currently on the right track so let's don't start over again. If we could predict the 
next disaster or attack we'd prepare for it instead of preparing for the last one. Let’s keep 
the all-hazard perspective. 
Local 
• Future measurement should not be based on the Target Capability List (TCL) because of 
the reasoning articulated in the previous answer. However, I do agree that any 
measurement should be based on capacity building. Using the flawed tool of the TCL is 
the problem that I see with this issue currently. 
 
Private Sector 
• A security risk management could show how we are safer 
 
Other 
• We need to include natural hazards in the risk based model. 
• Don't think it is one size fits all. From a strategic perspective, it should be risk-based 
processes. The scenarios should evolve from the identified threats / risk assessment 
process. Ultimately, at the discipline level, it becomes capabilities-based, dependent 
upon the identified threats and associated scenarios. 
 
Q19. At this time, do you have any additional comments you would like to share on how 
the HSGP has effected your organization/locality?  
 
State 
• Too much work for so little benefit. 
• Could have been a great program but got to one sided. For all intent and purposes we 
have two federal law enforcement agencies. The Dept. of Justice could have done the 




• There is very little oversight when the grants get to the “Regional” level. It becomes more 
of a money grab instead of giving the money/putting it towards risk, consequence and 
threat projects. The Politicians MUST stay out of it and allow the first responders/law 
enforcement/health departments decide what the need is and how to spend the money. 
• State and Federal partners need to collaborate in an open meaningful manner. Locals 
and regional practitioners are successful acquiring equipment to meet the gaps in 
capabilities through regional collaboration, it would be helpful for the State and Federal 
partners to participate as a true partner not after the fact. State does not share what they 





• I believe from an overall perspective the funds have been appropriately spent. I do 
believe that these expenditures were made from a tool based goal, rather than program 
and planning. Power and politics became the common denominator, the notion of a pure 
and rational perspective were not achieved. The planning, education, and exercise to 
improve the system were not well addressed. 
• We are doing a lot of great work with UASI and other funding. We have confidence that 
our state (SAA or otherwise) has a clue what we're up to. They're [State’s] focused on 
micro-managing every individual purchase instead of on connecting the projects to the 
bigger picture IJs and strategies. 
• The HSGP has allowed our UASI area and our State to receive equipment and training 
that previously would be unavailable due to lack of funding. The grants have also 
provided a reason to network and develop good working relationships with other 
agencies and jurisdictions throughout our State. 
• HSGP has increased our city's and regions capability more than we could have predicted. 
It is not a perfect system. It benefits our first responders every day. 
• HSGP has definitely had a huge impact on our region. It has facilitated the building and 
strengthening of partnerships that are extremely important for building an all-hazards 
capability. It has created a regionalization culture that has greatly impacted collaboration 
and cooperation in agencies that would otherwise continue to operate in a vacuum. 
• If HSGP goes away tomorrow, so do most of the people doing the bulk of the HLS work 
at state and local levels. 
• If I were making the decisions my top priority would be to build and sustain the local 
homeland security regions because there are a lot of economies to scale for local 
emergency management. I'd also include the local regions in the disaster declaration 
process, which would force the local jurisdictions to develop strong relationships for 
mitigation, preparedness, response , and recovery. 
• I believe the HSGP has been successful because of the unprecedented cooperation 
among all of the regional partners based largely on the leadership qualities of the points 
of contact and their professional staff. 
• HSGP has improved communication equipment regional and local. Better equipment and 
training and excellent exercises 
• The Terrorism Liaison Officer Position in relation to the Fusion centers needs to be 
funded and wholly include the Fire service without regard to function. 
• Significantly enhanced response equipment availability, not necessarily capabilities. 
Regional, multi-jurisdictional collaboration has increased significantly. 
• The money that has been directed to our region has enabled us to come together as a 
region, implement regional planning, training and exercising, as well as recognize the 
need to prepare for regional response to these large scale events. The workload, the 
unending rules and regulations that stand in the way of our progress (for example, 
NEPA), is frustrating and only serves to delay our preparedness efforts. 
• Without a capabilities assessment, the locals submit IJs for their own pet projects versus 
the needs of the region for building capabilities. 
• As a UASI, the regional focus has been tremendously helpful in building capability 
• Government and coordination do not seem to go hand in hand. The government sector 
has a lot to learn in putting together business cases to justify why grant funding is needed 
and what it will be used for. Many government people could use a class in just educating 
them about strategic planning, business case justification and project management! 
• Our municipality has been very fortunate in receiving HS grants. We have been equally 
fortunate to be part of a “enlightened” regional group of governments where solid 
strategies have been developed and our grants have been wisely used for the benefit of 





• Provided funding to increase capabilities at the local level. 
• We appreciate the funds, but has it improved our level of preparedness, not really, we 
have a few more toys to play with, but the responsibility of preparedness and planning 
falls on me as the emergency manager and until the recent 5.4 earthquake my position 
was slated for layoff, so emergency managers have all the responsibility but no authority 
when it comes to grants and most of the time are not even invited to the party even 
though we're responsible for planning it and making sure everyone has a good time!! 
 
Private Sector 
• an old song... Allow locals to hire personnel not just buy things would go a long way. 
 
Other 
• I would like my discipline to reflect both Fire and Emergency Medical Services. 
• From a regional basis, we have substantially improved our preparedness across all 
response disciplines. However, this process isn't a sprint, but is a marathon. The 
challenge is to develop a regional preparedness system / organization that will survive 
over time. 
• This county has received no HSGP funding. 
 
Q20. Any additional thoughts or recommendations that could improve the capability to 
measure the impact that the HSGP has made on preparedness?  
 
Federal 
• Give all this Gap Analysis, Cost to Capabilities stuff a rest, or at least concentrate the 
efforts in areas that local and State governments have a stake in identifying. Perform the 
monitoring, require the reporting and conduct grant processes as they are currently 
prescribed, and we could get some good data for analysis. Why are we so concerned 
with measuring the impact from HSGP? It has improved things, but we are never there 
because there is only a second in time, and you are on to the next there the next second 
in time. Communicate, coordinate, allow State and Local Governments flexibility in their 
approach to use of funding, but with good monitoring to assure compliance with grant 
regulations. Have dialogue to identify problems early. Respect the views of the local and 
state government EM/HS community. 
 
State 
• A national standard that does not change greatly over time-something that, after a few 
years, you can go back and measure progress. I have heard countless stories of 
numerous assessments done in my State, and every few years they change. Sometime 
due to change in front-line personnel or senior leadership; sometimes because what is 
being done at the state level is replaced with a federal mandate. Regardless, it seems to 
create a moving target mentality that is very frustrating. 
• Since the 70's behavioral scientist have told us that demonstrating a competent is the 
best method for evaluating a capability. 
 
UASI 
• If there are model deployments in the Nation, these models should be shared throughout 
the Nation as examples of proven, measured, capability improvements. 
• Program evaluation component to look at how the funds were spent and their impact in 
terms of overall preparedness. 
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• Start small...pick one or two UASIs that are ready for this and let them develop a 
report...perhaps even a mini-SPR to demonstrate what evaluation of a program of this 
magnitude can look like. 
• The grant guidance (UASI) must be changed to ensure that the funding received goes to 
the major jurisdiction (s) it was intended for. While collaboration is a must. simply 
because you are a neighbor should not mean that you should have equal share in the 
funding and have equal say in how another jurisdiction spends it funding to protect, 
prevent and respond to its threats. 
• I didn't think I would ever admit this, but TOPOFF 4 was perhaps the best test of the 
HSGP capability and partnership that we could ever hope for. Those that played hard in 
our community, received tenfold the benefit than those that did not. Those that did well, 
do so due to an understanding of the response and recovery mechanism provided by the 
HSGP experience. 
• The Feds have appeared to have passed off a big part of the homeland defense mission 
to states and locals. If indeed the homeland defense mission is now part of states and 
locals responsibilities, then it is incumbent on the Feds to fund this mission at a level 
commensurate with the needs of the country and for a long-term duration (decades). 
• Emergency managers of larger municipalities and regional coordinators must take a 
greater role in the program. The states must provide funding for additional staff to 
evaluate-audit the program. 
• Measures to ensure gaps identified in the HSGP requests, training or exercises are 
completed prior to eligibility to apply for future grants. 
• Yes, have one consistent methodology and message. 
• DHS needs to pick a tool and move forward with it. They also need to decide on what the 
“targets” are that we are shooting for. Without some sort of standardized assessment 
tool, we will never be able to answer the fundamental questions: How prepared are we? 
How prepared do we need to be? And how do we fill the gap? 
• Yes, start using methods of community outreach and action from the community to show 
that they are prepared. How about a tax write-off for purchasing an emergency kit and 
plan? 




• Capabilities should be coordinated with a more regional approach rather than small local 
agencies duplicating efforts. 
Other 
• You are asking some good questions. I'm a Program Manager for an 8-county regional 
task force in South Central region of our state.  
• My understanding is the program has had a measureable impact on most jurisdictions 
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